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 It was my objective to understand whether accurate and inaccurate 
eyewitnesses could be distinguished by their decision-making during a 
sequential-lineup. All eyewitnesses, except in Study 6, were shown a video-
taped crime and presented with sequential lineups. 
 Study 1 was designed to identify the decision processes of eyewitnesses. 
While viewing a culprit-present lineup, witnesses were asked to “think aloud” 
and later describe in writing their thoughts as they reached a decision for each 
photograph; five decision process statements were then created or selected 
from previous research. In Study 2, the main dependent measure asked 
eyewitnesses to endorse all applicable decision process statements from Study 
1. Factor analysis revealed a simple matching strategy containing three decision 
processes and a deliberative strategy with four decision processes. Accurate 
eyewitnesses were significantly associated with the simple matching strategy, 
and inaccurate eyewitnesses with the deliberative strategy.  
 An automatic recognition statement was added to the decision process 
statements. Study 3 looked at inaccurate identifications in culprit-absent lineups 
and found that the decision processes of inaccurate eyewitnesses did not differ 
regardless of having selected an innocent suspect replacement or a known 
  
  
innocent picture. Study 4a and 4b successfully replicated previous findings using a 
new set of experimental materials with different witness viewing conditions. 
 Study 5 demonstrated that accuracy rates could not be predictably 
influenced via the manipulation of witness decision processes. Witnesses forced 
to use deliberative decision processes were not subsequently less accurate. 
Witnesses forced to use simple matching and automatic processes were also not 
subsequently more accurate. Study 6 participants were asked to postdict 
witness accuracy. They were given previous eyewitness identification judgment 
forms and some were informed about the decision strategies found to be 
indicative of accuracy and some were not. Unexpectedly, informed participants 
did not outperform the uninformed or perform better than chance. 
 Studies 7 and 8 tested whether logical modifications to the sequential 
procedure would affect accuracy. In Study 7, only culprit-present lineups were 
conducted and seeing it twice before making any identification (no-ID-first-
view) presentation produced significantly greater accuracy than the traditional 
presentation. Study 8 served as a replication and extension, using both culprit-
present and culprit-absent lineups. The superiority of the no-ID-first view 
condition did not reach significance. The implications of Studies 1-8 for 
memory, face recognition and the legal system are discussed.
  
  
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
 Deanna Dace Caputo, born August 31st, 1977 in Santa Monica, California, 
grew up in Canyon Country, California, the daughter of John and Michelle Caputo, 
with one older brother, John, who has a five year old daughter Dylana and 
received a Bachelor’s Degree in Information Technology.  Deanna graduated from 
Canyon High in 1995, as one of the top 10 students in her class, and was very active 
in Concert Choir and Madrigals. She obtained her Bachelors of Science Degree, 
Magna Cum Laude, from Santa Clara University in June 1999, majoring in 
Psychology with a minor in Spanish. Deanna did active psychological research for 
all four years at Santa Clara under the direction of Dr. Thomas Plante. In her senior 
year, she took a Social Psychology course from Dr. Jerry Burger, which drew her 
interest away from clinical psychology and toward understanding the “average” 
person. In 1999, Deanna entered the Ph.D. program in the Department of 
Psychology at Cornell University, where she began her studies of human judgment 
and decision-making. In her second year, she began conducting research in 
psychology and law with Dr. David Dunning. Deanna had found her “niche” in 
studying the applied aspects of social psychology in legal settings, and began 
extensive research on eyewitness identifications. She received her Ph.D. in Social 
and Personality Psychology in August of 2004.   
 When not in the lab, Deanna was most passionate about her singing. She 
sang as a soprano in a local community choir, the Out Loud Chorus, for four great 
years. In October 2002, she began vocal training with Brother Shawn Benedict, the 
musical director of Out Loud Chorus. Deanna made her solo debut on March, 19th, 
2003, in Festival of Voices 2003, at the Historic State Theatre in downtown Ithaca. 
She also soloed in Festival of Voices 2004. When not singing, she enjoyed spending 
time at Stewart Park, Ithaca Falls, or O’Leary’s Irish Pub with friends. 
  iii
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
this  is dedicated to my family: 
Mom, Dad, John, Dylana, Grams, Grandpa, Binky, Wende, & Michelle 
  iv
  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 I would like to thank the members of my committee- Tom Gilovich and 
Shelly Campo- for their caring, support and the invaluable research skills they 
taught me. I would like to especially thank my committee Chairperson, David 
Dunning, for his guidance in helping me find research that would “get me up in 
the morning.” He encouraged me to explore the many applied aspects of social 
psychology and use my skills were I felt they were needed. Most of all I would like 
to thank Dave for sparking my interest in psychology and law and imparting in me 
his enthusiasm for psychological research. I also want to thank Jan Talbot for being 
such a great collaborator and friend. 
 I have to give special thanks to my Eyewitness Identification Research Team, to 
whom I owe so much of my success. Natalie, Kento, Andrea, Evelyn, Jennifer, 
Elyse, Alyssa, and Jeremy - each one of you made a contribution to this work 
beyond that required. Also, thank you to the department staff: Cindy, Lisa, Pam, 
and Linda, my time here would not have been as easy without the laughs, cookies, 
and hugs.  I would also like to thank my parents, family, and friends for their help 
and support for the last 5 years. Mom, you are always there when I need you, my 
perfect fan! Dad, thank you for instilling in me the drive to succeed and do my very 
best at everything, it all started with McDonald’s! Grams, thank you for the great 
long distance conversations and the time we spent together on my visits home. You 
are truly one of my best friends and I cherish that. John, thank you for all your 
technical support through the years and sharing with me your beautiful daughter! 
Last, but definitely not least, the girlfriends. Thank you Reka, Jessie, and Monica 
for each making a part of my time at Cornell the best it could be. Michelle, we have 
been friends since we were 12 and you will always be with me where ever I ago, 
distance will never keep us apart.    
  v
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH                        iii 
DEDICATION                          iv 
ACKNOWLEDMENTS                          v 
LIST OF TABLES                         vii 
LIST OF FIGURES                           x 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION                        1 
CHAPTER TWO:    EXPLORING DECISION PROCESSES                   29 
CHAPTER THREE:  DEFINING DECISION PROCESSSES                              42 
CHAPTER FOUR:    DECISION STRATEGIES AND TARGET ABSENT               
                    LINEUPS                      54 
CHAPTER FIVE:   REPLICATION OF ACCURACY AND DECISION              
   STRATEGIES USING NEW CRIME STIMULI                     72 
CHAPTER SIX: ACCURACY AND SIMPLE MATCHING VERSUS  
   DELIBERATIVE THOUGHT STRATEGIES                  86 
CHAPTER SEVEN: POSTDICTING EYEWITNESS ACCURACY                  95 
CHAPTER EIGHT: MODIFYING SEQUENTIAL LINEUP        
              PRESENTATIONS                                                                105 
CHAPTER NINE:  REPLICATION OF ACCURACY AND LINEUP     
               PRESENTATION MODIFICATIONS                      122 
CHAPTER TEN:  GENERAL DISCUSSION                                         132 
    
APPENDICES                                                                                                              163 
REFERENCES                       166  
  vi
  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.  Percent of Written Decision Processes Statements made 
  by Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses in Open-Ended  
  Question              37 
 
Table 2.  Final Statements Designed or Selected to Capture Eyewitness  
  Decision Processes when Viewing Sequential Lineups       39 
 
Table 3.  Mean Percentages of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses  
  Endorsing Photograph Influence Statements        40 
 
Table 4.  Mean Percentages of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
  Endorsing Individual Decision Processes Statements       46 
 
Table 5a.  Factor Analysis Loadings            48  
 
Table 5b. Factor Analysis Components          49 
 
Table 6. Mean Number of Simple Matching and Deliberative  
  Thought Responses Endorsed by Accurate and Inaccurate  
  Eyewitnesses                                                                                         51 
   
Table 7.  Mean Percentages of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
  Endorsing Individual Decision Processes Statements                  58 
 
Table 8.  Mean Number of Simple Matching, Deliberative Thought,  
  and Automatic Responses Endorsed by Accurate and  
  vii
  
  Inaccurate Eyewitnesses                         60 
 
Table 9. Mean Percentages of Target Present and Target Absent  
  Inaccurate Eyewitnesses Endorsing Individual Decision  
  Processes Statements                      62 
 
Table 10. Mean Percentages of Target Present and Target Absent  
  Inaccurate Eyewitnesses from Studies 2 and 3 Endorsing  
  Individual Decision Processes Statements        63 
 
Table 11.    Mean Percentages of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses  
  Endorsing Individual Decision Processes Statements from  
  Study 2 and 3 Collapsed           65 
 
Table 12.  Mean Number of Simple Matching, Deliberative Thought,  
  and Automatic Responses Endorsed by Accurate and  
  Inaccurate Eyewitnesses from Studies 2 and 3 Collapsed              67 
 
Table 13.    Mean Percentages of Target Present and Target Absent  
  Inaccurate Eyewitnesses Endorsing Individual Decision  
  Processes Statements                                  79 
 
Table 14.    Mean Percentages of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses  
  Endorsing Individual Decision Processes Statements from  
  Collapsed Data                                                                                      80 
 
Table 15.  Mean Number of Simple Matching and Deliberative  
  Thought Responses Endorsed by Accurate and Inaccurate  
  Eyewitnesses from Collapsed Data                                                    82 
  viii
  
Table 16.  Identification Decisions (%) and Diagnosticity Ratios  
  Resulting from Control, “Create an Image” and “Think Back” 
  Lineup Strategies                       92 
 
Table 17. Accuracy Rates (%) of Informed and Uninformed Conditions     99 
 
Table 18.   Weight Given to Witness Questionnaire Responses by 
  Judges Assessing Accuracy of Identification                                  100 
 
Table 19.   Accuracy Rates (%) of Verbally Informed, Written Informed  
  and Uninformed Conditions                                                             101 
 
Table 20.   Weight Given to Witness Questionnaire Responses by  
  Verbally Informed, Written Informed, and Uninformed  
  Judges Assessing Accuracy of Identification                                  102 
 
Table 21. Identification Decisions (%) and Diagnosticity Ratios  
  Resulting from ONCE, MULTIPLE, and NoID Sequential  
  Lineup Procedures                                                                            118 
 
Table 22. Identification Decisions (%) and Diagnosticity Ratios  
  Resulting from ONCE, MULTIPLE, and NoID Sequential 
  Lineup Procedures                                                                              128 
  ix
  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.   Witness Accuracy Rates (%) between “Think Back”       
  and Control Conditions                                                                       89 
 
Figure 2.   Witness Accuracy Rates (%) between “Create an  
  Image” and Control Conditions                                                         90 
 
Figure 3.  Mean Eyewitness Identification Judgments across  
  Three  Conditions                                                                               114 
 
Figure 4.  Mean Confidence of Accurate and Inaccurate  
  Eyewitnesses Across Three Presentation Conditions                   116 
 
Figure 5.  Mean Eyewitness Identification Accuracy (%) Across  
  Three  Presentation Conditions                                                       125 
 
Figure 6.  Mean Confidence of Accurate and Inaccurate  
  Eyewitnesses Across Three Presentation Condition                     126
  x
 CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “A lineup is a legally recognized police investigation procedure in which 
a suspect is embedded among distractors. The eyewitness’s task is to decide 
whether or not the culprit in question is in the lineup and, if so, which person is 
the culprit” (Wells & Luus, 1990, p.107). The process seems simple and the 
outcome convincing.  Eyewitness evidence is “direct” evidence of guilt. Even 
fingerprints are only given status as circumstantial (indirect) evidence because 
they do not tell the story of what exactly someone was doing or more 
importantly when. Therefore, eyewitness evidence is given a powerful status in 
criminal justice proceedings. According to a survey of district attorneys 
nationwide, it was estimated that over 77,000 Americans become criminal 
defendants each year after being identified from lineups or photospreads. That 
is 200 people per day (Goldstein, Chance, & Schneller, 1989).  
 However, with each new publication eyewitness identification 
researchers point out that what appears to be a simple identification is, in fact, 
the result of a series of complex and potentially unreliable social and cognitive 
events that began several months earlier when the event was originally 
witnessed and an identification was made (Wells, Seelau, Rydell & Luus, 1994). 
Lineup procedures play an important role in the identification experience, and 
the decision processes of eyewitnesses viewing simultaneous lineups (i.e., 
seeing all six lineup pictures at one time) has been the topic of an entire field of 
research.  These data show that the simultaneous lineup can produce a false 
identification rate of up to 30% and that people making these false 
identifications tend to use a “process of elimination” strategy in determining 
which photograph to select (Lindsay & Wells, 1985; Dunning & Stern, 1994). In 
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order to improve the situation, eyewitness researchers Lindsay and Wells 
designed a lineup procedure that would make it virtually impossible for 
witnesses to make an identification through a process of elimination strategy 
(Lindsay & Wells, 1985). This sequential lineup (i.e., viewing one lineup 
photograph at a time) reduces false identifications to approximately 17%, and is 
used by the entire State of New Jersey, jurisdictions in many other States, and in 
parts of Canada. 
 To date, there is very little known about the decision processes of 
eyewitnesses viewing sequential lineup procedures. Can accurate and 
inaccurate eyewitnesses viewing sequential lineups be distinguished by their 
decision-making strategies? If so, can this information be used to decrease false 
identification while maintaining accuracy? Or, can decision processes be used 
to predict witness accuracy after the fact? This series of experiments intended to 
explore these and related questions concerning eyewitness accuracy and police 
lineup procedures, and thereby add to a growing body of knowledge that will 
help the criminal justice system better protect innocent suspects.  
 
The Eyewitness Problem 
Eyewitness researchers function under the assumption that there is an 
“eyewitness identification problem” (Wells, 1993). In their eyes, this makes the 
legal system’s dependence on eyewitnesses problematic. There are a number of 
observations that warrant such an assumption. First, many experimental 
studies using crime simulations have found high rates of false identifications 
(e.g., Brigham & Cairns, 1988; Culter, Penrod, & Martens, 1987a; Leippe, Wells, 
& Ostrom, 1978; Lindsay, 1986; Lindsay & Wells, 1980, 1985; Loftus & Greene, 
1980; Malpass & Devine, 1981; Wells, 1984; Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1986; 
Wells & Leippe, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979; and many more). 
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These studies can range from a 12% false identification rate (Leippe, Wells, & 
Ostrom, 1978) to a 70% false identification rate (Lindsay and Wells, 1980). 
Indeed, “after years of experiments, most of us [researchers] must admit that 
we are still impressed with the extent to which eyewitness reliability is well 
below what we intuitively expected it to be” (Wells, 1980, p. 238). The situation 
has not improved much since this statement in 1980; experiments continue to 
produce low numbers of total identifications and high rates of false 
identifications even using crime simulations with clear and extended views of 
the perpetrator.  
A second reason to assume a problem with identifications is that there is 
‘sincerity’ to most of the false identifications observed in experiments; 
eyewitnesses actually seem to believe that their false identifications are in fact 
accurate identifications. This is evidenced by the fact that eyewitness 
participants often have high subjective confidence in their identifications even 
when they are inaccurate (Luus & Wells, 1994; Wells & Murray, 1983).  
The third observation warranting the study of the eyewitness 
identification problem is that analyses of documented cases of wrongful 
conviction have shown that the single largest factor leading to false convictions 
has been eyewitness error. For example, in 1986 Huff and colleagues estimated 
that 60% of 500 eyewitness identification cases they had documented were 
wrongful convictions (convictions later set aside because of confession or new 
evidence) (Huff, Ratner, & Sagarin, 1986). If this type of archival analysis was 
done today, the numbers would not likely look more encouraging since 
virtually no changes have been made to how police handle eyewitness 
identification evidence.  
The most compelling evidence for a problem comes from a closer look at 
recent DNA exonerations. As of the time of this writing, postconviction DNA 
  
  4
testing has freed 143 people who were convicted by juries of their peers of 
crimes that they did not commit (The Innocence Project, 2004). A study of the 
first 62 DNA exoneration cases revealed that mistaken eyewitness 
identifications were the primary evidence in 52 of 62 (84%) cases involving a 
total of 77 confident but mistaken eyewitnesses (Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 
2000). Those who were exonerated had served an average of 10 years in prison, 
and 8 people were sentenced to death before being found innocent. The 
difficulty in relying on DNA evidence to “catch” human mistakes is that the 
vast majority of perpetrators in assaults and murders, and virtually all 
robberies, drive by shootings, and other major crimes do not leave behind 
definitive biological trace evidence that can show that an eyewitness was 
mistaken. “Misidentifications create a double horror: the wrong person is 
devastated by this personal tragedy, and the real criminal is still out on the 
streets, probably committing further crimes” (Loftus, 1993, p. 550). DNA 
exonerations do not solve the problem; they only prove its existence and 
illuminate the need for reform. 
 These observations seem to verify the existence of an eyewitness 
problem and in the course of a criminal trial eyewitness identification testimony 
can provide compelling evidence against a defendant. However, it is not 
appropriate to conclude from the experimental findings and DNA revelations 
that eyewitnesses are inherently unreliable. What these data internally reveal is 
that critical variables affect the rise and fall of eyewitness errors (Wells, Wright, & 
Bradfield, 1999). Eyewitness researchers have identified multiple sources of 
error, three of which are the inherent limits of the cognitive system (memory), 
the motives and assumptions that eyewitnesses bring to the process, and the 
methods of the legal system used to obtain eyewitness evidence (Seelau & 
Wells, 1995). These will be discussed in detail in later sections of this chapter. 
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The Guide for Eyewitness Evidence  
 The DNA-based exonerations were revealed in tandem with the 
maturation of the eyewitness literature, which was prepared with policy 
statements and practical solutions to the problems exposed. A set of 
recommendations put together by a collaboration of active eyewitness 
researchers, often referred to as “the white paper,” made some specific 
recommendations for how to improve lineup processes to decrease inaccuracies 
(Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe, 1998). This pivotal 
paper highlighted the DNA findings and displayed a large amount of research 
evidence in support of practical police modifications, so much so that it caught 
the eye of Attorney General Janet Reno. Over a one-year period 34 police 
officers, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and psychologists met at the National 
Institute of Justice to put together The Guide for law enforcement with 
recommendations for how to properly handle all elements of eyewitness 
evidence, particularly identifications (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness 
Evidence, 1999). Because a multi-disciplinary group created the handbook, 
compromises had to be made, and not all of the researchers’ recommendations 
were included in the final product, mostly due to legal policy concerns of 
prosecutors. These concerns will be discussed in later sections. 
 One of the main underlying rationales for distributing The Guide was to 
reduce inaccuracies in eyewitness identification at the front line (i.e., in police 
stations), instead of relying on the rest of the judicial system to identify bad 
identifications after the fact. Is this not one of the central jobs of the criminal 
justice system, protecting innocent suspects? Jurors are heavily persuaded by 
eyewitness evidence, and they are unable to distinguish between accuracy and 
inaccuracy. By the time an eyewitness testifies at trial, after being positively 
reinforced and coached by police and lawyers, he or she is so confident in the 
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identification that jurors have difficulty taking into consideration more valuable 
indicators of eyewitness accuracy (i.e., details of viewing conditions, decision 
processes, etc.).  In addition, even when the most egregiously biased lineup 
procedures are used, judges almost never suppress identification evidence 
(Foxhall, 2000). A nationwide survey of prosecutors and law officers found that 
they were content with the current status quo, with respect to judges’ handling 
of eyewitness evidence (Brigham & WolfsKeil, 1983). For example, 68% of 
officers and 87% of prosecutors declared that judges place the “right amount” 
of emphasis on eyewitness evidence. In an adversarial judicial process it is no 
surprise that 89% of defense attorneys disagreed with the amount of power an 
identification carries in the courtroom. Thus, with jurors’ inability to 
distinguish eyewitness accuracy and the courts simultaneous emphasis on it, 
there might be a better chance of changing police practices than there is of 
preventing injustice in the courtroom.  
 Police seek to convict the guilty but not the innocent. From a best-
practices perspective, anything that could improve that outcome should be 
recommended (Levi & Lindsay, 200). A “best practice” conceptualization or 
framework was born out of a response to the fact that The Guide, put out by the 
US Department of Justice, did not include all of the recommended lineup 
procedures that researchers have studied and offered as improvements. One 
recommendation made by psychologists that was discussed but not adequately 
endorsed was the sequential lineup procedure. At the time that The Guide was 
published, the police officers, lawyers, and policy makers in the working group 
felt that not enough was known about the sequential lineup to make it a central 
recommendation. Instead, The Guide focused lineup recommendations on issues 
surrounding the simultaneous lineup procedure, an area where we do know a 
lot about eyewitness behavior.   
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Face Recognition, Face Encoding, and Decision Processes 
 The face recognition research contributes the best theoretical foundation 
for better understanding eyewitness decision processes. Humans are 
exceptionally good when it comes to recognizing faces. However, a distinction 
has been made in the literature between “recognizing” and “identifying” 
(Mandler, 1980). Recognizing that something is familiar is a relatively quick 
process that involves determining whether there is a match between a stimulus 
and a memory trace or representation. Thus, when a face is seen it has to 
surpass a “familiarity” threshold before it is categorized by witnesses as “old.” 
On the other hand, identifying is a slow and analytical process; contextual 
information regarding the perception and encoding of the stimulus is 
important. Consequently, it is more deliberative than recognizing.  
 An eyewitness in a lineup task has to determine whether a face was seen 
at the crime or somewhere else. Mandler’s research shows that the critical 
difference between a recognition response and an identification response in this 
situation is the recall and analysis of the contextual information that is 
necessary for an identification response. Confusion on the part of an eyewitness 
between recognition and identification may explain why some witnesses make 
inaccurate identifications. This suggests that police officers are really looking 
for eyewitnesses to recognize someone out of a lineup as “familiar” by 
matching their memory of the culprit with each suspects’ photograph. In a 
relevant extension of his discussion of recognition and identification, Mandler 
(1991) proposed a “dual process theory” that identified two routes of facial 
recognition. The automatic route, where one can recognize a face via an 
automatic experience of familiarity. And the controlled route, where 
recognition results from a more analytical and deliberate process that requires 
significant cognitive effort. This theory suggests that the task of identifying may 
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lead to greater inaccuracy if there is incorrect recall of the contextual 
information and these eyewitnesses will behave more analytically in trying to 
identify someone from the lineup. 
 The face recognition research suggested to eyewitness researchers that 
they needed to force eyewitnesses away from using controlled processing, such 
as deductive reasoning, to determine who the police suspect. Instead, 
researchers needed to ensure that lineups were a test of automatic recognition 
memory and not a test of recall. In other words, the goal of the researchers was 
to learn something from the witness’s memory that they were not able to 
articulate in verbal recall of a description. This required an understanding of 
how faces are encoded and stored.  
 It has been empirically shown that faces are stored in memory primarily 
as whole configural images, even though they are encoded in terms of their 
constituent features (Davies, 1981; Klatzky, 1986).  If faces are stored in a 
holistic manner, then good recognition would involve a one-to-one match 
between the entire stored image and the external stimulus. Thus, eyewitness 
researchers concurred that recognition is likely to be a basically automatic and 
effortless process requiring a holistic image, whereas an analytic representation 
would be best for recall (Wells & Turtle 1986). However, what happens when 
the stored image is incomplete or not clear enough? The matching between the 
stored image and the target would be unsuccessful.  Would this lead the 
memory to try to rebuild the holistic image? The memory could access the 
encoded constituent features but would need more information to fill in the 
gaps. This may be where some eyewitnesses encounter difficulties. No longer 
able to “recognize” the culprit, they strive to “identify” him somehow. When 
looking at the photographs in a lineup, witnesses with incomplete memories 
might extract the missing facial features from the other lineup pictures. The 
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difficulty of trying to identify someone out of a lineup when the memory trace 
is not complete is likely to lead to relative judgment processing (i.e., a 
comparison of photographs in order to fill in the gaps). This process would 
require significant cognitive effort and would be very deliberative.  
 The face recognition and encoding literature made clear predictions for 
what good recognitions should look like and the process for poor identifications 
was inferred. Do these differences (i.e., automatic “recognizing” versus 
controlled “identifying”) clearly differentiate accurate and inaccurate 
eyewitnesses viewing simultaneous lineups? And will these same theoretical 
predictions apply to the newer sequential lineup procedure? 
 
What We Know About Eyewitness Decision Making 
 Once a lineup is fairly composed, the eyewitness is called to the police 
station, given instructions, and either shown a photospread of pictures or is 
taken into a room with a one-way mirror and shown a corporeal (i.e., live) 
lineup. The lineup presentation traditionally used in photospreads or live 
lineups is a simultaneous lineup procedure that presents the eyewitnesses with 
all lineup members (usually 6 or 8) at once. Understanding the limitations of the 
traditional simultaneous lineup procedure necessitates a discussion of 
eyewitness motivations.  
  Eyewitnesses often conclude or presume that if police have gone 
through all the trouble to put together a lineup, then one of the lineup members 
must be the culprit (Sporer, 1993). This can result in a response bias, such that 
witnesses feel they must make a choice from a lineup regardless of the quality 
of their recollections of the offender, or their ability to distinguish the offender 
from the lineup distractors. Support for a response bias has been found by 
looking at “choosing” as a decision problem which is influenced by factors 
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related to witnesses’ decision criterion (Malpass & Devine, 1981). Studies have 
found choosing rates to be quite high. One study found that 82% of participants 
identified a lineup member, and they concluded that this high rate might reflect 
an “a priori belief” that the lineup contains the perpetrator (Culter, Penrod, & 
Martens, 1987b). This assumption incites the use of a judgmental strategy in 
which witnesses identify the lineup member who best resembles their memory 
of the perpetrator.  This has been called a “relative judgment process” (Lindsay 
& Wells, 1985).     
 The relative judgment process, or assumption, is when eyewitnesses choose 
the lineup member who most looks like the culprit relative to the other lineup 
members. Of course, this decision criterion works well and produces a high rate 
of identifications when the culprit is in the lineup; however, when the culprit is 
absent any decision is an error and could put an innocent suspect in jeopardy. 
The problem is more evident with the realization that there is always someone 
who looks more like the offender than the other members in a lineup situation, 
and if an innocent suspect is brought in for a lineup it is extremely likely that he 
will most resemble the actual culprit (otherwise he might never have been 
brought into the investigation). Thus, eyewitnesses who do not entertain the 
possibility that the culprit is not in the lineup will always make a choice and 
this assumption will demand that eyewitnesses use deliberative cognitive 
processes, controlled processing.  
 The use of relative judgments has been contrasted to absolute judgments in 
which the eyewitnesses compare each lineup member to their memory of the 
culprit and use a certain criterion threshold that determines whether the match 
is close enough to warrant selecting a lineup member (Wells, et al., 1998; 
Dunning & Stern, 1994; Lindsay & Wells, 1985). This judgment strategy differs 
from the relative judgment strategy in that even if the assumption of the culprit 
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being present is maintained, the strategy entails that the person has set a 
threshold of recognition that is required before a selection will be made. 
Therefore, an identification will only be made if the absolute criterion is met 
between memory and an individual photograph; no comparison of lineup 
photographs to each other is required or necessary for the absolute judgment 
strategy. There is also no “closest match,” the only match is a picture that 
reaches the identification threshold. This is consistent with a one-to-one face 
recognition match, automatic processing.  
 The easiest way to think about the difference between the two decision 
criteria is to understand the question that is asked as an eyewitness approaches 
the lineup pictures. The absolute judgment criterion answers the question “Is 
this the perpetrator or not?” for each lineup photograph. In contrast, the 
relative judgment process stipulates the question “Is this person more similar to 
the perpetrator than the other lineup members?” for each lineup photograph.   
 The real question then remained, could relative or absolute judgment 
processing explain eyewitness accuracy differences? In 1994, Dunning and 
Stern conducted studies looking at the decision processes of witnesses as they 
looked at simultaneous lineups. They found that inaccurate eyewitnesses 
viewing simultaneous lineups were most likely to use relative judgment 
processes, and more particularly, a process of elimination strategy of comparing 
the photos to each other, narrowing down the choices, and selecting a photo 
from those remaining. In contrast, they found that accurate eyewitnesses were 
most likely to indicate that it was difficult to explain why, but that the culprit’s 
photograph just “popped out” at them, or that they just “recognized” him. 
These descriptions mapped onto a more absolute judgment, in which one 
lineup photograph is the correct one without further explanation of why.   
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 Dunning and Stern (1994) also predicted and demonstrated that these 
indicators of accuracy and inaccuracy directly reflected the amount of cognitive 
effort expended by eyewitnesses. They found that eyewitnesses who described 
their decision-making as absolute and automatic (e.g., the photograph “popped 
out” at me) were more likely to make accurate identifications. In contrast, they 
found that eyewitnesses who reported using a “process of elimination 
strategy,” indicated having difficulty picking the exact person, and depended 
heavily on the other lineup photographs were clearly using relative judgment 
and controlled processing. Indeed, people using these strategies were 
significantly more likely to make false identifications. Although these witnesses 
felt certain that the culprit must be in the lineup, they were just not sure which 
one he was. This more deliberative and thoughtful process did not improve 
their chances of selecting the correct photograph.  
 This type of decision processes research answered many questions about 
witness decision-making in simultaneous lineup situations. In addition, the 
findings were consistent with face recognition and face encoding theories. 
Eyewitness accuracy was determined by whether witnesses used automatic or 
controlled processes, and this dichotomy was evident in witnesses’ descriptions 
of their own thought processes. Would this dichotomy also be true for 
sequential lineup eyewitnesses? If not, would the race recognition research shed 
light onto any deviations from simultaneous lineup decision-making?  
 
The Sequential Lineup 
 In 1985, almost 20 years ago, Lindsay and Wells devised an alternative 
lineup format using the relative judgment conceptualization that would reduce 
the ability of eyewitnesses to rely on relative judgments. In the sequential lineup 
presentation, the eyewitness is presented with one lineup member (photo or live) 
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at a time, and she must decide for each person whether or not that person is the 
perpetrator before being allowed to view the next person. Although the 
eyewitness could decide when viewing one person that they are a relatively 
better match to the perpetrator than the previous person, the eyewitness cannot 
be sure that the next person (not yet viewed) will not look even more like the 
perpetrator. Researchers reasoned that a sequential procedure would disable 
the ease of relative judgments and induce eyewitness to use a more absolute 
criterion. Lindsay and Wells (1985) designed a study comparing sequential and 
simultaneous presentations and found that both produced almost identical 
correct identification rates (i.e., culprit present lineup). Yet the false 
identification rate (i.e., culprit absent lineup) with the simultaneous procedure 
(43%) was significantly reduced using the sequential procedure (17%).  
 The significant decrease in false identification rates has been replicated, 
although with small decreases in correct identifications (Cutler & Penrod, 1988; 
Melara, Dewitt-Rickards, & O’Brien, 1989; Lindsay, Lea, Nosworthy, Fulford, 
Hector, LeVan, & Seabrook, 1991; Sporer, 1993; Lindsay, Pozzulo, Craig, Lee, & 
Corber, 1997). In one replication, researchers also manipulated whether 
eyewitnesses knew the total number of lineup members that they were going to 
see (Cutler & Penrod, 1988). They found the sequential procedure to be superior 
regardless of the additional manipulation but they also found that the 
sequential presentation was significantly better if witnesses were not aware of 
the number of lineup members to be viewed. It was thought that if 
eyewitnesses know they are coming close to the end of the sequence, they may 
fall back into making guesses as to the likelihood that the remaining members 
will show greater resemblance to the perpetrator than the ones being viewed. 
Thus, in the standard sequential procedure, witnesses should not be told how 
many photographs they will be seeing in total.  
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 The small decrease in correct identification rates using the sequential 
lineup presentation is a huge concern to the criminal justice system. However, 
results from a recent meta-analysis ease some of this concern (Steblay, Dysart, 
Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001). Although they found that correct identification rates 
were higher from simultaneous (50%) vs. sequential (35%) procedures, this 
difference largely disappeared and became nonsignificant when 
methodological moderator variables that model the most realistic simulations 
of crimes and police procedures were controlled for across experiments (e.g., 
live staged events, cautionary instructions, single perpetrators, and adult 
witnesses asked to describe the perpetrator). The correct identifications that are 
lost using sequential presentations could be conceived of as calculated guesses 
produced by a relative judgment strategy used in simultaneous lineup 
decisions. In the meta-analysis, Steblay and colleagues also found the 
superiority of the sequential procedure for decreasing false identifications of 
innocents, and this effect was increased when the same methodological 
moderators (e.g., live staged events, cautionary instructions, single 
perpetrators, and adult witnesses asked to describe the perpetrator) were 
considered. Overall, they found that the odds of actual guilt associated with 
identification from a sequential procedure will be twice that of the 
simultaneous lineup—even considering the slight decrease in correct 
identifications.  
 Two caveats must be made to the previous claims about the sequential 
lineup procedure. If sequential procedures are used without the use of blind 
administration (i.e., someone who does not know which lineup member is the 
suspect), it is a concern that lineup instructors will be better able to 
“communicate” the identity of the suspect with sequential procedures, as 
opposed to the simultaneous, due to the attention paid to one picture at a time 
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(Wells, Seelau, Rydell, & Luus, 1994). Secondly, it is important that 
eyewitnesses continue through the entire sequential procedure, even after an 
identification has been made. A central concern of prosecutors in determining 
recommendations for The Guide was that if an eyewitness selected a lineup 
distractor photo early in the sequential procedure, before getting to the actual 
suspect, then the witness’ recognition for the suspect would not be tested. These 
modifications to lineups, the sequential procedure and double blind 
administration have already been made in Canada. The State of New Jersey is 
leading the way by imposing “attorney general guidelines for preparing and 
conducting photo and live lineup identifications,” that include double blind 
procedures and sequential presentation (Farmer, 2001). 
 Considering the potential the sequential lineup has for reducing the 
eyewitness problem, one would expect to find a vast literature investigating all 
the parameters that are affected by such a lineup change. Unfortunately, this 
literature is minimal. A recent study showed that the sequential procedure 
advantage in maintaining accuracy while reducing false identifications was 
eliminated when there was the slightest change in the appearance of the 
perpetrator between encoding and the lineup procedure (i.e., the female 
perpetrator had her hair up and in a pony tail when committing the crime but 
had her hair down in the lineup) (Memon & Gabbert, 2003). They found that 
witnesses became reluctant to choose anyone and accuracy decreased to 
significantly less than the simultaneous lineup. There is, however, a large 
concern with this study, the placement of hair, up or down, is simple to address 
in real lineup situations, the suspect could be told to put her hair up in a pony 
tail. A better appearance manipulation would have been hair color or cut for 
women or facial hair alterations such as a beard or no beard for men. However, 
it is true that recognition is easier the more the retrieval conditions match the 
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encoding conditions. An unpublished study by Rod Lindsay and colleagues, 
looking at another aspect of lineup situations, found the cross-race effect (i.e., 
poorer accuracy rates when a witness tries to identify someone from a different 
race than their own) was worse in the sequential lineup compared to a 
simultaneous lineup (Lindsay,  2003).  
 In addition to these studies, there are also a few scattered studies looking 
at how to best diagnose eyewitness accuracy when sequential lineups are used. 
Sporer (1993), for example, found that witnesses accurately choosing the culprit 
from sequential lineups took less time viewing his face than did those who 
chose an incorrect face; witnesses viewing a sequential lineup made their 
identifications more slowly when they were inaccurate. Another study also 
found that accurate choices were made much faster than inaccurate choices 
using the sequential procedure and thus replicated Sporer’s findings (Kneller, 
Memon, & Stevenage, 2001). In addition, this study found that inaccurate 
choosers took more time to select a foil (1.06 s) than they did to reject the target 
(0.69 s).  
 Most related to the studies presented here are three studies that looked 
at the cognitive processes and decision-making strategies of eyewitnesses’ 
viewing sequential versus simultaneous lineups. In the first study, Lindsay and 
his colleagues compared simultaneous and sequential lineups when the culprit 
was either present or absent and asked participants to indicate on a 7-point 
scale whether they used a relative or absolute decision process when making 
their decisions (Lindsay, Lea & Fulford, 1991). They found that participants 
given a sequential lineup relied on “absolute” judgments significantly more 
often than those given simultaneous lineups. These findings were uninfluenced 
by whether the culprit was present or not. A second, more recent, study 
provided direct evidence using signal detection analyses that witnesses viewing 
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sequential lineups enhance discriminability because they elicit the use of an 
absolute decision-strategy (Gronlund, 2004). This was in contrast to a few 
researchers who argue that the sequential lineup simply leads witnesses to 
adopt a more conservative response criterion (Ebbesen & Flowe, 2002).  
 In the third study, researchers presented choosers (witnesses who 
selected a photograph, whether accurate or not) from a sequential lineup with 
the decision process statements from Dunning & Stern’s (1994) analysis of 
witnesses viewing simultaneous lineups (Kneller, Memon, & Stevenage, 2001). 
Participants were asked which statements best described their decision-making 
strategy. The first two statements “I just recognized him, I cannot explain why,” 
and “His face just ‘popped out’ at me” were considered to be indicative of an 
absolute and automatic recognition strategy. The second two: “I compared the 
photographs to each other in order to narrow the choices,” and “I first 
eliminated the ones definitely not him, then chose among the rest” were 
considered representative of a relative judgment strategy. The last two 
statements included were not found to differentiate witness accuracy in 
Dunning and Stern: “I matched the image in my head to the picture in front of 
me,” and “I based the judgment on specific facial features.” The researchers 
reported findings looking at absolute versus relative decision strategies but did 
not report response rates to the actual individual statements. The researchers 
found using sequential lineups that only one witness reported the use of a 
relative strategy and 67% of the witnesses reported using an absolute strategy. 
Of the 67% of witnesses using an absolute strategy, 47% were accurate and 20% 
were inaccurate. 
 The findings from these studies support the notion that the sequential 
procedure reduces eyewitnesses’ ability to use relative judgment strategies, and 
suggest that it is the use of absolute judgment strategies that influence whether 
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a witness is accurate, rather than the lineup presentation used or whether the 
culprit was present or absent. Although the data reveal interesting information 
about inaccurate eyewitnesses viewing sequential lineups, they do not tell us 
anything about the specific decision strategies inaccurate witnesses are using. In 
the last study described above, Kneller and colleagues found that the majority 
of eyewitnesses were using absolute decision strategies, but this only included 
20% of the inaccurate witnesses. There must be something different about 
inaccurate witness decision-making in sequential lineups that thwarts total 
accuracy, if they are not using a relative or absolute decision strategy.  
 Research has clearly demonstrated that in sequential lineup situations, 
eyewitnesses are no longer able to use relative judgment processes and they can 
no longer use a process of elimination to narrow down the choices. What 
decision-making processes would the general face recognition research predict 
are used in sequential lineup procedures, particularly by those who select the 
innocent suspect? Indeed, accurate eyewitnesses should still be able to match 
their memory to each photograph in an absolute judgment, ensuring automatic 
processing. However, it will be more difficult for them to experience a “pop 
out” if there is no simultaneous array of photographs for the culprit’s photo to 
stand out from. Thus, in the sequential lineup, accurate eyewitnesses may be 
more likely to only find that they just recognize the culprit.  
 In looking to the facial recognition literature to assist with concrete 
predictions for decision strategies of inaccurate witnesses in sequential lineup 
situations, a significant pattern was noted. The face recognition literature is 
primarily concerned with understanding why people are as good as they are at 
recognizing faces. The questions posed by these researchers neglect to ask 
about what happens when people are wrong. What are people thinking and 
doing when reaching wrong face recognitions? There is no virtually no 
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literature on “bad” face recognition. Thus, the only way to derive predictions is 
to look at the “good” recognition literature and try to extract how that might 
explain inaccuracy. 
 This series of studies asks: In the sequential lineup situation, what do 
inaccurate eyewitnesses think or do differently? If we assume, as discussed 
previously, that inaccurate eyewitnesses are people who stored incomplete 
images of the perpetrator, the matching between the stored image and the 
target would be unsuccessful.  When looking at the photographs in a lineup, 
witnesses with incomplete memories could extract the missing facial features 
from the other lineup choices, which has been shown to be the case with 
inaccurate eyewitnesses viewing simultaneous lineups. However, eyewitnesses 
viewing sequential lineups no longer have the luxury of using the other lineup 
photographs to fill in the gaps in memory because they are only allowed to see 
one picture at a time and short term memory cannot hold that many 
photographs simultaneously. Could it be that, although faces are encoded by 
their constituent parts and then stored as whole images, the memory still has 
access to most of the constituent parts used to create the holistic image? If the 
holistic image is incomplete and additional information is not accessible from 
the other lineup pictures, the memory could access the encoded constituent 
features to try to identify the correct face. Inaccurate eyewitnesses could then 
use the facial features that were encoded and retained to identify a photograph 
by comparing those specific features to each photograph in the lineup and 
looking for the closest match. This would be in some sense, a modified relative 
judgment strategy. Although witnesses cannot use a process of elimination 
strategy, they may still be able to use one or two specific features to eliminate 
photographs and narrow the pool. If this is not the case, these witnesses will 
need to fill in the gaps in the incomplete memorial representation using 
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information gathered somewhere in the witness experience. A systematic 
exploration of eyewitness decision-making in sequential lineup situations 
would improve our understanding of the approximately 17% of eyewitnesses 
who continue to select innocent suspects. 
 “The simplicity of the sequential technique, along with many promising 
research outcomes, has made it one of the most important of all the practical 
contributions of eyewitness research to actual eyewitness evidence collection 
procedures” (Steblay, et al., 2001, p. 460). If the sequential lineup has been 
shown to significantly reduce the kinds of false identifications that DNA 
exonerations highlight, why did the working group that created The Guide not 
put sequential lineup procedures at the forefront of its recommendations? 
There were a number of reasons for this outcome. In 1999, the working group 
felt that there just was not enough research published and reported on the 
impact of sequential procedures, and that the research had come primarily from 
two eyewitness research laboratories. Thus, although there is much promise for 
the sequential procedure to reduce eyewitness error, the breadth and volume of 
research was not great enough to warrant it as a central recommendation in 
1999 (Wells, Malpass, Lindsay, Fisher, Turtle, & Fulero, 2000). Since that time, 
there has been more published research examining different facets of the 
sequential lineup. However, researchers need to continue exploring the 
parameters of sequential lineups and the postdictive factors that will be useful 
to triers of fact (i.e., lawyers, judges, and jurors). We need to know more about 
the decision processes of witnesses, particularly inaccurate ones, as they view 
sequential lineups and make identifications. This series of studies seeks to fill 
that void. Before discussing the present studies, it is necessary to address the 
methodologies and terminologies commonly used in eyewitness research.  
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Methods and Terminology for Studying Eyewitness Identifications 
 In the eyewitness literature an important distinction has been made 
between the types of variables that can be studied. Some variables can be under 
the control of the police investigators like sequential lineup procedures and 
other have to be measured after the fact like witness decision processes.  
 This distinction is between estimator-variable research and system-
variable research (Wells, 1978). Estimator variables are factors that affect 
eyewitness accuracy, but are not under the control of the criminal justice 
system.  These variables can be manipulated in research but one can only 
estimate the role of factors such as stress, weapon focus, perceived time 
viewing culprit, crime seriousness, attention paid by witness, and demographic 
variables (i.e., age, race, and sex). The challenges to the forensic utility of 
estimator variables is that their levels must be assessed after the fact, and 
objective verification of the variables is often impossible. They probably interact 
with one another to affect eyewitness recall and recognition. (Wells, 1978), and 
they demonstrate inconsistent patterns of results across studies (McCloskey & 
Egeth, 1983). Thus, estimator-variable research will never be able to help alter 
the accuracy of a witness’s account, but it can affect prosecutors’, judges’, and 
jurors’ reliance on a witness’s testimony.  
 On the other hand, system variable research looks at factors that are 
under the direct control of the judicial system, particularly by police who 
interview witnesses and conduct lineups. System variables include interviews, 
question structure, mugshots, and lineup instructions and procedures. The 
concept of a system variable is considered to be synonymous with the concept 
of a “preventable error” (Wells, 1993). If a system variable is affecting accuracy, 
then changes to the system will change eyewitness accuracy. Accordingly, this 
paper looks at witness decision-making as both a system variable and an 
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estimator variable. The findings from this series of studies could be important 
to either changing lineup procedures to make it difficult for inaccurate 
eyewitness to make a decision and/or helping the criminal justice system be 
better able to identify witness accuracy, or more importantly inaccuracy, after 
the fact by knowing which types of decisions processes to look for when 
deciding how confident to be in a given witness’ choice.    
 In order to produce a valid and reliable body of research that policy 
makers will trust, eyewitness researchers consistently use the same 
experimental procedures. Eyewitness identification studies usually have three 
stages: 1) participants are shown a simulated crime via slide shows, film 
scenarios, or live stagings, and are typically unaware that they are going to see 
a crime occur and be asked identify the perpetrator or recall information, 2) a 
manipulation of either information, instructions, lineup composition, or lineup 
presentation are presented and there is an appropriate control condition for 
comparison, and 3) participants are asked to select the perpetrator from a show-
up, photo-lineup, or live-lineup, and confidence in decision is requested.  
Staged crimes have the advantage of being meticulously pre-planned and 
recorded so that the eyewitness’s identifications and other testimony can be 
compared and contrasted with fact (i.e., what really happened in the crime and 
who did it). Usually only one variable is manipulated at a time and all other 
factors are held constant so main effects can be determined.  
 When reviewing eyewitness identification experimental findings it is 
important to understand what is considered an eyewitness error. In one sense 
an error could be any identification of a lineup member who is not the culprit. 
However, forensically, most lineups include one suspect and a number of other 
“fillers” or “distractors.” In addition, researchers use either target-present or 
target-absent lineups, and the most complete studies have both conditions. In a 
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target-present lineup the criminal seen in the simulated crime is a suspect in the 
lineup surrounded by other fillers. In a target-absent lineup the criminal is 
replaced with a similar looking suspect. It is important to always differentiate 
between a “suspect” and a “culprit.” A suspect is someone the police believe 
might be the culprit, but people are supposed to be innocent until proven 
guilty. In practice the police are unable to differentiate between suspects and 
culprits until trials are complete (and often not even then), but in laboratories 
researches can model the two possible lineup situations. Thus, in eyewitness 
research, in a target-present lineup the suspect is the culprit, and in a target-
absent lineup the suspect is not the culprit. The problem in actual police lineups 
is that nobody really knows how often the suspect is or is not the culprit in 
most lineups, unless further evidence is revealed or somebody else confesses to 
the crime (Wells, 1993).  
 Accordingly, there are four responses possible as a function of a single 
suspect, target present or absent lineup. The witness could identify the guilty 
suspect, which would occur only in the target-present lineup (a hit), or the 
witness could identify the innocent suspect, which would occur in a target-
absent lineup (a false identification). In addition, the witness could select a 
distractor in either a target-present or absent lineup and that would be an error, 
but not a false identification, for no charges would be brought up against that 
person. Lastly, the witness could make no choice, which would be an error only 
in the target-present lineup (a miss). Therefore, the most harmful “error” is a 
false identification of an innocent suspect, who presumably looks similar to the 
real criminal. The goal then should be increasing the ratio of the frequencies of 
hits to false identifications by eliminating harmful influences on the 
identification process (Lindsay & Wells, 1980). However, previous research 
with simultaneous lineups showed that inaccurate witnesses in target absent 
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situations did not look differently in their decision processes than inaccurate 
witnesses in target present situations (i.e., selecting a distractor photograph).  
 
 The Present Studies 
 Following the model of Dunning and Stern (1994), the series of studies 
presented here is interested in providing a detailed analysis of eyewitness 
accuracy as a function of different decision-making processes using sequential 
lineups. The face recognition literature and previous eyewitness identification 
research support the belief that accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses can be 
distinguished by the decision processes they use in lineup situations. The goal 
of the studies was to discover the types of automatic or controlled processes 
that eyewitnesses might use in sequential lineup situations, and then to test 
those processes.  
 Recall that the sequential lineup procedure was specifically designed to 
reduce the ability of witnesses to use process of elimination and relative 
judgment strategies. Thus, even with sequential lineups, greater accuracy 
should continue to be associated with automatic processing. These 
identifications should seem effortless and inexplicable by eyewitnesses. Due to 
the design of the sequential procedure and the inability of witnesses to see all of 
the photographs at one time, a “pop out” feature was not predicted. There 
would be no background for a “pop out” to reveal itself, although an automatic 
“Aha, that’s him!” reaction could still occur. 
 Inaccurate eyewitnesses viewing the sequential procedure would no 
longer be able to make an identification through relative judgments. What other 
strategies might witnesses use instead? It was predicted that their decision-
making would still be very deliberative. They are likely to search out additional 
sources of information in attempting to fill in their incomplete memorial 
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representation of the perpetrator. However, no clear predictions were made as 
to how they would go about extracting additional information from the lineup 
experience and photographs. It was hypothesized, based on the facial encoding 
research, that they might use the specific features retained in memory to 
compare photographs and narrow the choices. Having a better understanding 
of what decision-making processes eyewitnesses pursue when faced with 
sequential lineups may help us to better understand the false identifications still 
being made. In addition, these studies aimed to lend more empirical evidence 
and support for recommending the sequential lineup procedure to police 
departments in future guides or national recommendations.   
 Study 1 investigated the decision-making of eyewitnesses using the 
“think aloud” procedure from Dunning & Stern (1994). Participants had the 
opportunity to share their decision processes, both verbally during the lineup 
procedure and in an open-ended question after seeing a video-taped crime and 
making an identification judgment. After qualitatively analyzing eyewitness 
processes, the findings of this study were translated into concrete decision-
making statements that could be tested in later studies.  
 The decision process statements of Study 1 were then tested in Study 2, 
to determine if they could differentiate accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses in 
a meaningful way. To test this, participants became eyewitnesses after seeing a 
video-taped crime and were put through the same target present sequential 
lineup procedure as in Study 1. After the identification task was completed, 
these witnesses were then asked to select which decision process statements 
best described the strategies they used when faced with the lineup task. They 
were also asked, in an open-ended question, what strategies they used to select 
the photograph they had selected.  
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 Studies 3 and 4 were designed to expand the sequential line-up findings 
to target absent situations and rule out the possibility that the decision-making 
findings were exclusive to one set of crime materials. Target absent situations 
allow researchers to identify eyewitnesses that would be making consequential 
false identifications in real world conditions. These studies also sought to 
determine if there is a significant difference between the decision-making 
strategies of target absent and target present inaccurate identifications, even 
though this was not the case with simultaneous lineups. Essentially, this study 
investigated whether when an eyewitness selects a photograph that is not the 
actual suspect, were they thinking differently before they selected an innocent 
suspect or a lineup distractor? In addition, Study 4 was a necessary replication 
of the findings using an entirely different set of materials: a new crime video 
created to be easier and produce more identification, a new perpetrator, and a 
new set of lineup distractors. It is important to show that the eyewitness 
decisions in Studies 1-3 were not somehow an artifact of the sequential lineup 
procedure they experienced. 
  Expecting to find some differences between accurate and inaccurate 
eyewitness decision-making, Study 5 was designed to manipulate those 
differences. If accurate eyewitnesses follow a successful decision-making 
strategy, then perhaps forcing all eyewitnesses to adhere to that strategy could 
decrease false identifications. In a similar vein, forcing all eyewitnesses to 
endorse strategies of inaccurate eyewitnesses should decrease witness accuracy. 
This would demonstrate the impact of the different decision strategies, and if 
successful this study would show that decision processes directly affect 
accuracy.  
 Study 6 asked participants to assume the role of police officer, lawyer, 
judge, or juror, and to determine the accuracy of eyewitnesses by looking solely 
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at the decision strategies eyewitnesses endorsed in the final questionnaire in 
previous experiments. This study was designed to test whether observers could 
intuitively determine accuracy while only having access to eyewitness decision-
making processes, which is more information than jurors receive during trial. 
Perhaps giving jurors access to eyewitness decision strategies would aid them 
in better determining the accuracy or weight of witness testimony, instead of 
having the sole emphasis be placed on witness confidence.  
 Lastly, Studies 7 and 8, were interested in whether logical modifications 
to the traditional sequential lineup procedure would affect accuracy rates. 
Police officers seek to acquire as much information as possible from 
eyewitnesses and it is possible that witnesses who do not make an identification 
from the sequential lineup will be offered a second opportunity to see the 
lineup. Would this second opportunity significantly impact sequential lineup 
accuracy rates? In addition, eyewitnesses have previously mentioned their 
hesitation to select too early from the sequential lineup procedure for fear that a 
later picture will be a closer match to the culprit. Would giving eyewitnesses a 
preview of the lineup photographs in a sequential fashion reduce their concern 
for selecting in a second viewing? These two modifications to the sequential 
lineup procedure were contrasted with the traditional, one time view of the 
sequential lineup. In Study 7, only target present lineups were conducted across 
conditions. Study 8 served as a replication and extension, using both target 
present and target absent lineups.  
 Very few moments are more dramatic than when, prompted by a lawyer, a 
courtroom witness outstretches an arm, finger extended, and declares with rock-
solid certainty that the accused is the person she saw fleeing the crime scene. The 
defense lawyer instructs the jury that the witness only got a 10 second view in the 
dark, took 30 minutes to pick him from the lineup, and at one time said that she 
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thought he was the closest looking guy. However, the jury, overwhelmed with the 
witness’s confidence in her identification, returns a verdict of guilty, transforming 
the innocently accused into a criminal. The following studies address ways in 
which this situation could have been prevented.  
 
  
  
CHAPTER TWO: 
EXPLORING DECISION PROCESSES 
 
Overview 
Study 1 was a pilot experiment designed to explore and identify any 
themes or decision processes that might differentiate accurate and inaccurate 
eyewitnesses viewing sequential lineups. Previous work with simultaneous 
lineups demonstrated significant differences in eyewitness decision processes 
(Dunning & Stern, 1994). Study 1 sought to discover whether accurate and 
inaccurate eyewitnesses used different strategies for identifying a perpetrator 
out of a sequential lineup. I predicted that accurate eyewitness would report 
using more automatic recognition processes. I did not make clear predictions 
for how the remaining inaccurate eyewitnesses would process the sequential 
lineup; most previous studies on simultaneous lineups show that inaccurate 
eyewitnesses used a process of elimination strategy, and since the sequential 
lineup was designed to prevent the use of such a strategy, it was not clear 
which strategy inaccurate eyewitnesses would use.  
Mock witnesses viewed a video-taped staged crime and then were asked 
to identify the culprit from a target present, eight person, sequential lineup 
procedure. While making their identifications all eyewitnesses were asked to 
share out loud their thought processes. In addition, after completing the lineup 
procedure, all witnesses were asked about the decision processes they had 
followed in reaching their decision.  I was interested in identifying themes or 
patterns in the decision processes of witnesses who made positive 
identifications, meaning they identified a specific photograph as that of the 
perpetrator, whether correct or incorrect. 
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Participants 
 Participants were 129 Cornell University undergraduates from a variety 
of courses in psychology and human development who earned extra credit for 
their participation.  
 
Procedure 
  Participants were brought into the lab individually to participate in a 
study called “Sponsoring Cornell.” They were told that the study was focused 
on recruiting corporations to sponsor Cornell with monetary funds and that 
they were being asked to watch some partially edited video made by the 
Cornell Development Office and the Cornell Communications Department. 
Participants were informed that no sound had been added yet because we 
wanted them to focus on the footage taken. They were also told that the video 
would be turned into a recruitment piece aimed at soliciting large corporations 
to donate money to Cornell for campus improvements. The experimenter 
highlighted that it was important that participants pay close attention because 
we wanted their comments concerning the content and quality of the video, as 
well as its potential effects. Then participants signed a consent form. 
Next, participants viewed the 4.5 minute video, which contained footage 
of all campus buildings and facilities that had been recently built, remodeled, or 
renovated. About three quarters of the way into the video, footage was shown 
of the most recently renovated location, the campus bookstore. The video 
focused on the renovated areas in the bookstore. The participants saw the inside 
of the bookstore, including random students shopping for supplies.  Near the 
end of the footage of the bookstore, the camera panned toward the music 
section. The camera focused on a woman looking at greeting cards and then 
panned the entire compact disc music section, finally focusing in on a man 
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looking at a CD. The man was of European descent, early 20’s, had an average 
build, very short brown hair, brown eyes, and was wearing a black winter 
jacket. The man was looking at a CD and then slipped it into the front of his 
partically zipped up coat and walked way. The perpetrator was visible for 
approximately 45 seconds and then the video concluded. The video was shown 
on a 27 inch flat screen television monitor.  
At this point, participants were informed that the real interest of the 
experiment was eyewitness identifications and the experimenter had a few 
questions for the participant to answer. Participants then completed an 
approximately 10-15 minute questionnaire about events leading up to but not 
including the crime scene in the video. This was used as a time filler. For 
example, participants were asked to identify the time on the clock tower and 
the name of the building currently under construction.  
 After participants had completed the video questions, the experimenter 
told them that they would be participating in a lineup procedure and that we 
wanted them to identify the person who stole the CD from the campus 
bookstore. They were given the option to identify one of the photographs, 
refuse to make any decision, or decide that the perpetrator was not in the 
lineup. The experimenter read the sequential lineup instructions: “You will be 
shown a sequence of individual photographs and you must decide for each 
photograph whether or not it is a picture of the criminal you saw in the video. 
You can take as long as you wish to make a decision for each photograph but 
you will only be shown each photograph once.” The experimenter also told 
them to “remember that the perpetrator may or may not be one of the photos 
presented to you.”  
 Finally, the experimenter explained the “think aloud” procedures used 
in Dunning and Stern (1994). Participants were instructed to “say out loud what 
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you are thinking or doing, what sorts of things are going on in your head as 
you look at each photograph and try to make a decision.” The experimenter 
then asked for consent to tape-record the participants’ out loud thinking while 
they reached their judgments. The experimenter turned the tape-recorder on 
and began the sequential lineup procedure.  
 Next, the participant was handed an identification sheet that was 
numbered from 1 to 12 and had a “yes” or “no” option as well as a confidence 
scale (1=not certain, 7=very certain) for each number (See Appendix A). At the 
top of the identification sheet it reiterated the warning, “remember that the 
perpetrator may or may not be one of the photos presented to you.” The 
experimenter held in her hand a shuffled “deck” of 12 photographs face down 
and read aloud the warning on the top of the participant identification sheet. 
Participants were not informed of the number of photos to be seen, but the 
identification form had places to respond to 12 photos.  She then asked, “Is 
number one the person you saw?” At that time she turned up the deck of 
photographs with the first photograph in front of the witness and waited for 
the witness to circle either yes or no and indicate how certain he or she was of 
that decision. The experimenter was instructed to look at the answer sheet and 
not the photographs, and was blind to who the perpetrator was. After both the 
identification and confidence measure responses were circled, the experimenter 
placed the first photo behind the second photo in the deck and revealed the 
second photograph, repeating the procedure for all 8 photographs. After 
photograph #8, participants were told that there would be no more 
photographs. Participants were led to believe that there were 12 photographs in 
the lineup, so as to prevent a response bias toward the end of the lineup. In the 
real world, some witnesses might feel the need to select a photograph, if they 
think they are coming to the end of the options. Then, the identification form 
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was removed from the participant and he or she was asked, “Would you be 
willing to testify as a witness in a mock trial later this semester?” This was a 
second measure of the witnesses’ confidence in their identification. The 
experimenter marked the response on the bottom of the identification form.  
  
Materials 
  The “think aloud” protocol was used for two of the same reasons it was 
used in Dunning and Stern (1994). First, having to verbally share thought 
processes would make it easier for participants to answer questions about their 
decision processes after the lineup was completed; these dependent measures 
are discussed below. Secondly, tape-recording participants’ thoughts as they 
were making their decisions could prove to be a rich source of data.  
 The lineup foils were selected from a collection of 50 photographs of 
college-aged men who possessed the same coloring and facial descriptors as the 
perpetrator. The similarity of these photographs to the photograph of the 
offender, as well as their ranking within the collection of photographs were 
rated and ranked by 30 student participants. In addition, the similarity of these 
photographs to a composite description of the offender, as well as their ranking 
within the collection were rated and ranked by 35 different student 
participants. The eight photographs selected were in the top ten ranked list 
both by photograph similarity and match to description and the highest ranked 
picture was used as the suspect replacement in subsequent culprit absent 
lineups. In the lineup, the perpetrator and all foils wore identical navy blue 
sweatshirts and gazed into the camera without emotion.  
 A quantitative index of lineup fairness, functional size, was used to 
measure the number of foils functionally present in the line-up that represented 
effective distractors (i.e., lineup foils that would protect innocent suspects while 
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at the same time allowing the culprit to stand out) (Wells, Leippe, & Ostrom, 
1979). In order to determine functional size, mockwitnesses (people unaware of 
the crime) were given the description of the culprit, shown the lineup, and 
asked to select the culprit using only the description.  Thus, functional size is 
the total number of mockwitnesses divided by the number of mockwitnesses 
who chose the suspect (or 1 over the proportion of mockwitnesses choosing the 
suspect). The functional sizes were 4.57 and 5.02 for the culprit present and 
culprit absent sequential lineups, respectively (McQuiston & Malpass, 2002).  
Therefore, there were approximately five good lineup distractors in each 
lineup.  
 
Dependent Measures 
 After reaching an identification judgment (i.e., selecting a photograph, 
making no decision, or deciding he is not there), all participants completed a 
follow-up questionnaire containing similar dependent measures to those used 
with the simultaneous lineup procedure in Dunning & Stern (1994). First, 
participants were asked to reiterate their identification decision and express 
their confidence in their identification decision on a scale from 0% to 100%. 
They then were given an open-ended question asking them to describe, in their 
own words, their decision process or what made them choose the picture that 
they chose.  
  Next, participants were asked “How much influence did the other 
(nonchosen) pictures have on your decision.” There were four response 
alternatives: “They had little influence on my decision,” “As I looked at more 
pictures, they all began to look the same,” “They confused me; they made the 
task more difficult,” and “They were all so similar that they made me less 
confident.” Participants could select as many responses as applied. Lastly, 
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participants were asked “What would you say had a greater influence on your 
decision, the pictures in the lineup, your memory of the culprit or both?” After 
completing the final questionnaire, due to experimenter blindness, participants 
were not told which photograph in the lineup was the perpetrator. However, 
they were given the researcher’s email address and were told they could be 
emailed the identity of the perpetrator if they were interested. Participants were 
then debriefed by the experimenter, who shared with them the general 
rationale of the study and thanked them for their participation. Participants, in 
all studies, were explicitly asked not to share the real purposes of this study 
with other students. 
 
Results 
 Of the 129 participants in the study, 63 (49%) made positive 
identifications. Of these, 19 (30%) were accurate and selected the culprit, and 44 
(70%) were inaccurate and selected a distractor photograph. Inaccurate 
identifications did include eyewitnesses making multiple identifications from 
the lineup, usually two; although these witnesses are clearly uncertain, their 
decision processes may be useful for the qualitative analyses. Of the remaining 
66 witnesses, 26 (39%) marked “no decision” and 40 (61%) insisted that the 
perpetrator’s photograph was not in the lineup.   
 
Decision Processes of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
 Accurate eyewitnesses were significantly more confident in their 
identifications than inaccurate eyewitness (M’s= 69% versus 46%), t(56) = 3.87, p 
< .001.  The main interest was in whether accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses 
described their decision processes differently. There were two measures I could 
use to look for decision process patterns: the “think aloud” recordings and 
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participants’ open-ended written descriptions of their decision processes. In 
order to evaluate these measures, a two part coding process was conducted by 
the researchers for both the “think aloud” tapes and the written responses. 
First, both coders independently examined all of the responses to determine 
whether or not themes or categories emerged across participants. Then, they 
agreed upon categories. In the second part of the coding strategy, the raters 
individually re-examined each of the responses and coded them according to 
the outlined categories. There was 90% agreement between coders for both the 
verbatim think aloud tapes and the written responses. All discrepancies were 
resolved through discussion.  
 The responses were all coded according to whether participant 
eyewitnesses mentioned any of 6 processes or potential themes identified by the 
researchers: 1) they made their identification due to familiarity or being struck 
by a particular photograph; 2) they noticed specific features of the perpetrator 
and looked for those features in the photographs; 3) they said that the photo 
they selected looked the closest to the culprit; 4) they compared the photos to 
their memory of the guy; 5) they thought back to the image in the video; and 6) 
they had difficulty making an identification due to poor attention and poor 
retained image of perpetrator.  
 Although I expected the verbatim think aloud tapes to be most fruitful, 
they proved to be least interesting. Approximately 50% of both accurate and 
inaccurate eyewitnesses only mentioned the physical characteristics of the 
culprit in the video and discussed how they used those characteristics to 
compare each photograph.  Beyond that there were sparse mentions of 
familiarity and comparisons to memory, but nothing was mentioned in a 
consistent way in relation to accuracy. The written responses proved to be 
much more detailed and often included decision strategies  (Table 1). Potential 
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indicators of accuracy, from the coding, included primarily a sense of 
familiarity or being “struck” by a certain photograph. Indicators of inaccuracy 
that were mentioned included looking for specific or distinctive features and 
using those features to identify the culprit’s photograph, selecting the 
photograph that looked closest to the culprit, and admitting having difficulty 
making an identification due to a lack of attention or image retained from the 
crime.   
 
Table 1.   Percent of Written Decision Processes Statements made by 
Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses in Open-Ended Question 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                       Witness Type                                   
                                                                                           _________________________ 
Coding Category                                                      Accurate        Inaccurate
    
______________________________________________________________________ 
1.  Familiarity a       26  11 
2. Looked for specific facial features i    74  86 
3. Selected photo that looked closest to culprit i      26  36  
4. Compared memory to photograph    21  25 
5. Thought back to the image in the video   5  5 
6. Difficulty making identification due to attention   11   27 
    or image retained i  
______________________________________________________________________ 
a Potential Indicator of accuracy                i Potential Indicator of inaccuracy 
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 Based on the qualitative analysis of participants’ verbal and written 
responses, five decision process statements were either carried over from 
Dunning & Stern (1994) or extracted from the coding process and written to 
encompass the possible decision processes of accurate and inaccurate 
eyewitnesses for further exploration (Table 2). The first statement aimed to 
describe a sense of familiarity, “I just recognized him, I cannot explain why.” 
The second statement was important to include, to describe attention to specific 
physical features, “I focused on his most distinctive feature.” The third 
statement was chosen because many inaccurate eyewitnesses indicated that the 
selected photograph was more like the culprit than the other photographs, “He 
was the closest to what I remember but not exact.”  And although there was not 
a consistent pattern in statements about memory, many witnesses mentioned in 
different ways the use of some image in making their decision which led me to 
include the Dunning and Stern statement, “I matched the image in my head to 
the picture in front of me.” Lastly, a number of eyewitnesses did mention 
thinking back to the video when looking at the photograph, so I was interested 
in whether the video image was what they used to make an identification and 
wrote the statement, “While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think back 
to the video and compare.” No decision statement was specifically written to 
encompass the sixth coding category, general difficulty making an 
identification, because I felt that these issues were addressed in the other 
decision processes questions concerning attention to pictures or memory 
(described below). These five decision processes statements will be 
experimentally evaluated in Studies 2-5 and I expect that further data will 
confirm them as useful in discriminating between accurate and inaccurate 
eyewitnesses.  
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Table  2.   Final Statements Designed or Selected to Capture 
Eyewitness Decision Processes when Viewing Sequential Lineups 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why* 
2. I focused on his most distinctive feature. 
3. He was the closest person to what I remember, but not exact.* 
4. I matched the image in my head to the picture in front of me.* 
5. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think back to the video and 
compare. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
* Decision process statements selected from Dunning and Stern (1994) 
 
 The other dependent measures looked at whether eyewitnesses’ 
identifications were impacted by the other photographs in the lineup, as well as 
whether their memory or the pictures had a greater impact on their 
identification decisions.  Accurate witnesses or inaccurate witnesses were not 
more likely to endorse any of the four items (Table 3). In addition, when asked, 
“What would you say had a greater influence on your decision, the pictures in 
the line-up, or your memory of the culprit [or both]?”, accurate eyewitness were 
moderately more likely to say their memory (z = 1.90, p < .06, while inaccurate 
eyewitness were moderately more likely to say both their memory and the 
photographs (z = -1.79, p < .07. 
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Table 3.   Mean Percentages of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
Endorsing Photograph Influence Statements 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                      Witness Type 
                                                                                           _____________________ 
                                                                           Accurate  Inaccurate   z    p 
Individual Item                              (n = 63)      (n = 19) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. The other photos had little influence on my decision.      32         20         .95   ns 
2. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look         32        16        1.41  ns    
    the same. 
3. They [other photos] confused me; made the task more     42        64       -1.59  ns 
    difficult.  
4. They [other photos] were all so similar that they made     16        27       - .98  ns 
    me less confident. 
 
Summary 
 Study 1 revealed that participant eyewitnesses who accurately identified 
the perpetrator in a sequential lineup came to that decision in a manner 
different from those who selected a photograph of an innocent person from the 
lineup. Accurate eyewitnesses in their written descriptions of their thought 
processes frequently mentioned that the culprit’s photograph just looked 
‘familiar’ to them or “struck them.” Accurate witnesses moderately indicated 
that the other pictures had little influence on their decision. In contrast, 
inaccurate eyewitnesses tended to have a weak image of the perpetrator, so 
they selected the closest photograph and tried to use distinctive features to 
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identify the culprit. They also felt that the other photographs in the lineups 
made the task more difficult by confusing them and making them less 
confident. Inaccurate eyewitnesses moderately indicated that the pictures and 
their memory had equal impact on their lineup decision.  
 Some readers may note that few statistical tests were conducted in Study 
1, and no tests were done on the frequencies of decision process responses of 
accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses. The aim of this study was to look for 
common patterns or themes in eyewitnesses self-reported descriptions of their 
decision processes. Formal statistical tests were not appropriate because the 
methods were not controlled (i.e., dependent measures were open-ended) nor 
were they equivalent to actual eyewitness situations; real world eyewitnesses 
are never asked to verbalize their thought processes. Therefore, Study 2 was 
designed to test the qualitative findings from this study in a more controlled 
procedure and environment that would be ecologically valid.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that there may be differences in 
the decision processes that accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses use when they 
are faced with a sequential lineup. Further studies explored these differences 
and determined whether they significantly differentiate these important 
eyewitness groups in predictable ways.   
  
 CHAPTER 3: 
DEFINING DECISION PROCESSES 
 
Overview 
Study 2 was designed to determine whether the decision processes that 
were qualitatively extracted from Study 1 would significantly distinguish the 
decision processes of accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses viewing sequential 
lineup procedures. In Study 1, I identified five decision processes themes that 
were consistently mentioned by accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses when 
describing their identification decisions and created or selected decision 
processes statements to reflect these themes. In this study I predicted that 
accurate eyewitnesses viewing a sequential lineup would be most likely to 
endorse decision processes statements like: “I just recognized him, I cannot 
explain why” and “I matched the image in my head to the person in front of 
me,” as well as indicate that the other photographs in the lineup had little 
influence on their decision. In contrast, I predicted that inaccurate eyewitnesses 
would endorse statements like: “I focused on his most distinctive feature,” “He 
was the closest person to what I remember but not exact,” and “While I looked 
at each photograph, I tried to think back to the video and compare,” as well as 
state that the other pictures in the lineup all began to look the same, confused 
them and made them less confident.  
In this study, after seeing the same videotaped staged crime as in Study 
1, eyewitnesses were shown the same eight person sequential lineup, were 
asked to identify the perpetrator, and were then asked to describe their decision 
processes by endorsing strategies presented to them, as well as describing their 
processes in an open-ended format. In all studies, I was interested in the 
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decision processes of witnesses who made positive identifications, whether 
correct or incorrect.   
 
Participants 
 Participants were 139 Cornell University undergraduates from a variety 
of courses in psychology and human development who earned extra credit for 
their participation.  
 
Procedure 
  The procedures were exactly the same as they were in Study 1, except 
that witnesses were not asked to “think aloud” because this proved less useful 
than asking for open-ended descriptions of decision processes.  
 
Dependent Measures 
 After reaching an identification judgment, all participants completed a 
follow up questionnaire containing similar dependent measures to those used 
in Study 1, but with the addition of a closed-ended decision processes question 
using the final statements from Study 1 (See Appendix B). First, participants 
were asked to reiterate their identification decision and express their confidence 
in their decision on a scale from 0% to 100%. The main dependent measure 
asked, “How would you best describe your decision process.” There were five 
responses listed and participants were told to select as many as applied. The 
response options included the processes statements identified in Study 1: “I just 
recognized him, I cannot explain why,” “I focused on his most distinctive 
feature,” “He was the closest person to what I remember, but not exact,” “I 
matched the image in my head to the picture in front of me,” and “While I 
   
  44
looked at each photograph, I tried to think back to the video and compare.” 
Participants could also endorse “other” and write in their response.  
 Participants were then asked “How much influence did the other 
(nonchosen) pictures have on your decision?” The same four response 
alternatives were used: “They had little influence on my decision,” “As I looked 
at more pictures, they all began to look the same, “They confused me; they 
made the task more difficult,” and “They were all so similar that they made me 
less confident.” Participants could, again, select as many as applied. Next, 
participants were asked “What would you say had a greater influence on your 
decision, the pictures in the lineup, your memory of the culprit or both.” 
Finally, the last question was open-ended and asked participants to describe, in 
their own words, their decision process or what made them choose the picture 
that they chose.  
 After completing the final questionnaire, participants were not told 
which photograph in the lineup was the perpetrator due to experimenter 
blindness. However, they were given the researcher’s email address and told 
they could request to be emailed the identity of the perpetrator if they were 
interested. Participants were then debriefed by the experimenter, who shared 
with them the general rationale of the study and thanked them for their 
participation.  
 
Results 
Of the 139 participants in the study, 56 (40%) made positive 
identifications, meaning they identified a specific photograph as that of the 
perpetrator. Of these, 31 (55%) were accurate and 25 (45%) were inaccurate. Of 
the remaining 83 witnesses, 55 (66%) marked “no decision,” 9 (11%) insisted 
that the perpetrator’s photograph was not in the lineup, and 19 (23%) marked 
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more than one photograph and thus were not included in the positive 
identifications.  
 
Decision Processes of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
Analyses focused on witnesses who made positive identifications, 
whether correct or incorrect. Accurate witnesses had marginally greater 
confidence than inaccurate witnesses (74% vs. 42%, t(52) = 1.90, p < .06). I was 
most interested in finding out whether there was differential selection of 
decision process statements by accurate and inaccurate witnesses. The mean 
responses of accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses can be seen in Table 4. 
Accurate eyewitnesses endorsed multiple statements such as “I matched the 
image in my head to the picture in front of me” (65% versus 40%, z = 1.83, p < 
.06) and “the other photographs had little influence on my decision” (77% 
versus 40%, z = 2.85, p < .004). Inaccurate eyewitnesses, as was partially 
predicted, were significantly more likely to endorse “While I looked at each 
photograph, I tried to think back to the video and compare” (76% versus 36%, z 
= 3.02, p < .002), and indicate that the other pictures confused them and made 
the task more difficult (40% versus 10%, z = 2.67, p < .008). As was not 
predicted, they also were marginally more likely to endorse “I just recognized 
him, I cannot explain why” (24% versus 7%,  z = 1.86, p < .06). 
In addition, when asked which had a greater influence on their decision, 
their memory of the perpetrator or the pictures in the lineup, three times as 
many inaccurate participants responded that the pictures were more influential 
than their memories (z = -1.65, p < .10). There was a non significant trend that 
accurate witnesses were more likely to indicate that their memories were more 
influential than the photographs in their decision making (z = 1.22, ns).  
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Table 4.   Mean Percentages of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
Endorsing Individual Decision Processes Statements 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                   Witness Type 
                         ___________________ 
                                                                      Accurate   Inaccurate   z     p 
Individual Item                                (n = 31)       (n = 25) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why. i  7   24        -1.86      .06 
2. I focused on his most distinctive feature.  16   16     .15        ns 
3. He was the closest person to what I remember 29   36    -.55        ns 
    but not exact. 
4. I matched the image in my head to the picture in 65   40         1.83      .06 
    front on me. a 
5. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think 36   76   -3.02    .002 
    back to the video and compare. i  
6. The other photos had little influence on my  77   40   2.85     .004 
    decision. a 
7. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to 13   20    -.72        ns 
    look the same. 
8. They [other photos] confused me; made the task 10   40  -2.67     .008 
    more difficult. i 
9. They [other photos] were all so similar that they 13   20    -.72        ns 
    made me less confident. 
 
a Indicator of accuracy            i Indicator of inaccuracy 
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 Next, broader, more thematic, differences in decision processes for 
eyewitnesses viewing sequential lineups were explored using principal 
components factor analysis. The factor analysis using a varimax rotation on the 5-
item question of “how would you best describe your decision process,” and the 
four item question of “how much influence did the other pictures have on your 
decision,” revealed two clear 4-item factors, and a 1-item factor (Tables 5a & 5b).  
The first 4-item factor contained responses revealing a more deliberative and 
thoughtful strategy: “He was the closest person to what I remember, but not exact,” 
“While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think back to the video and 
compare,” “As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look the same,” and 
“They [the other pictures] were all so similar they made me less confident.” The 
second 4-item factor contained responses attuned to a simple matching strategy: “I 
focused on his most distinct feature,” “I matched the image in my head to the 
picture in front of me,” “They [the other pictures] had little influence on my 
decision,” and “They [the other pictures] did not confuse me; they did not make 
the task more difficult.” The last factor included the response most indicative of an 
automatic recognition strategy: “I just recognized him, I cannot explain why.”  
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Table 5a. Factor Analysis Loadings 
______________________________________________________________________
                                Component 
                         _________________________ 
Individual Item                                                     1          2                    3
  
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why.         .051     -.072   .827 
2. I focused on his most distinctive feature.        .099      .672   .200 
3. He was the closest person to what I remember       .571      .105             -.497 
    but not exact. 
4. I matched the image in my head to the picture      -.193       .541  -.163 
    in front on me. 
5. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to           .458      -.417  -.277 
    think back to the video and compare.  
6. The other photos had little influence on my         -.596        .617      -.093 
    decision. 
7. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to        .694       -.228   .189 
    look the same. 
8. They [other photos] confused me; made the task    .078       -.781   .259 
    more difficult.     
9. They [other photos] were all so similar that they     .854         .016  -.044 
    made me less confident. 
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Table 5b. Factor Analysis Components 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Factor 1: Deliberative Thought Strategy Statements 
He was the closest person to what I remember but not exact. 
While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think back to the video 
and compare 
As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look the same. 
The other pictures were all so similar they made me less confident.  
Factor 2: Simple Matching Strategy Statements 
I focused on his most distinct feature.  
I matched the image in my head to the picture in front of me.  
The other pictures had little influence on my decision.  
The other pictures confused me; made the task more difficult (reverse 
scored).  
Factor 3: Automatic Recognition Statement 
 I recognized him, I cannot explain why 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 After running reliability analyses two significant factors remained: the four 
item deliberative and thoughtful strategy (α > .63) and a three item simple 
matching strategy that did not include “I focused on his most distinct feature” (α > 
.66). It was not surprising that the distinct feature statement did not remain 
significantly tied to the other accurate statements; it was included because both 
accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses in Study 1 described using a distinct feature 
like hair and nose to compare lineup photographs. Therefore, the data on this 
decision process replicate the findings in Study 1.  
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 Further, to see if these two decision strategies could be mapped specifically 
onto the accuracy of the eyewitness, I averaged the items in Factor 1 together 
creating a deliberative thought variable and did the same with the items in Factor 
2, creating a simple matching variable. Using these two new composite variables, a 
2 (accurate vs. inaccurate) X 2 (simple match statements vs. deliberative 
statements) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between 
the type of strategy used and the accuracy of the participant witness, F (1 , 54) = 
10.21, p  < .002).  In order to ensure that the strategies represented unique 
decision processes and not just witness confidence, the within-subjects 2 x 2 
ANOVA was done again, controlling for confidence as a covariate, F (1 , 51) = 
5.41, p  < .02, the interaction was still significant.  Then, I performed an 
independent samples t-test and found that accurate eyewitnesses (n=31) were 
significantly more likely to report their decision process using the simple matching 
strategy, t(54) = -2.98, p< .004, and inaccurate eyewitnesses (n=25) were 
significantly more likely to report that they reached their decision through a 
more deliberative and thoughtful strategy, t(54) = 2.35,  p< .022 (Table 6). 
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Table 6. Mean Number of Simple Matching and Deliberative Thought 
Responses Endorsed by Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses        
______________________________________________________________________ 
      Witness Type 
                        
     Accurate       Inaccurate 
      (n = 31)                     (n = 25) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 Decision Strategy     
Simple Matching        2.3*                      1.6 
Deliberative                    0.9                      1.7**   
                          
 
*p < .02, accurate witnesses significantly more likely than inaccurate witnesses 
to endorse simple matching strategy.                   
**p < .004, inaccurate witnesses significantly more likely than accurate 
witnesses to endorse deliberative strategy.  
 
Discussion 
 This study supports the hypothesis that there are significant differences 
between how accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses process sequential lineups. I 
have demonstrated that the decision process of accurate eyewitnesses is a 
simple strategy of matching the lineup pictures to the image of the perpetrator 
in memory, and this process is not influenced by the other pictures in the 
lineup. I had predicted that automatic recognition would be a prominent 
technique for accurate eyewitnesses in this study, since research on the 
simultaneous lineup revealed such a process. However, it became evident early 
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in this research project that the sequential lineup makes the “pop out” of any 
one photograph impossible since the photos are never seen simultaneously. 
Therefore, accurate eyewitnesses use the picture in their memory to create 
recognition of the perpetrator, in the sequential lineup. This is a matching 
strategy that does not require the lineup photos to be presented next to each 
other, and yet maintains accuracy.  
 Inaccurate eyewitnesses proved to use a more deliberative strategy in 
which they appeared not to have a clear image in their head of the perpetrator, 
but instead relied on their ability to think back to the crime scene. These 
eyewitnesses tried to use the other photos in the lineup as a guide, but found 
the task to be difficult because all of the photos began to look the same when 
they were not presented all at once.  Therefore, inaccurate eyewitnesses were no 
longer able to compare the photographs (as in a simultaneous lineup), instead 
they tried to think back to the crime, compare, and select the closest person. 
This indicates a similar pattern of inaccurate eyewitnesses trying to pick the 
closest person, instead of the “certain” perpetrator.  
 
Summary 
 Study 2 was the experimental test of the qualitative and untested 
findings from Study 1. As predicted, there were significant differences in how 
accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses processed the sequential lineup. By better 
understanding the decision-making strategies of eyewitnesses using the 
sequential lineup, researchers can try to design procedures making it even more 
difficult for inaccurate eyewitness to come to a decision, and we may even be 
able to successfully determine the accuracy of eyewitnesses after they have 
chosen a photograph. The further exploration and replication of the simple 
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matching strategy and the deliberative thought strategy in situations most 
similar to those witnesses encounter in police stations was the intent of Study 3.  
   
  
CHAPTER 4: 
DECISION STRATEGIES AND TARGET ABSENT LINEUPS 
 
Overview  
 In Studies 1 and 2, only target present lineups were conducted.  In target 
present lineups, accurate identifications indicate that the witness chose the 
correct perpetrator, and inaccurate eyewitnesses chose a foil or filler lineup 
photograph. In actual police lineup situations, the most problematic inaccurate 
identifications involve witnesses selecting an innocent suspect that is usually 
brought into the police station as a match to the perpetrator’s description. This 
study will include both target present and target absent conditions and will 
address two central questions. Do the decision processes accurate eyewitnesses 
use in target present lineup situations significantly differ from inaccurate 
eyewitnesses in target absent situations? Is there a difference between 
inaccurate eyewitnesses who make identifications in target absent vs. target 
present conditions? 
 In addition, study 2 analyses did not seem to capture the potential 
automatic recognition processes of accurate eyewitnesses with the decision 
statement “I just recognized him, I cannot explain why.” Although this 
statement did significantly differentiate accurate and inaccurate witnesses, it 
showed no strong connection with the other statements in the factor analyses. 
Thus, after looking further at accurate eyewitnesses’ open-ended responses to 
studies 1 and 2, I included an additional decision process statement that might 
further capture the predicted automatic nature of accurate identifications.  
After seeing the same videotaped staged crime as in studies 1 and 2, 
eyewitnesses were either shown an eight person target absent lineup in which 
the perpetrator photograph was replaced with a similar looking innocent
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suspect, or they saw the same eight person target present sequential lineup 
used in studies 1 and 2.  Then, witnesses were asked to identify the perpetrator, 
and describe their decision processes by endorsing up to six strategies 
presented to them, as well as describing their processes in an open-ended 
format. Any positive identification was included in subsequent analyses, 
regardless of whether it was correct or incorrect. 
 
Participants 
     Participants were 174 Cornell University undergraduates from a variety of 
courses in psychology and human development who earned extra credit for 
their participation.  
 
Procedure 
  The procedures were exactly the same as Studies 1 and 2, except 
participants were randomly assigned to see either an eight person target 
present lineup or a target absent with replacement lineup. Thus, a similar 
looking suspect photograph was replaced as the perpetrator photograph in the 
target absent condition.  
 
Dependent Measures 
 After reaching an identification judgment, all participants completed a 
follow up questionnaire containing the same dependent measures as those used 
in Study 2, but with the addition of one new decision processes statement (See 
Appendix C). Participant witnesses were asked “How would you best describe 
your decision process?” There were now six responses listed and participants 
were told to select as many as applied. The response options included the 
processes identified in Study 1: “I just recognized him, I cannot explain why,” I 
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focused on his most distinctive feature,” He was the closest person to what I 
remember, but not exact, “I matched the image in my head to the picture in 
front of me,” and “While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think back to 
the video and compare.” In addition, participants could endorse “As soon as I 
saw the picture, I knew that it was the culprit.” Participants could also endorse 
“other” and write in their response.   
 
Results 
 Of the 174 participants in the study, 68 were in the target present 
condition and 106 were in the target-absent condition. From the target present 
condition, 24 (35%) made an accurate identification, 8 (12%) selected an 
innocent foil, 19 (28%) made no decision at all, and 17(25%) insisted that the 
perpetrator was not in the lineup. From the target absent condition, 14 (13%) 
selected the innocent suspect replacement, 14 (13%) selected a lineup foil, 21 
(31%) made no decision at all, 54 (51%) correctly indicated that the perpetrator 
was not in the lineup, and 3 (3%) marked more than one photograph and thus 
were not included in the positive identifications. 
 
Decision Processes of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
 The first question of interest in this study was whether witnesses 
selecting the innocent replacement from the target absent lineup (i.e., 
inaccurate, n=14) made decisions differently from witnesses selecting the actual 
perpetrator in target present lineups (i.e., accurate, n=24). Accurate witnesses 
had significantly greater confidence than inaccurate witnesses (71% versus 53%, 
t(35) = 2.12, p < .04). Was there a differential selection of decision process 
statements by accurate and inaccurate witnesses in this situation? The mean 
responses of accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses can be seen in Table 7. 
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Accurate eyewitnesses marginally endorsed the statement “I focused on his 
most distinctive feature” (21% versus 0%, z = 1.83, p < .06). In addition, they 
were more likely, but not significantly, to endorse “I just recognized him, I 
cannot explain why” (38% versus 14%,  z = 1.52, p < .12), , and “As soon as I saw 
the picture, I knew it was the culprit” (13% versus 0%, z = 1.38, p < .16. 
Inaccurate eyewitnesses, selecting the target replacement, were significantly 
more likely to endorse “He was the closest person to what I remember but not 
exact” (57% versus 25%, z = 1.98, p < .04), and indicate that the other pictures 
were so similar they made them less confident (50% versus 21%, z = 1.87, p < 
.06).  
When participants were asked which had a greater influence on their 
decision, their memory of the perpetrator or the pictures in the lineup, accurate 
witnesses were significantly more likely to say their memory (71% versus 29%, 
z  =  2.53, p < .01). Inaccurate eyewitnesses were not more likely endorse that 
the pictures had the greatest impact on their identification (z = -.58, ns). Instead, 
they significantly indicated that both their memory and the pictures impacted 
their decision making (z = -2.27, p < .02).   
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Table 7.   Mean Percentages of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
Endorsing Individual Decision Processes Statements 
______________________________________________________________________ 
               Witness Type 
                     __________________ 
            Target         Target 
            Present       Absent 
                                                                     Accurate   Inaccurate   z         p 
Individual Item                      (n= 24)       (n= 14) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why. a  38   14         1.52      .12 
2. I focused on his most distinctive feature. a   21   0      1.83      .06 
3. He was the closest person to what I remember  25   57   -1.98      .04  
    but not exact. i 
4. I matched the image in my head to the picture   50    36           .86      ns 
    in front on me. 
5. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think     63   57     .33        ns 
    back to the video and compare.  
6. As soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was the     13    0    1.38      .16 
    culprit. a  
7. The other photos had little influence on my decision.  54   36     1.10      ns      
8. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look     17   29   - .82        ns 
    the same. 
9. They [other photos] confused me; made the task     33   36    -.15        ns 
    more difficult. 
10. They [other photos] were all so similar that they         21   50    -1.87     .06 
    made me less confident. i 
a Indicator of accuracy                i Indicator of inaccuracy 
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 As originally predicted, accurate eyewitnesses, as shown in the analyses 
above, were significantly more likely to endorse automatic recognition decision 
processes such as “I just recognized him, I cannot explain why,” and the 
addition “As soon as I saw the picture, I knew it was the culprit.” Therefore, I 
added an automatic recognition factor that averaged responses to “I just 
recognized him, I cannot explain why” and “As soon as I saw the picture, I knew 
that it was the culprit.” Accurate eyewitnesses were moderately more likely to 
report using automatic decision processes t(36) = 10.19, p < .07.  
 Further, I wanted to see if the simple matching and deliberative processing 
strategies identified in study 2 would differentiate between accurate and inaccurate 
witnesses in this study. To test this, I averaged the items into the same two factors 
and created a simple matching variable and a deliberative variable. I performed an 
independent samples t-test and found that accurate eyewitnesses (n=24) were not 
significantly more likely to report their decision process using the simple matching 
strategy statements, t(36) = 1.16,  ns, and inaccurate eyewitnesses (n=14) were 
also not more likely to report that they reached their decision through a more 
deliberative and thoughtful strategy, t(36) = -1.47, ns (Table 8).  As well, a 2 
(accurate vs. inaccurate) X 2 (simple match statements vs. deliberative statements) 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between the type of 
strategy used and the accuracy of the participant witness, F (1 , 36) = 2.33, p  < .14).  
Although the analyses were obviously in the predicted direction, probably due 
to the smaller sample sizes, significance was not reached. Confirmation that 
Study 3 was on its way to replicating the findings of Study 2 is evidenced in the 
similar effect sizes from the interaction between witness strategy and accuracy 
in Study 2 (η = .39) and Study 3 (η = .25). Eta (η) is the proportion of variance in 
the dependent variable that is explained by differences among groups.  
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Table 8. Mean Number of Simple Matching, Deliberative Thought, and 
Automatic Responses Endorsed by Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
______________________________________________________________________ 
      Witness Type 
                       ________________________________________ 
   Target Present   Target Absent 
      Accurate      Inaccurate 
       (n = 24)        (n = 14) 
__________________________________________________________ 
 Decision Strategy     
Simple Matching            1.3                        1.1 
            Deliberative                        0.9                        1.6  
 Automatic             0.4             0.1* 
______________________________________________________________________ 
* p <  .07, accurate witnesses were more likely to endorse automatic variable than 
inaccurate witnesses.  
 
Inaccurate Witnesses from Target Present and Target Absent Lineups 
 The second extension of study 3 from studies 1 and 2, was determining if 
the decision processes inaccurate eyewitnesses use in target absent situations 
significantly differ, not only from accurate eyewitnesses, but from inaccurate 
eyewitnesses in target present conditions. Using z scores, I compared target 
present inaccurate responses (n = 8) to the main dependent measures, to target 
absent inaccurate (n =14 ) responses (Table 9). Only one decision process was 
significantly different for both sets of inaccurate eyewitnesses, “I focused on his 
most distinctive feature.” This decision process was endorsed more often by 
inaccurate eyewitnesses selecting foil photographs than by witnesses selecting 
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the innocent suspect in a target absent lineup (z = 1.96, p < .06). A 2 (target 
present inaccurate vs. target absent inaccurate) X 2 (simple match statements vs. 
deliberative statements) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant 
interaction between the type of strategy used and the two types of inaccurate 
witnesses, F (1 , 20) = .93, ns).  However, I was concerned that there were only 
eight inaccurate participants in the target present condition.   
 In order to get a more powerful and comprehensive analyses of these 
differences, I collapsed the inaccurate witness data from Study 2 and Study 3, in 
order to determine if inaccurate eyewitnesses in target absent conditions differ 
significantly from those in target present conditions. By doing this, the analysis 
included 33 target present inaccurate identifications and 14 target absent 
inaccurate identifications from this study. Analysis of the collapsed data show 
that only one out of nine decision processes were significantly different 
between target present and target absent inaccurate witnesses (Table 10). One 
was marginally more likely to be endorsed by target present inaccurate 
witnesses, “I focused on his most distinctive feature” (z = 1.7, p < .08), and the 
other was more likely to be endorsed by target absent inaccurate witnesses, 
“the other photos were all so similar they made me less confident” (z = -1.97, p 
< .04). However, a 2 (target present inaccurate vs. target absent inaccurate) X 2 
(simple match statements vs. deliberative statements) repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed no significant interaction between the type of strategy used and the two 
types of inaccurate witnesses, F (1 , 45) = .57, ns).   
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Table 9.   Mean Percentages of Target Present and Target Absent Inaccurate 
Eyewitnesses Endorsing Individual Decision Processes Statements 
______________________________________________________________________ 
          Inaccurate Witness Type 
                          ________________ 
                Target     Target 
                                                                         Present   Absent      z        p    
Individual Item                  (n = 8)    (n = 14) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why.   13   14         -.12        ns 
2. I focused on his most distinctive feature.   25   0      1.96      .06 
3. He was the closest person to what I remember but   50   57     -.32       ns  
    not exact. 
4. I matched the image in my head to the picture in       63   36          1.2        ns 
    front on me.  
5. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think     63          57     .24        ns 
    back to the video and compare.  
6. As soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was the     13      0     1.36        ns 
    culprit.   
7. The other photos had little influence on my decision. 50   36    .66         ns 
8. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look     25   29    -.18        ns 
    the same. 
9. They [other photos] confused me; made the task         13   36     -1.18     ns 
    more difficult.  
10. They [other photos] were all so similar that they         25   50     -1.15     ns 
   made me less confident. 
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Table 10.   Mean Percentages of Target Present and Target Absent Inaccurate 
Eyewitnesses from Studies 2 and 3 Endorsing Individual 
Decision Processes Statements 
______________________________________________________________________ 
          Inaccurate Witness Type 
                        __________________ 
                Target     Target 
                                                                         Present    Absent      z        p    
Individual Item                  (n = 33)  (n = 14) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why.   21   14         .55         ns 
2. I focused on his most distinctive feature.   18   0        1.7      .08 
3. He was the closest person to what I remember but  39   57     -1.12     ns  
    not exact. 
4. I matched the image in my head to the picture in  45   36          .62        ns 
    front on me. 
5. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think  73   57     1.05      ns 
   back to the video and compare.  
6. As soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was the  13      0       1.36      ns 
    culprit. 
7. The other photos had little influence on my decision. 42   36       .43      ns 
8. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look    21   29     -.54       ns 
    the same.  
9. They [other photos] confused me; made the task    33   36     -.16       ns 
    more difficult. 
10. They [other photos] were all so similar that they       21   50     -1.97     04 
    made me less confident. 
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Analyses of Studies 2 and 3 Collapsed 
 Due to the fact that most responses were not significantly different 
between target absent and target present inaccurate identifications, it seemed 
that collapsing all data from study 2 with data from this study would give the 
most comprehensive picture of differences between decision processes of 
accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses viewing sequential lineups. Collapsing 
the data, there were 55 accurate witnesses and 47 inaccurate witnesses in the 
analyses.  
 Accurate witnesses had significantly greater confidence than inaccurate 
witnesses (72% vs. 59%, t (97) = 2.85, p < .005). The mean responses of accurate 
and inaccurate eyewitnesses can be seen in Table 11. Accurate eyewitnesses 
continued to significantly endorse “They [the other photos] had little influence 
on my decision” (67% versus 44%, z = 2.72, p < .006) and were more likely to 
select “I matched the image in my head to the picture in front of me” (58% 
versus 43%, z = 1.58, p < .12). Inaccurate eyewitnesses were significantly more 
likely to endorse “While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think back to the 
video and compare” (68% versus 47%, z = 2.11, p < .04), and “He was the closest 
person to what I remember but not exact” (45% versus 27%, z = 1.84, p < .06). In 
addition incorrect eyewitnesses were more likely to say “They [the other 
photos] confused me; made the task more difficult (34% versus 20%, z = 1.61, p 
< .10), and “They [other photos] were all so similar that they made me less 
confident” (30% versus 16%, z = 1.62, p < .10). Statements such as “I just 
recognized him, I cannot explain why” (20% versus 19%,  z =.11, ns), and “I 
focused on his most distinctive feature” (18% versus 12%,  z = .875, ns) did not 
distinguish the conditions once the data were collapsed.   
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Table 11.   Mean Percentages of  Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
Endorsing Individual Decision Processes Statements from  
Study 2 and 3 Collapsed 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                 Witness Type 
                     _____________________ 
                                                                             Accurate   Inaccurate    z     p 
  Individual Item                           (n = 55)      (n = 47) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why.     20   19         .11         ns 
2. I focused on his most distinctive feature.     18   12      .75         ns 
3. He was the closest person to what I remember but    27   45    -1.84     .06  
    not exact. i 
4. I matched the image in my head to the picture in    58   43          1.58     .12 
    front on me. a 
5. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think        47   68    -2.11      04 
    back to the video and compare. i 
6. As soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was the     13     5     .96        ns 
    culprit. 
7. The other photos had little influence on my decision.a  67    40     2.72   .006      
8. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look     15    23        -1.14      ns 
    the same. 
9. They [other photos] confused me; made the task           20    34     -1.61    .10 
    more difficult. i  
10. They [other photos] were all so similar that they      16    30    -1.62     .10 
   made me less confident. i                                                                                                                       
a Indictor of accuracy          i Indicator of inaccuracy 
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When asked which had a greater influence on their decision, their 
memory of the perpetrator or the pictures in the lineup, accurate participants 
were most likely to say their memory (71% versus 47%, z = 1.65, p < .10) and 
inaccurate participants were more likely to say the pictures (17% versus 7%, z = 
1.53, p < .12) or both memory and pictures equally (36% versus 22%, z = 1.61, p 
< .10).  
Do the simple matching and deliberative processing strategies identified in 
study 2 differentiate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses in this study?  The 
items were averaged into the same two factors from study 2, creating a simple 
matching variable and a deliberative variable, in addition to the automatic 
recognition variable that averaged responses to “I just recognized him, I cannot 
explain why” and “As soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was the culprit.” A 2 
(accurate vs. inaccurate) X 2 (simple match statements vs. deliberative statements) 
repeated measures ANOVA reveals a significant interaction between the type of 
strategy used and the accuracy of the participant witness, F (1 , 100) = 10.52, p  < 
.002).  The automatic variable was not included in the ANOVA because the second 
automatic statement was not included as a dependent measure until this study. In 
order to rule out that the strategies did not represent unique decision processes 
but were simply indicative of witness confidence, the within-subjects the 2x2 
ANOVA was tested again, controlling for confidence as a covariate, F (1 , 96) = 
3.77 , p  < .06, the interaction maintained moderate significance.  Then, performing 
independent samples t-tests, accurate eyewitnesses (n=55) were significantly more 
likely to report their decision process using the simple matching strategy 
statements, t(100) = 2.77,  p <.007, and inaccurate eyewitnesses (n=47) were more 
likely to report that they reached their decision through a more deliberative and 
thoughtful strategy, t(100) = -2.67,  p < .009 (Table 12). In addition, accurate 
eyewitnesses were significantly more likely to endorse automatic recognition 
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decision processes t(100) = 2.10,  p < .04. I was not able to capture this process 
with the one decision statement; the addition of a second automatic processing 
decision statement proved successful.  
 
Table 12. Mean Number of Simple Matching, Deliberative Thought, and 
Automatic Responses Endorsed by Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses from 
Study 2 and 3 Collapsed 
______________________________________________________________________ 
               Witness Type 
                                                  ________________________________ 
    Accurate             Inaccurate 
     (n = 55)     (n = 47) 
_____________________________________________________ 
 Decision Strategy     
Simple Matching          1.5*                    1.1 
Deliberative                      0.9                    1.4*  
Automatic           0.4**         0.2 
______________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .009, accurate witnesses were significantly  more likely than inaccurate witnesses 
to endorse the simple matching variable and inaccurate witnesses were significantly 
more likely than inaccurate witnesses to endorse the deliberative variable.  
 **p < .04, accurate witnesses were more likely to endorse automatic variable than 
inaccurate witnesses. 
 
Discussion 
 Study 3 was an extension of studies 1 and 2, looking at witness decision 
processes in target present and target absent situations. This distinction is 
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important in securing the ecological validity of the research for actual police 
situations. In this study, I found significant differences in decision-making 
strategies between accurate witnesses who selected the correct target from the 
lineup and inaccurate eyewitnesses who selected the perpetrator replacement 
from the lineup (i.e., innocent suspect). Accurate eyewitnesses were 
significantly more likely to endorse that they just recognized the culprit without 
being able to explain why (i.e., automatic), and they focused on his most 
distinctive feature and used that feature to compare against the lineup 
photographs. In addition, they were moderately more likely to say that as soon 
as they saw the picture of culprit, they knew that it was him, further 
representative of automatic processing. However, the findings did not 
completely replicate study 2. Participants did not significantly indicate the use 
of their memory in matching the photographs to the image in their head, 
although the data are in the right direction. Although approaching significance, 
accurate participants also did not indicate that the other photographs in the 
lineup had little influence on their decision. Nevertheless, when asked whether 
their memory, the pictures, or both had a greater influence on their decision, 
accurate witnesses were significantly more likely to endorse their memory 
alone.  
 Furthermore, the data from inaccurate participants did not replicate 
study 2. Inaccurate eyewitnesses were more likely to say that they picked the 
closest match but not the exact culprit, as well as indicate that all the pictures in 
the lineup were so similar that they were made less confident. These witnesses 
did not endorse the strategy of looking back to the video to compare each 
photograph, a large component of the deliberative thought strategy discovered 
in study 2. However, accurate eyewitnesses did endorse more simple matching 
strategy statements than inaccurate eyewitness and inaccurate eyewitnesses 
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selected more deliberative strategy statements. Although these findings were 
not significant, they did lend support for the themes identified in study 2.  
 Due to the fact that the target absent inaccurate data did not replicate the 
target present inaccurate witnesses, further analyses were undertaken to 
determine if these groups differed significantly in their decision making 
processes. Only one factor differentiated the processing of these groups, 
focusing on his most distinctive feature, and thus does not explain the lack of 
replication. Unfortunately, there were only 8 target present inaccurate 
identifications. So, to be certain that there was not a larger distinction between 
these inaccurate groups, the target present and target absent inaccurate data 
were collapsed across studies 2 and 3. A similar pattern emerged, target present 
inaccurates were still more likely to endorse using the distinctive feature 
approach, but target absent inaccurates were also more likely to say that the 
other photos were so similar they became less confident. These processes, 
however, were not those that significantly differentiated accurate from 
inaccurate witnesses in study 2.  
 In order to get the most complete picture of witness decision processes, 
and since there was little distinction between target present and target absent 
inaccurate witnesses, all of the data from studies 2 and 3 were analyzed 
together. By collapsing the data, the number of participants in each cell 
increased dramatically, producing enough power to show an effect if it existed. 
Together the data significantly differentiated the decision-making processes of 
accurate and inaccurate witnesses and produced what I believe is the most 
comprehensive analysis of the data. Accurate witnesses used the image in their 
head to match the pictures in the lineup and indicated that the other 
photographs in the lineups had little influence on their final decision. 
Obviously, the other photographs are taken into consideration but accurate 
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eyewitness did not use them as a tool to decide if the culprit’s photograph was 
a better match. Inaccurate witnesses, on the other hand, chose the photograph 
that was closest to what they remembered; they thought back to the video and 
compared each photograph to a less clear, more distant image; and they felt 
that the other photographs confused them, made the task more difficult, and 
were so similar they became less confident. Thus, these witnesses were 
strategically using the other photographs to help them identify the true culprit 
but found that strategy very difficult with the sequential lineup procedure. 
When the decision strategies of both groups were broken down into the simple 
matching and deliberative process strategies, accurate eyewitnesses were 
significantly more likely to endorse the former and inaccurate witnesses the 
later. In addition, accurate witnesses were significantly more likely to endorse 
the two more automatic processes, as was originally predicted.  
 The primary distinction between the simple matching and deliberative 
thought strategies is captured in what image of the perpetrator witnesses use 
when attempting to identify his photograph later. Accurate eyewitnesses 
continue to state that they have an image in their head of the culprit and they 
compare that image to every photograph presented to them. On the other hand, 
inaccurate eyewitnesses need to look back to the video for an image, creating a 
far less clear image and an image that may deteriorate when more lineup 
photographs are presented. The ability to have an active image present after 
seeing a crime would cognitively enable a more accurate recognition of the 
perpetrator when the images are compared. Thus, I believe that accurate 
eyewitnesses are better able to identify the correct culprit because they were 
able to retain a solid image of the perpetrator in memory for later comparison.  
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Summary 
 Study 3 demonstrated a simple matching strategy used by accurate 
eyewitnesses and a deliberative thought strategy used by inaccurate 
eyewitnesses. In addition, accurate eyewitnesses did show more automatic 
processing, a pattern consistent throughout the eyewitness literature. This 
study, combined with the data from study 2, provides evidence that witness 
accuracy impacts or is impacted by the decision processes witnesses use. The 
results from Study 3, however, are based on a single crime, perpetrator, and 
lineup. It is important that the generalizability of the findings be well 
established. However, to be sure that this effect is not related to the specific 
quality or type of crime presented to witnesses in studies 1-3, replication of 
these distinctive strategies with a different set of crime and lineup materials 
would be more compelling. This was the aim of Study 4, to which we now turn.  
  
 CHAPTER FIVE: 
REPLICATION OF ACCURACY AND DECISION STRATEGIES 
USING NEW CRIME STIMULI 
 
Overview 
Study 4a and 4b aimed to replicate the findings from Study 3 using a 
new crime, perpetrator, and lineup. As was obvious from the accuracy rates of 
Studies 2 and 3, the “Sponsoring Cornell” witness situation was difficult for 
participants. In this study, I created a new set of materials that was expected to 
make identifications somewhat easier for witnesses. In real world conditions, 
there is significant variability in the viewing conditions from crime to crime. 
When doing laboratory research, it is important to be sure that the decision-
making processes found in the previous studies can be replicated in situations 
where the viewing conditions are different.  
In these studies, participant witnesses were asked to identify the culprit 
from either a target present or target absent, eight person, sequential lineup 
procedure, after viewing a new video-taped staged crime in which the 
perpetrator steals a woman’s purse. Witnesses were then asked about the 
decision processes they had followed in reaching their decision, using the same 
decision statements selected in Study 1.  It was predicted that Studies 4a and 4b 
would replicate the findings of Study 3, distinguishing eyewitnesses by their 
utilization of either a simple matching strategy or a deliberative thought 
strategy. Accurate witnesses would also show automatic processing, it was 
predicted.  
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Participants 
 In Study 4a, participants were 139 Cornell University undergraduates 
recruited from a variety of courses in psychology and human development who 
earned extra credit for their participation; only target present lineups were 
included.  
 In Study 4b, another 188 participants, also Cornell University 
undergraduates from a variety of courses in psychology and human 
development who earned extra credit for their participation, target present or 
target absent lineup conditions were included.  
 
Procedure 
  In both Study 4a and 4b, all participants were brought into the lab 
individually to participate in a study called “Objective Film Criteria.” They 
were told by an experimenter that Cornell students over the years have 
expressed concern over the very subjective nature of grading in artistic courses 
and that we were interested in objectifying and improving the evaluation 
criteria used by college professors in artistic fields. Participants were told that 
they would critique 3 short videos shot by Cornell students in a beginning film 
course. The experimenter highlighted that it was important that participants 
pay close attention to the footage taken because after watching the videos we 
wanted them to evaluate each of them on how well the video was filmed using 
the most objective film criteria possible, and, finally, that we would be 
comparing student responses with those of faculty members with the goal of 
compiling a list of evaluative criteria that are seen as fair from both student and 
professor perspectives.     
 Participants actually only viewed two videos. The first video was 3 
minutes long and contained winter footage of the city of Ithaca, and the snow, 
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from artistic angles. The second video, the main manipulation, was 1 minute 
and 50 seconds long and contained scenes of various storefronts on the Ithaca 
Commons. At the end of the video, during footage of one storefront, a woman 
walked up the ATM machine by the storefront entrance, put down her 
shopping bag and purse by her right foot and proceeded to acquire money from 
the machine. A man, standing on the other side of the store entrance, looked 
around, walked up, and quietly took the purse and walked in the other 
direction while keeping a look-out for witnesses. The perpetrator was a 
Caucasian male, with brown eyes, straight, short to medium length brown hair 
(slightly thinning), slightly olive toned skin, high forehead, oval and long face, 
small mouth and lips, slightly large ears, medium build, and between 5’ 8”-
5’10’’ tall.  The perpetrator was visible for approximately 25 seconds. Most of 
that time the camera was close-up, giving witnesses a clear view of his face, and 
then the video concluded. The video was shown on a 27 inch flat screen 
television monitor.  
 At this point, Study 4a and 4b were slightly different. In Study 4a, 
participants were all shown the same target present, eight person sequential 
lineup. In Study 4b, participants were randomly assigned to either a target 
present condition or a target absent with replacement of innocent suspect 
condition. The sequential lineup proecdures were exactly the same as those 
used in Studies 1-3.  
 
Materials  
 The lineup foils were selected from a collection of 46 photographs of 
college-age men who possessed the same coloring and facial descriptors as the 
perpetrator. The similarities of these photographs to the photograph of the 
offender, as well as their ranking in similarity within the collection of 
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photographs, were made by 15 student participants. In addition, the similarities 
of these photographs to a composite description of the offender, as well as their 
ranking within the collection, were made by 20 different student participants. 
Five of the photographs selected were in the top ten ranked list both by 
photograph similarity and match to description, the other two were in the ten 
ranked list by match to description. The highest rated and ranked photograph 
was used as the suspect replacement in target absent lineups. In the lineup, the 
perpetrator and all foils wore identical navy blue sweatshirts and gazed into the 
camera without emotion.  
 Using the mockwitness procedure described in Study 1 and 60 total 
mockwitnesses, the functional sizes were 4.27 and 4.23 for the culprit present 
and culprit absent sequential lineups, respectively (McQuiston & Malpass, 
2002). Therefore, there were approximately four good distractors in each lineup. 
In addition, using the mockwitness procedure and 60 mockwitnesses the target 
present lineup was not biased toward the perpetrator and the target absent 
lineup was not biased toward the suspect replacement (McQuiston & Malpass, 
2002). Not biased means that the target photograph was not selected at a rate 
greater than chance by mockwitness persons unaware of the crime but who 
were given the description of the suspect and asked to select the culprit from 
the lineup. 
 
Dependent Measures 
 The dependent measures were exactly the same as those in Studies 1-3.  
 
Results 
 Two separate replication experiments were run, one with only a target 
present condition (Study 4a) and one with both a target absent and target 
  
  76
present conditions (Study 4b). Before data could be collapsed across both 
studies for increased power, analyses were done to be sure that target present 
inaccurate and target absent inaccurate witnesses are not significantly different 
in their decision processes, as was found in Study 3.   
 Of the 139 participants in Study 4a, 82 (59%) made positive 
identifications from a target present lineup, meaning they identified a specific 
photograph as that of the perpetrator. Of these, 63 (77%) were accurate and 19 
(23%) were inaccurate. Of the remaining 57 witnesses, 18 (32%) marked “no 
decision,” 19 (33%) insisted that the perpetrator’s photograph was not in the 
lineup, 7 (12%) selected multiple photographs, usually two, and were not 
included in further analyses, and, unfortunately, 13 (23%) participants had to be 
excluded due to technical difficulties with the television setup.   
 Of the 188 participants in Study 4b, 74 were in the target present 
condition and 114 were in the target-absent condition. From the target present 
condition, 25 (34%) made an accurate identification, 17 (23%) selected an 
innocent foil, 9 (12%) made no decision at all, 21 (28%) insisted that the 
perpetrator was not in the lineup, and 2 (3%) selected two photographs and 
were not included in further analyses. From the target absent condition, 18 
(16%) selected the innocent suspect replacement, 26 (23%) selected a lineup foil, 
15 (13%) made no decision at all, 54 (47%) correctly indicated that the 
perpetrator was not in the lineup, and 1 marked more than one photograph and 
was not included in the positive identifications. 
 
Inaccurate Witnesses from Target Present and Target Absent Lineups 
 The inaccurate witness responses from both data sets were collapsed, in 
order to determine if inaccurate eyewitnesses in target absent conditions 
differed significantly from those in target present conditions. By doing this, the 
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analysis included 36 target present inaccurate identifications and 18 target 
absent inaccurate identifications. Analysis of the collapsed data showed that 
only three out of nine decision processes were different between target present 
and target absent inaccurate witnesses, and one of these was the same as that 
found between studies 2 and 3 (Table 13). “I focused on his most distinctive 
feature” (z = -1.9, p < .06) was marginally more likely to be endorsed by target 
present inaccurate witnesses. The other two were more likely to be endorsed by 
target absent inaccurate witnesses, “The other photos had little influence on my 
decision (z = 2.17, p < .04),” and “They [other photos] were all so similar that 
they made me less confident” (z = 1.76, p < .08). Replicating Study 3, a 2 (target 
present inaccurate vs. target absent inaccurate) X 2 (simple match statements vs. 
deliberative statements) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant 
interaction between the type of strategy used and the two types of inaccurate 
witnesses, F (1 , 54) = 1.57, ns).   
 
Analyses of Collapsed Data 
 Due to the fact that, again, most responses were not significantly 
different between target absent and target present inaccurate identifications, it 
seemed that collapsing all data would give the most comprehensive replication 
of differences between decision processes of accurate and inaccurate 
eyewitnesses viewing sequential lineups. Collapsing the data, there were 88 
accurate witnesses and 54 inaccurate witnesses in the analyses.  
 Accurate witnesses had significantly greater confidence than inaccurate 
witnesses (77% vs.62%, t (140) = 3.50, p < .001). The mean responses of accurate 
and inaccurate eyewitnesses can be seen in Table 14. Accurate eyewitnesses 
continued to significantly or marginally endorse multiple statements such as “I 
focused on his most distinctive features” (28% versus 15%, z = 1.86, p < .06), “I 
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matched the image in my head to the picture in front of me” (68% versus 50%, z 
= 2.16, p < .04), “As soon as I saw the picture, I knew it was the culprit” (26% 
versus 95, z = 2.45, p < .01),  and “the other photographs had little influence on 
my decision” (72% versus 52%, z = 2.38, p < .02).  
 Inaccurate eyewitnesses were significantly more likely to endorse “He 
was the closest person to what I remember but not exact” (44% versus 16%, z = 
3.73, p < .001), “As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look the same 
(17% versus 5%, z = 2.43, p < .02), and “They [other photos] were all so similar 
that they made me less confident” (26% versus 13%, z = 2.04, p < .04). “While I 
looked at each photograph, I tried to think back to the video and compare,” 
although not significant, was in the right direction (61% versus 52%, z = 1.02, 
ns). 
 Statements that did not distinguish between conditions included, “I just 
recognized him, I cannot explain why” (26% versus 30%,  z = -.51, ns), and 
“They [other photos] confused me; made the task more difficult” (28% versus 
23%,  z = .68, ns). 
 When asked which had a greater influence on their decision, their 
memory of the perpetrator or the pictures in the lineup, accurate and inaccurate 
participants were most likely to say their memory (70% and 61%, respectively). 
This did not replicate the finding in previous studies, in which accurate 
witnesses generally indicate their memory having greater influence, and 
inaccurate witnesses indicated that the pictures or both had greater influence 
over their decisions. 
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Table 13.   Mean Percentages of Target Present and Target Absent Inaccurate 
Eyewitnesses Endorsing Individual Decision Processes Statements 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                  Inaccurate Witness Type 
                    ____________________ 
                        Target       Target 
                                                                     Present     Absent      z        p    
Individual Item                          (n = 36)     (n = 18) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why.  25   28           -.22      ns 
2. I focused on his most distinctive features.  8   28        -1.9     .06 
3. He was the closest person to what I remember but 50   33     1.16      ns  
    not exact. 
4. I matched the image in my head to the picture in 47   56          -.58       ns 
    front on me. 
5. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think 58   67     -.60       ns 
    back to the video and compare.  
6. As soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was the 8      11       -.33       ns   
    culprit. 
7. The other photos had little influence on my   42    72     -2.17     04 
    decision. 
8. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look 14    22     -.77       ns 
    the same. 
9. They [other photos] confused me; made the task 33    17      1.29     ns 
    more difficult. 
10. They [other photos] were all so similar that they     33    11      1.76    .08 
    made me less confident. 
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Table 14.   Mean Percentages of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
Endorsing Individual Decision Processes Statements from Collapsed Data 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                    Witness Type 
              ___________________ 
                                                                              Accurate   Inaccurate   z     p 
Individual Item                                                                 (n = 88)     (n = 54) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why.  30   26          .51        ns 
2. I focused on his most distinctive features. a  28   15       1.86     .06 
3. He was the closest person to what I remember but     16   44   -3.73     001  
    not exact. i  
4. I matched the image in my head to the picture in 68   50          2.16     .04 
    front on me. a 
5. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think 52   61    -1.02      ns 
    back to the video and compare.  
6. As soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was the 26   9    2.45      .01 
    culprit. a 
7. The other photos had little influence on my          72   52     2.38     .02      
    decision. a  
8. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look    5   17    -2.43     .02 
    the same. i 
9. They [other photos] confused me; made the task 23   28     -.68       ns 
    more difficult. 
10. They [other photos] were all so similar that they      13   26    -2.04      04 
    made me less confident. i                                                                                                                      
a Indictor of accuracy                       i Indicator of inaccuracy 
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Most importantly, did the simple matching and deliberative processing 
strategies identified in studies 2 and 3 differentiate between accurate and 
inaccurate witnesses in this study?  The items were averaged into the same two 
factors found in Study 2, creating a simple matching variable and a deliberative 
variable. The automatic recognition factor was also created and it was the average 
of responses to “I just recognized him, I cannot explain why” and “As soon as I 
saw the picture, I knew that it was the culprit.” A 2 (accurate vs. inaccurate) X 2 
(simple match statements vs. deliberative statements) repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction between the type of strategy used and the 
accuracy of the participant witness, F (1 , 140) = 18.26, p  < .0001).  The ANOVA did 
not include the automatic strategy so as to represent a simple replication of both 
studies 2 and 3. Performing an independent samples t-test, as predicted, accurate 
eyewitnesses (n=88) were significantly more likely than inaccurate eyewitnesses to 
report their decision process using the simple matching strategy statements, t (140) 
= 3.04, p < .003, and inaccurate eyewitnesses (n=54) were more likely than 
accurate eyewitnesses to report that they reached their decision through a more 
deliberative and thoughtful strategy, t (140) = -3.96, p < .001 (Table 15). 
However, accurate eyewitnesses, as found in Study 3, were not more likely to 
endorse automatic recognition decision processes t(140) = 1.29,  ns, although the 
findings are in the predicted direction. In order to ensure that the strategies 
represented unique decision processes and not just witness confidence, the 
within-subjects  2 x 2 ANOVA was done again, controlling for confidence as a 
covariate, F (1 , 139) = 10.82, p  < .01, the interaction was still significant.   
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Table 15. Mean Number of Simple Matching and Deliberative Thought 
Responses Endorsed by Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses from  
Collapsed Data 
______________________________________________________________________ 
      Witness Type 
    _____________________________________ 
     Accurate       Inaccurate 
     (n = 88)                                    (n = 54) 
________________________________________________________ 
 Decision Strategy     
Simple Matching           1.7*                        1.6 
Deliberative                       0.8                        1.3**  
Automatic            0.4                              0.3 
______________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .003, accurate witnesses significantly more likely than inaccurate witnesses to 
endorse simple matching strategy.                  
** p < .001, inaccurate witnesses significantly more likely than accurate witnesses to 
endorse deliberative strategy.  
 
Discussion 
  This study sought to replicate the findings from the data of Studies 2 
and 3 collapsed. Although there was significant overlap, it was not a perfect 
replication. It successfully replicated the findings that accurate eyewitnesses’ 
decision making is founded on a simple matching strategy, in which they match 
an image in their head to each picture presented to them in sequential order, 
and they do not allow the other lineup photographs to influence their 
identification. In addition, as predicted but not found in Study 3, accurate 
eyewitnesses in this study felt that as soon as they saw the picture of the culprit, 
they knew it was him. It was predicted that this automatic strategy would be 
  
  83
more significantly used by accurate witnesses; however, it was not included in 
the decision processes until Study 3, making it difficult to get significance in the 
collapsed data from Studies 2 and 3. In this study, the data indicate that 
accurate witnesses were significantly more likely to focus on a distinctive 
feature and compare that feature to each photograph. Until now this decision 
process has been the most inconsistent and even differentiated target present 
inaccurates from target absent inaccurates in both Study 3 and the present 
study. Therefore, this decision process will not be considered a reliable source 
of information for distinguishing witnesses’ decision making strategies.  
 This study also significantly, but imperfectly, replicated the decision 
processes of inaccurate eyewitnesses in Study 3. The data indicate that 
inaccurate eyewitnesses are still significantly more likely to use more 
deliberative thought strategies in selecting a lineup photograph. They are more 
likely to endorse that they selected the closest photograph even though he was 
not the exact perpetrator, as well as say that the other pictures in the lineup 
were so similar that they became less confident in their decisions. The strategy 
of thinking back to the video to compare that memory with each photograph 
did reach significance in this study, as it did in Study 2 but not Study 3.  
 There is, however, a possible explanation for this strategy not reaching 
significance even though the composite deliberative thought strategy did prove 
significant. The target absent and target present experiment in this study 
required a significantly greater number of participants in order to get enough 
positive identifications to do statistical analyses. This may be due to the fact 
that the majority of this data were collected in the fall semester, when many 
participants were taking a psychology and law course. The difficulty with these 
participants is that they may have become overly cautious eyewitnesses, less 
likely to make identifications and more likely to say that they just don’t know 
  
  84
which picture is him. In the psychology and law course there are multiple 
lectures on eyewitness evidence, discussing the large number of false 
identifications made by witnesses in police stations everyday. This information 
may cause these participants to develop a higher threshold for selecting a 
photograph. Thus, not only do they select fewer photographs, but those that do 
chose a photograph may use different processes than the typical inaccurate 
eyewitness.  
 Regardless of the circumstances and the above findings, I do believe that 
inaccurate eyewitnesses have a less clear image of the perpetrator in their mind 
and deliberatively think back to the video in order to compare the lineup 
photographs to the culprit. This is supported by the fact that the composite 
deliberative thought strategy maintained significance regardless of this one 
decision process not reaching significance.  
 The simple matching strategy and the deliberative thought strategy have 
proven successful across multiple studies and hundreds of participants. It is 
intuitive that having to think back to the crime in the video would produce a 
much less promising memory trace than having an image retained from the 
video to use when making an identification. When this memory trace proves 
less helpful, inaccurate eyewitnesses attempt to use the other photographs in 
the lineup to narrow their selections. The difficulty lies in their inability to 
directly compare all of the lineup photographs, the explicit intention of the 
sequential lineup procedure. Thus, accurate eyewitnesses carry an advantage 
even before the lineup is presented to them. If this is truly the case, then would 
forcing accurate eyewitnesses to use a more deliberative and thoughtful 
strategy decrease accuracy rates? In the same vein, would encouraging 
inaccurate eyewitnesses to create a clear image of the perpetrator before seeing 
the lineup improve their accuracy rates? 
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Summary 
Study 4 replicated most of the findings from studies 1-3, using a new 
crime, perpetrator, and lineup. These materials did prove to be easier for 
witnesses, increasing the identification rates from Studies 1-3. Even when 
participants were overly cautious in making identifications, the identification 
rates did not decrease from those seen in Studies 1-3. The simple matching 
strategy and the deliberative strategy both proved successful in continuing to 
differentiate accurate and inaccurate decision-making processes. Although the 
findings are encouraging, what is more ecologically important is whether these 
strategies can be used by law enforcement to improve the accuracy of 
eyewitness, in other words, to decrease false identifications of innocent 
suspects. The goal of Study 5 was to reveal whether forcing witnesses to use a 
particular decision strategy would affect witness accuracy rates.  
 
  
  
CHAPTER SIX: 
ACCURACY AND SIMPLE MATCHING 
VERUS DELIBERATIVE THOUGHT STRATEGIES 
 
Overview  
 The data presented thus far have consistently found that accurate 
eyewitnesses endorse a simple matching strategy and inaccurate eyewitnesses 
endorse a deliberative thought strategy. This knowledge alone is interesting, 
but its application to real police concerns is limited unless we know how useful 
the strategies may be in affecting witness decision strategies. If police officers 
encourage witnesses to create an image of the perpetrator before seeing the 
sequential lineup photographs, will that lead to greater accuracy? In contrast, 
does forcing witnesses to use a more deliberative process lead to greater 
inaccuracy? These questions are central to understanding the role of decision 
processes in witness accuracy. It could be that the decision process makes no 
difference, a witness either knows who the perpetrator is or does not, even 
before seeing a lineup. I predicted that manipulating witness decision processes 
would significantly affect accuracy of identifications. Compared to a control 
group, accuracy would decrease when witnesses are asked to be more 
deliberative in their processing, and think back to the video and compare for 
each photograph. Alternately, compared to a control group, inaccuracy would 
decrease when witnesses are instructed to create an image in their head and use 
only that image to compare to each lineup photograph. 
 Study 5 aimed to manipulate witnesses’ decision  processes in order to 
experimentally determine the centrality of the two decision strategies to witness 
accuracy. Participant witnesses were brought into the lab and assigned to either 
a control condition, a create an image condition, or a think back to the video 
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condition. Following the procedures and using the materials from Study 4, after 
seeing the crime participants were instructed as to what processes they were to 
use in determining which photograph was the perpetrator. They were then 
presented with the eight person sequential lineup and asked to identify the 
culprit in a target present  or a target absent situation.  
 
Participants 
     Participants were 167 Cornell University undergraduates recruited from a 
variety of courses in psychology and human development, who earned extra 
credit for their participation.  
 
Procedure 
  Participants were brought into the lab individually to participate in the 
study called “Objective Film Criteria.” They were told the same cover story and 
viewed the same videos as used in Study 4. After seeing the crime, participants 
were informed that the study was really interested in eyewitness identifications 
and were asked to answer some questions about the video in which the crime 
took place (a filler task). There were three conditions: control (N= 44), “create 
an image” (N= 73), and “think back” to the video (N= 50). In addition, 
participants either saw a target present or a target absent lineup in each 
condition. Thus, this study was a 3 (control, create an image, or think back) X 2 
(target present vs. target absent) design.  
 The control condition participants immediately began the standard 
sequential lineup procedure.  The “create an image” participants were 
instructed: “Before you view the lineup, we want you to take a few moments to 
form an image in your head of the perpetrator. Please do so now and indicate to 
me when you have this image. For each photograph in the lineup, we want you 
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to match the image you just created to each photograph I will present to you.” 
Then, they were asked if they understood the instructions and immediately 
began seeing photographs sequentially. The “think back” to the video condition 
received the following instruction: “Before you view the lineup, we want you to 
think back to the second video. Please do so now and indicate to me when you 
have this image. For each photograph in the lineup, we want you to think back 
to the video and compare that image to each photograph I will present to you.” 
Again, they were asked if they understood the instructions and the 
experimenter immediately began showing them the first lineup photograph. All 
procedures from this point on replicated Study 4.  
 
Dependent Measures 
 The post-identification questionnaire was exactly the same as that used 
in Studies 3 and 4.  The main dependent measure in this study was witness 
accuracy rates, comparing the control condition to the two experimental 
conditions (i.e., create an image and think back to the video). The decision-
process statements were used as manipulation checks in this study, to make 
sure that participants followed the experimenters instructions to either create 
an image or think back to the video.   
 
Results  
 Of the 167 participants in the study, 83 were in the target present 
condition and 84 were in the target-absent condition. From the target present 
condition, 10 (45%) of controls, 21 (58%) of create an image participants, and 14 
(56%) of think back participants made accurate identifications. From the target 
absent condition, 3 (14%) of controls, 4 (11%) of create an image participants, 
and 4 (16%) of think back participants made false positive identifications.  
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Think Back to the Video Condition 
Did forcing participants to “think back” to video and compare that 
image to each photograph, the more deliberative strategy, reduce accuracy 
rates? Looking only at the target present condition (Figure 1), the “think back” 
instructions produced an accuracy rate (56%) not different from the control 
condition (45%), X2(1) = .521, ns). It was also not even in the predicted direction. 
Therefore, participants in this condition did not make less accurate 
identifications but perhaps they made significantly more inaccurate 
identifications? In the target absent condition, the “think back” condition 
inaccuracy (16%) rate did not significantly differ from the control condition 
(14%), X2(1) = .05, ns).  
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Figure 1.  Witness Accuracy Rates (%) between “Think Back”  
and Control Conditions 
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Create an Image Condition 
 Did forcing participants to “create an image” and use only that image to 
compare with each photograph, the simple matching strategy, increase 
accuracy rates? Looking only at the target present condition (Figure 2), the 
“create an image” instructions produced an accuracy rate (58%) not 
significantly greater than the control condition (45%), X2(1) = .91, ns); although 
the data were in the right direction. Therefore, participants in this condition did 
not make more accurate identifications but perhaps they made significantly less 
inaccurate identifications? In the target absent condition, the “create an image” 
condition inaccuracy (11%) rate did not significantly differ from the control 
condition (14%), X2(1) = .11, ns). 
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Figure 2.  Witness Accuracy Rates (%) between “Create an Image”  
and Control Conditions 
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Diagnosticity 
 Based on the above findings, neither of the decision strategy instructions 
demonstrated the predicted findings. However, it is important to look at the 
bigger picture of whether one instruction affected both accuracy and inaccuracy 
rates in beneficial ways. Eyewitness researchers argue that the diagnosticity 
ratio is one of the best indicators of the potential value of a lineup technique or 
instructions as a source of evidence (Wells & Lindsay, 1980, 1985). The 
diagnosticity ratio is calculated as the ratio of the proportion of correct and false 
decisions. The higher the diagnosticity ratio, the greater the probative value of 
identification decisions from such lineup procedures should be. Table 16 shows 
the findings of all six cells of this experimental design. The diagnosticity ratios 
were 3.2 for the control condition, 5.3 for the “create an image” condition, and 
3.5 for the “think back” condition.  The probative value of the sequential 
procedure was greatest when participants were forced to create an image of the 
perpetrator and were asked to compare only that image to each lineup 
photograph to be presented to them. This manipulation of witness decision 
strategies made the accuracy rates more diagnostic than both the control 
condition and the “think back” condition. 
 
Manipulation Check  
 In order to better understand the lack of significant effects in both of the 
manipulation conditions, it is important to determine if participants followed 
the decision strategy instructions given to them.  Overall, their self-reported 
decision processes on the dependent measure revealed that participants were 
not following the specific instructions given to them. In the “create an image” 
condition, 52% of participants in both target present and target absent 
conditions reported “I matched the image in my head to the picture in front of 
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me” as a description of their decision strategy. This was not significantly 
greater than the control condition (41%), z = 1.17, ns.  In the “think back” 
condition, 64% of participants in both target present and target absent 
conditions reported “While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think back to 
the video and compare” as one of their decision strategies. However, this also 
did differ at all from the control condition (61%), z = .26, ns. Based on these 
findings, it doesn’t appear that the manipulation was effective enough, 
although in debriefing participants indicated that they followed the instructions 
while viewing the lineup photographs.  
 
Table 16.   Identification Decisions (%) and Diagnosticity Ratios Resulting from 
Control, “Create an Image” and “Think Back” Lineup Strategies 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                                                       Identification             
   ____________________________________________ 
     Target Present      Target Absent 
Lineup Strategy        Accurate             Inaccurate              Diagnosticity Ratio a 
Control   45                          14                                      3.2 
Create an Image                   58                          11                                      5.3              
Think Back                            56                          16                                      3.5    
 
a Proportion of correct identifications: proportion of false identifications 
 
Discussion 
 The best way to test if identification accuracy and inaccuracy result from 
different processing strategies is to manipulate the kind of decision-making 
strategies in question and then note changes in accuracy. Study 5 sought to 
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demonstrate that promotion of a simple matching strategy of comparing each 
picture with an image stored in memory could elicit an increase in accuracy 
rates; whilst the implementation of a very controlled and deliberative strategy, 
think back to the video for each photograph and compare only that image to 
make a choice, would decrease accuracy.  The data did not support these 
predictions. In this study, participants forced to “create an image” did not 
provide significantly greater accuracy and reduced inaccuracy than participants 
who made their identifications freely. As well, participants forced to “think 
back” also did not produce significantly greater inaccuracy or decreased 
accuracy than those who made their identifications freely. The manipulation 
checks revealed that in both conditions participants did not report following the 
instructions given to them. Although, careful debriefing of participants in the 
first few weeks of the experiment had indicated that they understood and were 
following the decision strategies that they were told to use. However, the 
manipulation checks of later participants provide a strong explanation for why 
the findings were not significant.  
 Although within the target present and target absent conditions the data 
did not support all of the hypotheses, the diagnosticity ratio of target present 
accuracy to target absent inaccuracy revealed stronger diagnosticity of the 
lineup for those told to use the simple matching strategy. This is indicative of a 
greater proportion of accuracy to inaccuracy, the main goal of all eyewitness 
research. Thus, Study 5 could be revealing more about eyewitness motivation in 
the laboratory than the effectiveness of forced decision strategies. However, it 
could also be that the decision process makes no difference, a witness either 
knows who the perpetrator is or does not, even before seeing a lineup. Casual 
direction is discussed in the last chapter.  
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Summary 
 Study 5 demonstrated that the manipulation of witness decision 
strategies was not an easy task and the findings do not give a clear picture of 
the effectiveness of forcing witnesses to follow simple matching or deliberative 
thought strategies. I do not believe that the data from this study indicate that 
these strategies do not map onto witness accuracy and inaccuracy. However, 
they do discourage the possibility that these decision strategies will be useful as 
system variables. Whether or not these decision processes can actively be used 
by police officers to encourage witness accuracy is inconclusive but not hopeful. 
Further replication would be necessary, perhaps with an increase in motivation 
for laboratory witnesses.  
 Although the decision strategies did not prove effective as a system 
variable, they could prove to be more effective as an estimator variable. 
Knowing the decision processes of eyewitnesses after the fact, could help triers 
of fact determine the reliability of a given eyewitness’ testimony. The goal of 
Study 6 was to demonstrate whether the distinction between a simple matching 
strategy and a deliberative strategy would help potential jurors’ postdict 
witness accuracy.  
  
  
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
POSTDICTING EYEWITNESS ACCURACY 
 
Overview  
 Every single day police officers, lawyers, judges and jurors all over the 
country are attempting to postdict eyewitness accuracy, they are trying to 
determine whether or not the witness was accurate after an identification has 
been made. How useful is an understanding of the decision-making strategies 
discovered and illuminated in Studies 1-4 in postdicting witness accuracy? 
Would explicit information about the decision processes be helpful and aid 
potential jurors in distinguishing accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses more 
successfully?  
 Study 6 was designed to address these questions using similar 
procedures as Study 5 in Dunning and Stern (1994). Participants were placed in 
the role of police officer, lawyer, judge, or juror, and they were asked to decide 
whether eyewitnesses were accurate or incorrect.  Roughly half the participants 
were informed of the decision processes examined in studies 1-3, being told that 
accurate witnesses tended to use a simple matching strategy and inaccurate 
witnesses a more deliberative and thoughtful strategy. The other half were not 
given any cues about eyewitnesses’ decision-making; their findings would 
indicate whether people can intuitively and effectively use witness decision 
processes when determining accuracy. All participants were given a set of post-
identification questionnaires completed by actual participants in Study 3. They 
were asked to decide, for each, whether the witness’s positive identification had 
been correct or incorrect. The success rates of the informed and uninformed 
groups would be compared.  
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Participants 
     Participants were 53 Cornell University undergraduates from a variety of 
courses in psychology and human development who earned extra credit for 
their participation.  
 
Procedure 
  Participants arrived and were run in small groups. They were told that 
we were interested in eyewitness testimony, and what criteria people use to 
evaluate the accuracy of an eyewitness to a crime.  There were given a 
description of the crime and identification task used in Study 3, and were told 
that they would be shown post identification questionnaires from witnesses 
who made positive identifications, meaning they selected a photograph. They 
were informed that some of the witnesses selected the correct photograph and 
others selected incorrect photographs and their task was to decide which of the 
eyewitnesses made accurate identifications and which made inaccurate 
identifications, as if they were a police officer, judge, or attorney.   
 All participants completed a consent form and were handed a sheet with 
further instructions, 40 witness protocols, and a sheet for marking their 
judgments. In the informed condition (n= 26), the written instructions included 
helpful hints to be considered when making their judgments. They were told 
that the hints were to be helpful but not concrete, and to use their best 
judgment. The helpful hints told participants in the informed condition that 
accurate eyewitnesses tended to match the image in the head with the pictures 
in front of them, said that the other picture in the lineup did not influence their 
decision and did not confuse them, and indicated that their memory had a 
greater impact on their identifications than the other lineup photographs. In 
addition, they were informed that inaccurate eyewitnesses chose the picture 
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that was closest to the culprit but not exact, looked at each photograph and 
tried to think back to the video and compare, said that as they looked at more 
pictures they all began to look the same and were so similar they made them 
feel less confident. As in Dunning and Stern (1994), informed participants were 
also told that the hints were to be considered “helpful, but not to be 
compelling,” and that they “should use [their] own best judgment in addition 
to these hints” when making their decisions. In the uninformed condition (n= 
25), the written instructions contained no hints or cues but merely reiterated 
that their task was to decide whether each witness had been accurate or 
inaccurate.  
 On the judgment sheet, after participants marked down their judgments 
for the 40 protocols, they were asked in an open-ended fashion to describe the 
strategies they followed when completing the task. Then, the protocols and 
judgment sheet were removed and they were asked to complete a questionnaire 
asking them to rate which decision process components they found most 
helpful. The questionnaire presented them with all 14 items contained in the 
post identification protocols they examined. For each item, using their 
experience, they were asked whether a witness endorsing that item was more 
likely to be accurate or inaccurate in his or her identification. They responded 
on an 11-point scale ranging from -5 (witnesses endorsing this item were 
definitely inaccurate) to 5 (witnesses endorsing this item were definitely 
accurate), with 0 indicating that that item had nothing to do with accuracy or 
error.   
 Once they completed the final questionnaire, participants were 
completely debriefed as to the purpose and aims of the study. If they were 
interested, an answer sheet for the task was available.  
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Materials 
 Each protocol packet included questionnaires from 20 accurate and 20 
inaccurate participant witnesses in Study 3. The questionnaires were selected at 
random and placed in random order in the packets, but there were not enough 
questionnaires to create more than one set of protocols for this study. 
Questionnaires from Study 2 were not included because the decision process 
“as soon as I saw the picture, I knew it was the culprit” had not been included 
yet and proved to play a significant role in Study 3. In addition, participants in 
this study saw only certain parts of the information provided by witnesses on 
the post identification questionnaire. They were given information as to how 
each witness had responded to the three close-ended questions included in all 
previous studies: “How would you describe your decision processes?” “How 
much influence did the other pictures have on your decision?” and “What 
would you say had a greater influence on your decision, the pictures in the 
lineup, or your memory of the culprit?” Information that was covered up on the 
questionnaires during photocopying included the specific photograph chosen, 
witness confidence, and responses to open-ended questions. These items were 
not included because I wanted to see whether participants would rely on the 
decision process measures that had successfully differentiated accurate and 
inaccurate identifications in the previous studies.  
 
Dependent Measures 
 The main dependent measure was the judgment sheets that participants 
completed while looking at the 40 protocols. The final questionnaire that 
included the 14 decision processes was used as a manipulation check as to 
whether informed participant used the helpful hints cues when determining 
accuracy or inaccuracy.  
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Results 
  Participants did not display any ability to differentiate accurate from 
inaccurate eyewitness identifications. As seen in Table 17, uninformed 
participants correctly classified 50.5% of the witness protocols, a rate equivalent 
to chance. The informed participants performed slightly below chance (47%), 
and significantly worse than the uninformed participants, t (49) = -2.79, p < .008.  
   
Table 17.  Accuracy Rates (%) of Informed and Uninformed Conditions 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                         Condition  
                                               ____________________________________ 
            Informed                   Uninformed 
Witness Accuracy                        (n = 26)                        (n = 25) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Accurate              44.6                         46.6                                                               
Inaccurate                                        49.4                               54.4                                                  
Combined                                        47.0                              50.5*                                                        
______________________________________________________________________ 
* p < .008 
 
 Did participants in the informed condition pay attention to the written 
“helpful hints” given to them? After evaluating the witness protocols, 
participants were asked about their decision-making processes and whether, 
overall, witnesses’ selection of a particular answer made them more likely to be 
accurate or inaccurate in their identification (Table 18). On average, both 
informed and uninformed participants indicated that witnesses citing simple 
matching strategy responses were more likely to be accurate than inaccurate 
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(2.8 and 3.0, respectively). However there was no significant difference between 
conditions, t (49) = -.534, ns. In addition, both informed and uninformed were 
also equally likely to state that witnesses citing deliberative strategy responses 
were more likely to be inaccurate than accurate (-1.7 and -1.5, respectively; t (49) 
= .729, ns).  Therefore, informed participants did not show any indication of 
having received additional information concerning witness decision-making 
and did not perform at levels greater than those who only had their intuitions 
to rely on.  
 
Table 18 .  Weight Given to Witness Questionnaire Responses by 
Judges Assessing Accuracy of Identification 
______________________________________________________________________ 
              Condition  
                ______________________________ 
Stated beliefs about relationship  
of measure to accuracy    Informed          Uninformed 
______________________________________________________________________               
     Simple Matching Strategy       2.8        3.0 
     Deliberative Strategy       -1.7         -1.5 
 
a Judges’ stated beliefs, responses were made on a scale ranging from -5 (witness 
definitely inaccurate when endorsed) to 0 (response has no relationship to accuracy) to 
5 (witness was definitely accurate).  
 
 In order to determine if the “helpful” hints were simply neglected 
because they were distributed in a written format, an additional 12 participants 
were run and were instead given the hints in a “mini lecture” format.  The 
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procedures were exactly the same except the experimenter read aloud a 
summary of the hints before handing them the written instructions with the 
helpful hints. Table 19 shows the accuracy rates for these verbally informed 
participants compared to the uninformed, as well as to those that were 
informed only in writing. There was no significant difference in overall 
accuracy between the verbally informed and the uninformed, t (35) = .414, ns.  
Although the verbally informed participants did correctly classify 59.6% of 
inaccurate witness protocols, a rate well above chance, this was not significantly 
greater than the levels produced by the uninformed participants, t (35) = 1.33, 
ns. In addition, as Table 20  shows, there were no significant differences in 
reported attention to accurate witnesses citing simple matching strategy 
responses (3.25 versus 3.0, verbally informed and uninformed respectively, t 
(35)= .66, ns) or inaccurate witnesses citing deliberative strategy responses (-1.9 
versus, -1.5, verbally informed and uninformed respectively, t (35)= .90, ns). 
 
Table 19.  Accuracy Rates (%) of Verbally Informed, Written Informed and 
Uninformed Conditions 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                    Condition  
                                             ________________________________________________ 
             Verbally  Informed     Uninformed    Written Informed 
Witness Accuracy                     (n = 12)                        (n = 25)            (n = 26) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Accurate            42.9                              46.6                      44.6  
Inaccurate                                       59.6                              54.4                      49.4 
Combined                                       51.3                              50.5                      47.0  
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 20.  Weight Given to Witness Questionnaire Responses by 
Verbally Informed, Written Informed, and Uninformed Judges 
Assessing Accuracy of Identification 
______________________________________________________________________ 
       Condition  
           _________________________________________________ 
Stated beliefs about  
relationship of  
measure to accuracy         Verbally  Informed     Uninformed    Written Informed 
______________________________________________________________________              
Simple Matching Strategy             3.3             3.0     2.8 
Deliberative Strategy            -1.9           -1.5      -1.7 
 
a Judges’ stated beliefs, responses were made on a scale ranging from -5 (witness 
definitely inaccurate when endorsed) to 0 (response has no relationship to accuracy) to 
5 (witness was definitely accurate).  
 
 It does not appear that verbalizing the helpful hints improved informed 
participants’ performance at classifying witness accuracy over the uninformed. 
However, did the “mini lecture” prove to increase participant performance over 
those only given written information? Overall, the verbally informed 
participants performed significantly better than the written informed 
participants, 51.3% versus 47%, t (36)= 2.42, p < .02 (Table 19). However, the 
verbally informed participants outperformed the written informed participants 
(by 10%) mostly when they judged protocols coming from witnesses making 
inaccurate identifications, t (36) = 2.57, p < .02. Both groups of participants 
achieved similar performance levels, roughly 43% vs. 44%, when making 
decisions about accurate witness protocols. Is this increase in performance due 
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to more attention paid to the strategies presented to the participants as “helpful 
hints?” On average, verbally informed and written informed participants 
indicated that witnesses citing simple matching strategy responses were more 
likely to be accurate than inaccurate (3.3 and 2.8, respectively; see Table 20). 
Although in the right direction, there was no significant difference between 
conditions, t (36) = 1.04, ns.  In addition, both verbally informed and written 
informed participants were equally likely to state that witnesses citing 
deliberative strategy responses were more likely to be inaccurate than accurate 
(-1.9 and -1.7, respectively; t (36)= .427, ns).   
 
Discussion 
 Study 6 was an assessment of whether explicit information about the 
decision processes of accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses would be helpful 
and aid potential jurors in successfully distinguishing them. Some participants 
were informed of the decision processes examined in studies 1-3 by being given 
a written “helpful hints” instruction page, which highlighted that accurate 
witnesses tended to use a simple matching strategy and inaccurate witnesses a 
more deliberative and thoughtful strategy. The other half of the participants 
were not given any cues about eyewitnesses’ decision-making. All participants 
were asked to decide for 40 protocols whether the witness’s positive 
identification had been correct or incorrect.  
 In general, participants showed almost no insight into the accuracy of 
witnesses using the decision-making protocols. This was apparent by the barely 
chance or below chance levels of performance for both uninformed and 
informed participants. Not only did giving some participants written 
information about witnesses’ actual decision-making strategies not improve 
performance, but these participants performed below chance and significantly 
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worse than uninformed participants. Additional analyses revealed that the 
informed participants did not pay attention to or take into account the extra 
information given to them.  
 In order to further discover whether educating people increases their 
ability to distinguish witness accuracy, an additional group of participants were 
given a “mini lecture” about witness decision processes before facing the 
witness protocols. These verbally informed participants did perform 
significantly better than those who were only informed in writing. However, 
they performed at barely chance levels and did not perform significantly better 
than the uninformed participants. Again, data analyses revealed that informed 
participants did not give significantly more weight to the decision strategies 
indicative of accuracy or inaccuracy when evaluating the protocols.   
 
Summary 
 Study 6 demonstrated that informing participants about simple 
matching and deliberative thought processes and their associations with 
witness accuracy did not increase their performance at postdicting accuracy. 
These findings are very perplexing and disturbing. It is difficult to believe that 
educating jurors with written instructions or verbal instructions about 
eyewitness decision-making would not improve their ability to distinguish 
accurate from inaccurate witnesses. What is more problematic is that the data 
do not suggest that the information would not be useful but indicate that 
people were not even using the information provided for the postdiction task. 
Further replication would be necessary to conclude that educating people is not 
worthwhile or that postdicting witness accuracy is not possible with only 
witness decision-making strategies. This will be discussed further in the last 
chapter.  
  
  
CHAPTER EIGHT: 
MODIFYING SEQUENTIAL LINEUP PRESENTATIONS 
 
Overview 
The previous six studies explored eyewitness decision processes using 
the original sequential lineup procedure, where eyewitnesses were only 
allowed to see each photograph once. The goal of police officers is to acquire as 
much information from eyewitnesses as possible, and, at times, this may 
motivate them to alter lineup procedures to accommodate an eyewitness or 
their own desire to learn more from an eyewitness. Even though there is a 
growing body of research looking at witness accuracy and decision processes 
using sequential lineups, there has been very little research looking at minor or 
significant alterations or changes to the sequential presentation procedures.  
In 1998 the New Jersey Attorney General, set out statewide guidelines 
for conducting lineups which required “when possible” that police personnel 
use sequential lineups (Farmer, 2001). However, these guidelines do not 
instruct police on how many times a given eyewitness can go through the 
sequential lineup or under what specific conditions. It was my goal to 
determine if different methods for presenting the sequential lineup more than 
once impacted identification rates. One of the larger concerns with sequential 
lineups is witnesses’ hesitation to select a photograph too early, fearing that a 
closer match will come in later photos. On the other hand, at what point, after 
multiple viewings of the lineup, does it become equivalent to a simultaneous 
procedure by allowing relative judgment processing? Again, the sequential 
lineup procedure was created to maintain accuracy while preventing false 
identifications from relative judgment processing. It would be helpful to 
investigators to show that any alterations to the sequential procedure by police 
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will not change its effectiveness, but if this is not the case then researchers need 
to be able to articulate the negative effects of changes to the procedures. 
Otherwise, police personnel will not understand why they need to follow the 
procedure exactly as it was designed. Having the consequences of alterations at 
hand would help researchers explain the importance of rigidly following 
recommended protocols.  
Before explaining the details of the present study, it is relevant to review 
previous research looking at how alterations to the sequential lineup 
presentation have been shown (or not shown) to impact eyewitness accuracy. 
Researchers in Ontario, Canada convinced police to adopt sequential 
procedures, but they quickly discovered that some police officers were making 
modifications to the procedures. While the modifications were based on the 
logic of reducing relative judgments, no empirical work had demonstrated that 
the changes would not affect accuracy rates. In a recent article, eyewitness 
researchers in Canada designed a study to test two modifications of the 
sequential procedure (Lindsay & Bellinger, 1999). The specific deviations tested 
reflected how uncomfortable some police investigators are with the idea of 
having someone else conduct their lineups (i.e., double-blind testing). Hence, 
some officers designed self-administered versions of the sequential lineup. The 
first alteration was called the “stack procedure,” and consisted of the 
investigating officer handing the stack of 15 pictures to the witness 
accompanied by sequential lineup instructions and the sequential lineup 
identification form, and then leaving the room so as not to influence the 
decision. The second deviation called the “album procedure,” provided the 
witness with a small photo album containing a single picture on each of 15 
pages such that witnesses had to turn the pages to see the next picture. Again, 
sequential instructions and forms were used.  
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In the Lindsay and Bellinger (1999) study, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two modified procedures or to the original procedure. 
Although the witnesses were left alone during the modified procedures, they 
were surreptitiously monitored by the experimenter who watched and 
recorded their behavior through a slightly ajar door. They found that the 
original sequential procedure produced a significantly higher rate of correct 
rejection of a target-absent lineup than the stack or album procedures. Not 
surprisingly, in both the stack and album conditions many witnesses were 
observed violating the instructions they were given and comparing pictures, 
producing relative judgment processing. Of the 28 witnesses in the stack 
condition, 12 violated the instructions and compared the pictures, and 88% of 
these violators made false-positive identifications compared to 0% of those who 
followed the instructions. In the album conditions, 15 out of 25 (60%) of the 
participant witnesses compared the pictures. Most of these witnesses lingered 
while turning the pages so that they had an opportunity to compare pictures on 
adjacent pages. Of the 33% total false positives, 100% were made by witnesses 
who compared pictures. This research showed that self-administered sequential 
lineups were only successful if the instructions were followed, but that 
witnesses often compared pictures if the opportunity was there. These 
researchers concluded that preventing comparison of photographs is superior 
to advising against it or instructing witnesses not to do it, especially if witnesses 
are left in position to violate the instructions.  
Aside from self-administered sequential procedures, the procedures 
could be varied in other ways with unknown effects on identification accuracy. 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada states in its recommendations that 
police may show the lineup to witnesses again if they fail to choose anyone 
from a sequential procedure (Brooks, 1983). Why would such a 
  
  108
recommendation be included? One of the concerns of critics of the sequential 
lineup, as discussed in the introduction, is that there can be a small decrease in 
accuracy rates compared to the simultaneous procedure. This decrease is 
primarily due to eliminating correct identifications of the culprit by those who 
do so only by chance, using a relative judgment process. However, it could also 
be the case that witnesses, during a sequential procedure, are more hesitant to 
make an identification and, therefore, have a higher threshold before they are 
willing to make an identification (i.e., very aware that the next photograph 
could be a better match). Would giving eyewitnesses an unexpected “second 
chance” to see the lineup recapture the slight decrease in accuracy without 
increasing false identifications?  
In two experiments Lindsay and colleagues (1991) tested whether a 
“second chance” after viewing sequential lineups impacted accuracy rates 
(Lindsay, Lea & Fulford, 1991). If the second chance was in the form of a 
simultaneous viewing, witnesses given an unexpected opportunity to examine 
the same lineup again showed a small but not significant increase in accuracy 
(46.7% to 53.3%). However, 16(69%) of the total witnesses made false 
identifications, and 5 out of 16 changed from correct rejections to false 
identifications during the second viewing. If the second viewing was using a 
sequential procedure, only 1 witness out of 16 changed decisions from a correct 
rejection to a false identification and accuracy was unaffected (25% and 28%). 
Thus, showing the sequential lineup a second time using the same sequential 
procedure did not prove to be detrimental to accuracy and inaccuracy rates, but 
showing a simultaneous lineup the second time proved to increase accuracy at 
the price of increased false identifications. This is a trade-off that eyewitness 
researchers and DNA exonerations have shown to be problematic.   
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The goal of Study 7 was to compare eyewitness accuracy rates across 
logical variations of the sequential procedure with accuracy rates from the 
original “one time” only procedure. In this study, three presentation procedures 
were compared using target present lineups: 1) viewing the sequential lineup 
only once, 2) viewing the sequential lineup as many times as desired as long as 
the photographs were shuffled between viewings, and 3) a two step process of 
seeing the sequential lineup once without making any identification, shuffling 
the photos, and seeing the lineup one last time with the opportunity to make an 
identification.  
This last procedure was designed to overcome the concern with 
sequential lineups that accurate witnesses’ hesitate to select a photograph too 
early, fearing that a closer match will come in later photos. The small decrease 
in accurate identifications in the sequential compared to the simultaneous 
lineup could be explained by a shift in response criterion.  Eyewitnesses 
viewing sequential lineups, having only one chance to see each photograph, 
may use a more conservative response criterion. This would ensure that they do 
not make many mistakes or false identifications but it will also increase the 
chances of missed accurate responses. Is there a sequential lineup procedure 
that would relax the response criterion enough to increase the frequency of 
accurate responses without increasing inaccurate responses? In comparison to 
the traditional sequential procedure, allowing eyewitnesses to view the lineup 
once, knowing that they cannot make identification and then permitting a 
second viewing after shuffling the order of the pictures may reduce the 
threshold for acceptance to a more reasonable level. While at the same time, this 
procedure should make it too difficult to use relative judgment processing and, 
in turn, improve accuracy rates from the traditional sequential lineup.  This 2-
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step presentation procedure turned out to be similar to Britain’s VIPER lineup 
system that requires eyewitnesses to see the sequential lineup twice.  
VIPER, which stands for “video identification parade electronic 
recording” is a unit of the West Yorkshire Police and was developed as a 
“parade” or sequential lineup system to be used in the UK since 1997 (Pike, 
Kemp, Brace, & Allen, (2000). The system has a central database of video 
sequences of faces that are linked to terminals situated in police departments. 
Suspects are given the opportunity to select the “distractor” photos that they 
want to appear in the parade with them, as well as their location in the final 
video sequence. The law in the United Kingdom requires that a witness must 
make a decision only after considering each parade member at least twice 
(Kemp, Pike, & Brace, 2001). Therefore, each witness is shown the video-based 
lineup photographs one at a time, in a sequential fashion. However, witnesses 
can request to look at a particular parade member again, as well as move 
forward and backward through the tape. Accuracy rates of the VIPER system 
compared to the traditional simultaneous lineups used elsewhere have not been 
published to date.  
Some researchers were concerned that multiple viewings would 
undermine the superiority of the sequential procedure. There is one study that 
looked presentation of the VIPER parade once, twice, or twice before being 
allowed to rewind the tape as they chose (Pike, Rowland, Towell, &, Kemp, 
1999). They found that in target present parades, performance improved with 
additional viewing of the parade. For target absent parades, they found that 
people who were allowed to rewind the tape at will were more accurate than 
those who saw the parade only once or twice. This is a surprising but 
encouraging finding that has not been replicated to date. Another concern with 
the VIPER system is that the lineup photographs are not reordered between 
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viewings. In order to ensure that relative judgment processing would be very 
difficult or impossible in my design of the no-ID-first viewing condition, the 
pictures must be shuffled between viewings and participants cannot move 
backward to previously seen pictures.  
In this study, participant witnesses were asked to identify the culprit 
from a target present, eight person, sequential lineup procedure, after viewing 
the same video-taped staged crime used in Studies 1-3, where the perpetrator 
steals a CD from a campus bookstore. Witnesses participated in one of the three 
conditions described earlier. After completing the lineup procedure, witnesses 
were then asked about the decision processes they had followed in reaching 
their decision, using the same decision statements selected in Study 1.  It was 
predicted that procedure 3 (i.e., no-ID-first-viewing) would avoid both of the 
above concerns and produce the greatest accuracy with the least number of 
false identifications, followed by procedure 1 (i.e., one time only), and then 
procedure 2 (i.e., as many viewings as desired). The last condition had the 
greatest probability for relative judgment processing.  
 
Participants 
 Participants were 426 Cornell University undergraduates recruited from 
a variety of courses in psychology and human development who earned extra 
credit for their participation. 
 
Procedure 
  The procedures were exactly the same as the “sponsoring Cornell” cover 
story in Studies 1-3, except there were three sequential lineup procedures. In all 
three conditions, participants were given the option to identify one of the 
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photographs, refuse to make any decision, or decide that the perpetrator was 
not in the lineup. All conditions saw the same target present lineup.  
 In the “one time” only condition (ONCE): The experimenter read the 
sequential lineup instructions: “You will be shown a sequence of individual 
photographs and you must decide for each photograph whether or not it is a 
picture of the criminal you saw in the video. You can take as long as you wish 
to make a decision for each photograph but you will only be shown each 
photograph once.”  
 In the “as many times as desired” condition (MULTIPLE): The 
experimenter read the sequential lineup instructions: “You will be shown a 
sequence of individual photographs and you must decide for each photograph 
whether or not it is a picture of the criminal you saw in the video. You will be 
able to see the lineup as many times as you like, however each time the lineup 
will be shuffled and you will have to go through the entire lineup and decide 
for each photograph whether or not it is the criminal you saw. You can take as 
long as you wish to make a decision for each photograph.” 
 In the “no-ID-first-viewing” condition (NoID): The experimenter read 
the sequential lineup instructions: “You will be shown a sequence of individual 
photographs and you must decide for each photograph whether or not it is a 
picture of the criminal you saw in the video. You will see the lineup TWICE. 
The first time you will go through the lineup without making ANY 
identification, you will simply be able to look at each photograph for as long as 
you like and will have to say “next” for the next photo. The second time, the 
pictures will be shuffled; you will have to go through the entire lineup and 
decide for each photograph whether or not it is the criminal you saw. That will 
be the last time you will see the lineup but you can take as long as you wish to 
make a decision for each photograph.” 
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Dependent Measures 
 The dependent measures were exactly the same as those used in Studies 
2-6. 
 
Results 
 Of the 426 participant witnesses, 139 were in the “one time” only 
(ONCE) condition, 123 in the “as many times as desired” (MULTIPLE) 
condition, and 164 in the “no-ID-first-viewing” (NoID) condition. Due to a lack 
of decision processing differences between target present inaccurate and target 
absent inaccurates in studies 3 and 4, inaccurate identifications were witnesses 
who selected a distractor photograph from a target present lineup. The same 
target present lineup was used in all three conditions.   
 
Identification Judgments across Conditions 
The results in Figure 1 support the primary prediction and show the 
greatest percent accuracy in the no-ID-first-viewing condition (39%), followed 
by the multiple-ID condition (29%), and then the one-time-only condition 
(22%). There was a significant relationship between accuracy and lineup 
presentation procedure (X2(2) = 10.06, p < .007). However, there were no 
significant differences in false positive responses across conditions: the no-ID-
first condition (24%), the multiple-ID condition (23%), or the only-one-view 
condition (18%) (X2(2) = 1.90, ns).  Looking at the non-choosers (those who 
indicated that they were not sure enough to select a picture and those who 
incorrectly rejected the lineup), there was a significant relationship between 
those who refused to select a picture and lineup presentation procedure (X2(2) = 
49.32, p < .0001). Eyewitnesses in the ONCE condition (40%) were most likely to 
make “no decision,” more so than both the MULTIPLE (14%) and the NoID 
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(9%) conditions. In contrast, there was a significant relationship between those 
who insisted that the perpetrator was not in the photographs and the lineup 
presentation procedure (X2(2) = 27.51, p < .0001). Both the MULTIPLE (30%) 
and NoID (27%) conditions were more likely than the ONCE condition (6%) to 
incorrectly insist that the culprit was “not there” in the lineup. Additionally, the 
ONCE condition (14%) had more multiple identifications by individual 
witnesses than either the MULTIPLE (4%) or the No ID conditions (1%). This 
was also a significant relationship across lineup procedures (X2(2) = 24.25, p < 
.000). It is evident by these trends that the criminal in these materials was 
generally difficult to identify, however, it was across conditions and it was the 
comparison between procedures that was of interest.  Particularly, eyewitnesses 
in the ONCE condition had the most difficult time identifying the culprit, 
evidenced by a low identification rate and the highest “no decision” and 
multiple identifications by individual witnesses.   
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Figure 3. Mean Eyewitness Identification Judgments across Three Conditions. 
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In the MULTIPLE condition, only 31 (25%) of eyewitnesses chose to see 
the lineup a second time, and nobody desired to see it more than twice. Of these 
31 witnesses, 12 made no identification at all either time, 5 reiterated their 
original decision, 5 went from no choice to selecting the culprit, and 9 went 
from no choice to selecting an innocent distractor. Note that not one eyewitness 
moved from accurate to inaccurate or vice versa by seeing the lineup a second 
time. Of course police probably would not ask a witness who had already 
identified the suspect to attempt a second identification. If only those who had 
not selected the suspect had made a second choice, the final percentage of 
correct identifications would have been 29% (compared with 25% for first 
choices) and the final percentage of incorrect identifications would have been 
23% (compared with 15% for first choices). Of those who changed their 
identifications from no decision, 5 made accurate identifications on the second 
shot and these comprised 14% of the final accurate identifications, but 9 made 
inaccurate identifications and these contributed 32% to the total inaccurate 
identifications. Thus, a third of the inaccurate identifications came from 
witnesses who did not make an identification the first time but chose to see the 
lineup a second time. It is important to note that, in total, only 21% of those 
who did not make an identification from the first lineup chose to see the lineup 
again. In debriefing, most witnesses felt that seeing the lineup again, in a 
different order, and having to say “yes” or “no” for each picture again would 
confuse them more.  
 
Confidence Ratings 
 Within the three conditions, accurate witnesses were marginally or 
significantly more confident than inaccurate witnesses (Figure 2): ONCE (74% 
versus 62%, t(52) = 1.90, p < .06), MULTIPLE (68% versus 55%, t(60) 2.12, p < 
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.04), and NoID (73% versus 64%, t(99) = 2.02, p < .05).  However, between 
conditions there was only one marginally significant effect, NoID inaccurate 
eyewitness were more confident than MULTIPLE inaccurate witnesses (t(63) = 
1.84, p < .07). Therefore, greater confidence after seeing the lineup twice in total 
cannot explain the superiority of the NoID condition in producing greater 
accuracy than the traditional sequential procedure.  
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Figure 4. Mean Confidence of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
Across Three Presentation Conditions. 
 
Eyewitness Decision Processes 
 Confidence rates did not explain the significant increase in accuracy 
from the ONCE to the NoID condition. Perhaps accurate eyewitnesses in the 
NoID condition were using different decision processes. Using the decision 
processes statements found in Study 1, accurate witnesses in the NoID 
condition were more likely than witnesses in the ONCE condition to endorse 
two decision processes: “As soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was the 
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culprit” (13% versus 0%, z (93) = 2.06, p < .04) and “I just recognized him, I 
cannot explain why” (21% versus 6%, z (93) = 1.88, p < .06). Both of these 
decision processes reflect an automatic decision strategy. Previous studies 
found that witnesses in the original sequential lineup were more likely to 
endorse automatic decision strategies if they were accurate, but the finding did 
not remain significant in all studies. As an eyewitness, being able to look 
through all of the lineup photographs sequentially without the pressure of 
having to decide for each picture may increase their ability to use automatic 
recognition or absolute judgment processes. The original sequential lineup 
procedure may inhibit automatic processing for some eyewitnesses who cannot 
handle the pressure of selecting without having seen all of the pictures, even if 
they are not comparing the pictures. This could be part of the explanation for 
why the sequential lineup produces a small decrease in accuracy from the 
simultaneous lineup procedure. The no-ID-first-view sequential procedure may 
have uninhibited these accurate eyewitnesses while still controlling inaccuracy.  
 
Diagnosticity 
 Based on the above findings, no single procedure demonstrated the 
greatest accuracy with the least false identifications, although one did provide 
the greater accuracy without affecting inaccuracy. Is one procedure superior to 
the others? Eyewitness researchers argue that the diagnosticity ratio is one of 
the best indicators of the potential value of a lineup technique as a source of 
evidence (Wells & Lindsay, 1980, 1985). The diagnosticity ratio is calculated as 
the ratio of the proportion of correct and false decisions. The higher the 
diagnosticity ratio, the greater the probative value of identification decisions 
from such lineups should be. The diagnosticity ratios were 1.22, 1.26, and 1.63 
for identifications of suspects from the ONCE, MULTIPLE, and NoID 
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sequential presentations (Table 21). The probative value of the sequential 
procedure was greatest for the no-ID-first viewing condition, making it more 
diagnostic than the original design. The MULTIPLE modification proved to be 
no different than the original ONCE procedure.  
 
Table 21.  Identification Decisions (%) and Diagnosticity Ratios Resulting from 
ONCE, MULTIPLE, and NoID Sequential Lineup Procedures 
 
 
                                                                   Identification          Diagnosticity Ratio a 
Lineup Method   Accurate         Inaccurate 
One Time Only         22                      18                                 1.22  
As Many Times as Desired                   29                      23                                 1.26              
No-ID-First Viewing                              39                      24                                 1.63    
 
a Proportion of correct identifications: proportion of false identifications 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to determine if modifications to the 
sequential procedure would alter the value of the procedure for maintaining 
accuracy while minimizing inaccuracy. Testing three possible presentations of 
the sequential procedure: seeing it once, as many times as desired, or no-ID-first 
viewing, some differences were found. The no-ID-first viewing presentation 
provided the greatest percentage accuracy while not significantly altering false 
identifications. It also proved to be the most diagnostic. It is possible that the 
no-ID-first-viewing condition proved to be most effective because participants 
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did not feel the pressure to select someone nor did they harbor concern that a 
better photo could come if they picked too early in the lineup. With this 
procedure inaccurate eyewitnesses did not have enough of an opportunity to 
compare photographs to each other and select the best match, but the accurate 
eyewitnesses used more automatic processing compared to the original “one 
time” only procedure. Support for this explanation comes from the 
astonishingly high rate of no decisions in the one time only condition (40%), not 
including those who did not make a decision but indicated that the perpetrator 
was not present in the lineup. These participant witnesses were simply not sure 
enough to make a choice, probably concerned that more pictures were going to 
be shown. If this were the case, then it was anticipated that confidence ratings 
would have increased for all choosers, both accurate and inaccurate 
identifications in the no-ID-first-view condition. Confidence ratings were 
uncorrelated with all of the presentation conditions.  
Consequently, the only explanation supported by the findings is that the 
no-ID-first-viewing procedure reduced the selection threshold and promoted 
more automatic recognition,  allowing greater accuracy without significantly 
increasing inaccuracy. This modified sequential procedure gave accurate 
eyewitness the opportunity to get comfortable enough selecting the culprit 
without allowing inaccurate eyewitnesses the ability to compare lineup 
photographs.  
The “as many times as desired” procedure proved to be less interesting, 
partly because only 31 out of 123 participant witnesses actually desired to see 
the lineup more than once, and not a single participant saw the lineup more 
than twice. The data indicated that seeing the lineup more than once led just 
over half of the witnesses to stay with their original judgment and the other half 
went from no decision to selecting the culprit or inaccurately selecting a 
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distractor. After the second lineup, there was an 8% increase in incorrect 
identifications. Alternately, there was only a 4% increase in accurate 
identifications after witnesses saw the lineup a second time. Since the increase 
in false identifications was sizably larger than the increase in correct 
identifications, it would be logical to conclude that seeing the lineup more than 
once harmed witness accuracy. However, the MULTIPLE condition did not 
significantly differ in overall accuracy rates from the ONCE condition, making 
it unfruitful but not harmful to permit eyewitnesses to see the sequential 
procedure a second time.  
The findings from the MULITPLE procedure replicate those from the 
“second chance” studies discussed previously. This design differed from the 
previously described “second chance” study because participants in that study 
were given an unexpected opportunity to see the lineup again, whereas in this 
study they were told in advance that they would be able to see the lineup as 
many times as they liked. Under unexpected “second chance” conditions 
eyewitnesses had made a choice they felt comfortable with and a second 
opportunity to look through the lineup produced insignificant deviations from 
that choice. However, when witnesses knew that they could see the lineup 
more than once, seeing the lineup the second time led to an increase in accuracy 
coupled with a substantial increase in inaccuracy, which could have been a 
dangerous situation. Even considering the changes in identification accuracy 
after a second view of the lineup, the MULTIPLE procedures final identification 
rates did not look differently from the rates in the original ONCE procedure. 
Based on these findings, police officers should be advised that informing 
eyewitnesses that they will be allowed to view the sequential procedure more 
than once, even if the pictures are shuffled between viewings, has the potential 
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to harm sequential lineup accuracy, although not below rates produced by the 
original sequential lineup in this study.  
 
Summary 
This study demonstrated the superiority of the no-ID-first-view 
sequential procedure. Not only did it continue to prevent relative judgment 
processing but it increased accuracy rates. There were, however, two possible 
limitations to this study. First, only target present lineups were conducted. 
Further research needs to address the issue of target absent lineups, which 
focus not only on choosers but also on incorrect choosers who select a most 
similar looking but innocent suspect. Second, generalization of the findings is 
limited to one set of crime materials. In Study 8, the “objective film criteria” 
crime materials from Studies 4 and 5 were used to replicate these findings and 
both target present and target absent eyewitness conditions were examined. 
After replication of these findings, recommendations will be made as to how 
police should be instructed to present the sequential lineup, with information 
regarding how accuracy is affected by alterations from the recommended 
presentation procedures.  
  
 CHAPTER NINE: 
REPLICATION OF ACCURACY AND 
LINEUP PRESENTATION MODIFICATIONS 
 
Overview 
Study 8 sought to replicate the findings from Study 7 using a new crime, 
perpetrator, and lineup. Eyewitnesses again found the  “Sponsoring Cornell” 
witness situation and lineup task to be difficult. Because in the real world 
conditions are significantly more variable from crime to crime than in the 
laboratory, it was important to be certain that the diagnosticity of the no-ID-
first-view condition could be replicated in situations where the viewing 
conditions were different. The ”objective film criteria” crime and lineup 
materials used in Studies 4a and 4b were used this in study. In addition, this 
study aimed to extend the accuracy findings to target absent lineup situations, 
where an innocent suspect replaced the actual perpetrators photograph in the 
lineup.  
In this study, participant witnesses were asked to identify the culprit 
from either a target present or target absent, eight person, sequential lineup 
procedure, after viewing a new video-taped staged crime in which the 
perpetrator steals a woman’s purse. Witnesses participated in one of the three 
lineup conditions discussed and compared in Study 7: 1) only one view, 2) as 
many times as desired or 3) the two-step process of seeing the lineup once 
without being allowed to select and then seeing the lineup again after the 
photos are shuffled and being able to select a picture). After completing the 
lineup procedure, witnesses were asked about the decision processes they had 
followed in reaching their decision, using the same decision statements used in 
studies 2-7. It was predicted that Study 8 would replicate the findings of Study 
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7, procedure 3 (i.e., no-ID-first-viewing) would produce greater accuracy with 
no significant increase in false identification, and would be more diagnostic 
than the original, one time only sequential procedure. It was also predicted that 
the multiple condition would, again, prove to be no improvement over the 
original design. 
 
Participants 
 Participants were 442 Cornell University undergraduates recruited from 
a variety of courses in psychology and human development who earned extra 
credit for their participation. 
 
Procedure 
  The procedures were exactly the same as Study 7, except for one 
additional condition.  In this study, participants either saw a target-present or 
target-absent lineup. As before, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three sequential lineup procedures: the “one time” only condition (ONCE), the 
“as many times as desired” condition (MULTIPLE), and the “no-ID-first-
viewing” condition (NoID). In all conditions, participants were given the option 
to identify one of the photographs, refuse to make any decision, or decide that 
the perpetrator was not in the lineup.  
 
Dependent Measures 
 The dependent measures were exactly the same as those in Studies 2-7. 
 
Results 
 Of the 442 participant witnesses, 187 were in the “one time” only 
(ONCE) condition, 134 in the “as many times as desired” (MULTIPLE) 
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condition, and 121 in the “no-ID-first-viewing” (NoID) condition. Accurate 
eyewitnesses were those who selected the culprit from the target present lineup 
and inaccurate eyewitnesses were those who selected the similar looking 
replacement suspect in the target absent lineup.   
 
Identification Judgments across Conditions 
The results in Figure 3 show that this study did not significantly replicate 
all of the findings from Study 7. In the target present condition, although the 
NoID condition produced a greater percent accuracy (48%) than the ONCE 
condition (34%) and equivalent accuracy to the MULTIPLE condition (50%), the 
relationship between accuracy and lineup presentation procedure approached 
but did not reach significance (X2(2) = 1.77, ns). Replicating Study 7, in the 
target absent condition there were no differences in inaccuracy rates across the 
three conditions: the no-ID-first condition (22%), the multiple-ID condition 
(16%), or the only-one-view condition (16%) (X2(2) = 1.24, ns).  In both the target 
present and target absent conditions, there were no differences in “no decision” 
judgments across the three lineup procedures (X2(2) = 2.93, ns, X2(2) = 2.0; ns, 
target present and target absent, respectively). In contrast, there was a 
relationship between witnesses insisting that the culprit was “not there” in the 
lineup and lineup presentation procedure in the target present condition (X2(2) 
= 8.12, p < .02). Eyewitnesses viewing the ONCE lineup procedure (28%) were 
significantly more likely to incorrectly claim that the culprit was not present in 
the target present condition than in the NoID lineup procedure (7%) and the 
MULTIPLE procedure (19%). However, there was no difference in “not there” 
decisions across procedures in the target absent condition (X2(2) = 2.68, ns).  
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Figure 5.   Mean Eyewitness Identification Accuracy (%) Across  
Three Presentation Conditions. 
 
In this study the MULTIPLE lineup procedure produced accuracy rates 
more similar to the NoID condition, than to the ONCE condition, opposite from 
the findings of Study 7. In the MULTIPLE condition, 34 out of 134 (25%) 
participant eyewitnesses chose to see the lineup a second time and, like Study 7, 
not one witness desired to the lineup more than twice. Of these 34 witnesses, 13 
saw target present lineups and 2 of these witnesses made accurate 
identifications (comprising 7% of the total accurate identifications), 6 selected 
foil photographs, and 5 did not make a decision again. Of the participant 
witnesses that saw target absent lineups, 21 asked to see the lineup again, and 1 
made an inaccurate identification (contributing 8% to the total inaccurate 
identifications), 10 selected or re-selected foil pictures, and 10 did not select 
anybody.  In total, 32% of those who did not make an identification from the 
first lineup chose to see the lineup again.  
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Confidence Ratings 
 Within the three lineup procedure conditions, accurate witnesses from 
target present conditions were not more confident than inaccurate witnesses 
from target absent conditions (Figure 4): ONCE (78% versus 72%, t(38) = 0.764, 
ns), MULTIPLE (79% versus 74%, t(37) 0.764, ns), and NoID (72% versus 74%, 
t(35) = -0.297, ns).  In addition, between conditions there were no significant 
differences in confidence ratings.  
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Figure 6. Mean Confidence of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses 
Across Three Presentation Conditions. 
 
Diagnosticity 
 Did one procedure prove to be better than the others in this study?  
Diagnosticity ratios were calculated as indicators of the potential value of a 
lineup technique as a source of evidence. The diagnosticity ratio is calculated as 
the ratio of the proportion of correct and false decisions. The higher the 
diagnosticity ratio, the greater the probative value of identification decisions 
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from such lineups should be. The diagnosticity ratios were 2.19, 3.13, and 2.18 
for identifications of suspects from the ONCE, MULTIPLE, and NoID 
sequential presentations (Table 22). The probative value of the sequential 
procedure was greatest for the multiple viewing condition, making it more 
diagnostic than the original design and the no-ID-first viewing design. 
However, the NoID presentation proved to be very diagnostic for correctly 
rejecting the lineup when the culprit was not present versus when the culprit 
was present, a ratio of 5.0.  
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Table 22.  Identification Decisions (%) and Diagnosticity Ratios Resulting from 
ONCE, MULTIPLE, and NoID Sequential Lineup Procedures 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                                                             Identification 
Lineup Method                            Suspects            Foil        No Decision    Not There  
One Time Only  
     Criminal Present (n=72)     35                     24                    12              29 
     Criminal Absent (n=115)    16                     23                    14              47 
 Diagnosticity Ratio        2.19a                                                          1.62 b       
As Many Times as Desired                       
     Criminal Present (n=54)                50                    24                      7              19                   
     Criminal Absent (n=80)                16                     28                    16              40   
 Diagnosticity Ratio                   3.13 a                                                         2.11 b 
No-ID-First Viewing                               
     Criminal Present (n=42)               48                     26                     19               7                            
     Criminal Absent (n=79)                22                     34                      9              35 
 Diagnosticity Ratio                  2.18 a                                                          5.00 b     
______________________________________________________________________ 
a Proportion of correct identifications: proportion of false identifications. 
b  Proportion of correct rejections: mistaken rejections of lineup.  
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to replicate Study 7 using target absent 
lineups, in addition to target present lineups, and determine if modifications to 
the sequential procedure alter the value of the traditional procedure for 
maintaining accuracy while minimizing inaccuracy. Study 7 tested three 
possible presentations of the sequential procedure: seeing it once, as many 
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times as desired, or no-ID-first viewing, and found some differences. Did these 
findings replicate? In this study, the no-ID-first viewing presentation provided 
12% greater accuracy than the once time presentation, however, the difference 
did not reach significance. However, the NoID presentation did not prove to be 
more diagnostic than the one time only presentation, as it had in the previous 
study. Thus, the no-ID-first viewing presentation did not maintain much of an 
advantage over the traditional procedure. It did however produce a greater 
ratio of correct rejections of target absent lineups to mistaken rejections of target 
present lineups. This was something that could not have been demonstrated in 
the design of Study 7.  
The MULTIPLE presentation results from this study deviated the most 
from the findings of Study 7. Previously this condition produced accuracy rates 
most similar to the traditional procedure, but in this study it looked more 
similar to the NoID condition and was more diagnostic than the other two 
conditions. The only difference between the designs of Studies 7 and 8 was the 
addition of target absent conditions for each presentation procedure. This, 
however, could not explain the improved accuracy that the MULTIPLE 
presentation showed over the one time only presentation because the target 
absent lineup could only impact false identifications rates.  
The target absent lineup condition was included to determine whether 
the different presentation procedures would affect inaccuracy rates differently 
when witnesses were selecting an inaccurate foil versus selecting the 
replacement suspect when the culprit was absent. There were no differences in 
inaccuracy rates across presentation conditions for both Study 7 and the present 
study. Thus, the choosing rates of witnesses selecting a foil in target present 
situations as well as those selecting an innocent suspect in target absent 
situations did not differ between presentation conditions across Studies 7 and 8.  
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All of the results for Studies 7 and 8 indicated that modifying the 
procedures so that witnesses see the lineup twice or in a two-step process did 
not impact eyewitness accuracy. Both presentation procedures proved to be 
more diagnostic in one of two studies but neither remained a reliable 
improvement. More importantly, neither alteration to the original sequential 
procedure harmed accuracy rates. In addition, the multiple viewing 
presentation replicated the findings of previous researchers who offered 
witnesses an unexpected “second chance” to see the lineup photographs. These 
studies extended those findings to witnesses who “expected” to be able to see 
the lineup again if they chose to.  
Based on the findings of Studies 7 and 8, researchers should be less 
concerned about police officers allowing eyewitnesses to see the lineup a 
second time, particularly those who did not make an identification the first 
time, as long as the photographs are shuffled between viewings. Although 
doing so did not reliably improve identifications, it also did not impair them. 
Additionally, the no-ID-first view presentation presented here did not maintain 
a consistent advantage over the traditional sequential lineup but also did not 
hurt accuracy rates. It will be important to see data comparing Britain’s VIPER 
system to the traditional sequential lineup to be sure that not shuffling the 
photos between lineup viewings does not increase relative judgments and 
inaccuracy.  
 
Summary 
This study did not replicate the previous findings from Study 7. The no-
ID-first viewing presentation did not provide superior accuracy over the 
traditional method and was not more diagnostic. The modified procedure did 
prove to be just as good as the traditional procedure, without any reduction in 
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accuracy or increase in inaccuracy. The multiple viewings condition, although 
also not providing significantly greater accuracy or reduced inaccuracy was 
more diagnostic than the traditional design. However, this cannot be explained 
by the addition of the target absent condition. In sum, Studies 7 and 8 showed 
that two potential modifications to the traditional one-time-only sequential 
lineup presentation did not significantly affect eyewitness accuracy rates. At 
times, the two modified procedures proved to show some advantage over the 
traditional procedure but these advantages were not reliable. 
Recommendations for police lineup procedures will follow in the general 
discussion.  
 
 
  
  
CHAPTER TEN: 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
  “The police lineup is both the critical means of presenting  
     eyewitness identification in court and one of the most  
     dangerous tools of justice (Brooks, 1983, p.45).” 
 
 Recent DNA exoneration cases have corroborated the warnings of 
eyewitness identification researchers by showing that mistaken eyewitness 
identification was the largest single factor contributing to the conviction of 
these innocent people. The series of studies presented in this manuscript do not 
solve this “eyewitness problem” (Wells, 1993).  However, eyewitness decision-
making is at the root of the problem, which is not surprising considering that 
face recognition is generally so good on a daily basis. The findings presented 
here contribute to a better understanding of how eyewitnesses cognitively 
process sequential lineups, an area that has received inadequate attention in the 
eyewitness literature. I sought to identify the decision strategies of accurate and 
inaccurate eyewitnesses viewing sequential lineups, as well as manipulate the 
strategies in an attempt to reduce false identifications. In addition, I aimed to 
determine whether minor modifications to the sequential presentation would 
affect eyewitness accuracy rates.  
 
Summary and Conclusions  
 In review, in the case of simultaneous lineups accurate eyewitnesses use 
automatic processing and inaccurate eyewitnesses use controlled processing in 
the form of relative judgments and process of elimination respectively. The 
eyewitness literature also tells us that the sequential procedure was designed to 
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decrease the approximately 30% false identification rate produced by the 
simultaneous lineup, and does so by decreasing relative judgments and making 
it impossible to use process of elimination or compare lineup pictures (Lindsay 
& Wells, 1985). However, there is still a 17% false identification rate with the 
sequential lineup. What we do not know is what these inaccurate eyewitnesses 
are doing differently from the accurate eyewitnesses. Dunning & Stern (1994) 
found that eyewitness identification accuracy could be distinguished by self-
reports of witnesses concerning how they made their identifications from a 
simultaneous lineup. The first six studies contained in this paper intended to 
determine if eyewitness accuracy after viewing sequential lineups could also be 
distinguished by self-report of how they made their identifications.  
 Study 1 was designed to identify the themes or decision processes that 
accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses use when viewing sequential lineups. 
While participant witnesses looked at the lineup photographs they were asked 
to “think aloud” what was going on in their head as they reached a decision for 
each photograph and they were asked in an open-ended question to describe 
how they came to their identification decision. Using primarily their open-
ended responses, Study 1 revealed that participant eyewitnesses who 
accurately identified the perpetrator in a sequential lineup mentioned 
potentially different themes than those who selected a distractor photograph 
from the lineup. Accurate eyewitnesses mentioned that the culprit’s 
photograph just looked “familiar” to them or “struck them.” In contrast, 
inaccurate eyewitnesses mentioned having a difficult time identifying the 
perpetrator and tended to say that they selected the closest photograph and 
tried to use distinctive features to identify the culprit. Based on a qualitative 
analysis of the findings, five decision process statements were created or carried 
over from Dunning & Stern’s (1994) analysis of simultaneous lineup decision-
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making. These statements included “I just recognized him, I cannot explain 
why,” “I focused on his most distinctive feature,” “He was the closest person to 
what I remember but not exact,” “I matched the image in my head to the 
picture in front of me,” and “While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think 
back to the video and compare.” 
 Study 2 presented these decision strategy statements designed in Study 1 
to eyewitnesses after they made an identification judgment, and using factor 
analysis established two decision strategies that differentiated accurate and 
inaccurate eyewitnesses viewing the same culprit present sequential lineup. 
Accurate eyewitnesses were more likely to report a simple matching strategy by 
endorsing three particular decision statements “I matched the image in my 
head to the picture in front of me,” “The other pictures had little influence on 
my decision,” and “The other pictures did not confuse me.” These descriptions 
were indicative of people who had a clear image of the perpetrator from the 
film and used that image and not the other lineup photographs to facilitate 
recognition from memory. Unexpectedly, accurate eyewitness did not 
consistently endorse the automatic decision statement commonly chosen in the 
simultaneous procedure, “I just recognized him, I cannot explain why.”  
 On the other hand, inaccurate eyewitnesses endorsed four statements 
indicative of deliberate and thoughtful but uncertain processing, “He was the 
closest person to what I remember but not exact,” “While I looked at each 
photograph, I tried to think back to the video and compared,” As I looked at 
more pictures, they all began to look the same,” and “The other pictures were 
all so similar they made me less confident.” The statements consistently chosen 
by inaccurate eyewitnesses were indicative of people who did not retain a clear 
image of the perpetrator and needed the other lineup photographs and their 
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ability to think back to the video in order to produce an identification. This will 
be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.  
 A composite measure of the three decision statements endorsed 
primarily by accurate eyewitnesses was created and defined as a “simple 
matching” strategy. A second composite measure of the four deliberative and 
thoughtful decision statements endorsed more commonly by inaccurate 
eyewitnesses was created and defined as a “deliberative” strategy. These 
decision strategies are unique to the sequential lineup procedure. The design of 
the sequential lineup makes it almost impossible for witnesses to rely on the 
other lineup photographs to produce a “pop” of the culprit or “process of 
eliminate” to the closest candidate. The sequential procedure requires witnesses 
to either use their memory of the culprit or their ability to the think back to the 
video, as sources of comparison for making identifications. This makes the task 
significantly more difficult, in that some form of memorial representation is 
central to the decision-making process of all eyewitnesses, and provides 
support for the qualitative strategies discovered in Study 1.  
 In Study 2, accurate eyewitnesses endorsed significantly more simple 
matching strategy statements than deliberative strategy statements. Inaccurate 
eyewitnesses did just the opposite and were more likely to endorse deliberative 
and thoughtful strategy statements. In addition, the automatic recognition 
statement was moderately more likely to be selected by inaccurate than 
accurate eyewitnesses. In looking at participants’ responses to an open-ended 
question about their decision processes, it seemed as though accurate 
eyewitness felt that their process was automatic but they were more likely to 
say things like “as soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was the culprit.”  
 This automatic recognition statement was added to the decision process 
dependent variable in Study 3, which was designed to look at inaccurate 
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identifications in target absent sequential lineups. Study 3 demonstrated that 
the decision processes of inaccurate eyewitnesses did not significantly differ 
regardless of whether they selected an innocent suspect replacement or a 
known innocent distractor picture. The data from Studies 2 and 3 were 
collapsed and the predicted interaction between the type of strategy used (simple 
matching versus deliberative) and the accuracy of the participant witness was 
significant. In addition, the two automatic recognition statements “I just recognized 
him, I cannot explain why” and “As soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was 
the culprit” were collapsed to form a composite “automatic” recognition measure 
and this strategy was endorsed significantly more often by accurate eyewitnesses.  
 Studies 4a and 4b were conducted to replicate the previous findings using a 
new set of experimental materials. In attempting to model real world conditions 
and the variability in the viewing conditions from crime to crime, it was 
important to be sure that the decision-making processes found in the previous 
studies could be replicated in situations where the viewing conditions were 
different. The findings successfully replicated the interaction between decision 
strategy (simple matching versus deliberative) and witness accuracy found in 
Study 3, but the “automatic” strategy did not differentiate witness accuracy. 
This lack of replication will be discussed in more detail below.  
 Study 5 offers evidence that accuracy rates cannot be easily influenced 
via the manipulation of the decision processes one uses when making an 
identification. In Study 5, witnesses who were asked to think back to the video 
and compare that image to each lineup photograph were not subsequently less 
accurate in their identifications than control witnesses who made their 
identifications freely. In trying to influence accuracy, witnesses were asked to 
create an image of the perpetrator before viewing the lineup and were told to 
use only that image when making their identification. This manipulation did 
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not prove to increase accuracy. The lack of significant findings in Study 5 will 
be discussed in more depth later in this chapter.  
 The last decision process study had participants who had not witnessed 
the crime behave like triers of fact. In Study 6, participants were given the 
decision process selections of 40 previous eyewitnesses and were asked to 
determine whether each witness had made an accurate or inaccurate 
identification. Half the participants were informed about the decision strategies 
found to be indicative of accuracy in Studies 2-4 and half were not informed. 
Unexpectedly, informed participants did not outperform the uninformed 
condition, nor did they perform better than chance levels. Analysis of the 
manipulation check uncovered that informed participants did not use the 
information given to them in making their assessments of witnesses’ accuracy. 
Even when additional participants were given verbal “mini lectures” on 
witness decision processes, they were not more likely to pay attention to the 
information, they were not more likely to classify witness protocols, and they 
did not outperform uninformed participants.  
 Lastly, Studies 7 and 8 were interested in testing modifications to the 
sequential procedure and whether logical changes would affect accuracy rates. 
In an attempt to gather as much information as possible, police officers may be 
tempted to offer witnesses who do not make an identification a second 
opportunity to see the lineup. In addition, eyewitnesses are often hesitant to 
select to early from the sequential lineup procedure for fear that a later picture 
will be a closer match to the culprit.  
 Two modifications to the sequential lineup procedure were contrasted 
with the traditional “one time” view of the sequential lineup, either seeing the 
lineup as many times as desired (i.e., multiple view) or a two step process of 
seeing the lineup once without being permitted to identify anyone, and then 
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seeing the lineup a second time after the pictures were shuffled and indicating 
yes or no for each picture (i.e., no-ID-first view). Eyewitnesses have only one 
chance to see each photograph in a sequential lineup, this second presentation 
modification was designed to reduce eyewitnesses’ use of a more conservative 
response criterion. The no-ID-first view presentation could ensure that 
eyewitnesses continue to not make many false positive identifications but 
without increasing the chances of missed accurate response due to an overly 
conservation response criterion.  In Study 7, only target present lineups were 
conducted across conditions and the no-ID-first view presentation produced 
significantly greater accuracy than the one time view and multiple view 
conditions. There were no significant differences in inaccuracy rates across 
conditions. Study 8 served as a replication and extension, using both target 
present and target absent lineups. The superiority of the no-ID-first view 
condition did not reach significance but produced 12% more accurate 
identifications than the one time view. The multiple view condition produced 
equivalent accuracy to the no-ID-first view condition. Again, there were no 
differences in inaccuracy rates across conditions. Thus, neither modification 
harmed accuracy, and the no-ID-first view presentation might allow the 
hesitant eyewitnesses more security in making identifications.  
 Although unexpected findings were discussed throughout, a few results 
of these studies are worth further elaboration and emphasis. The role of 
automatic processing proved to be less pronounced than predicted. In Study 1, 
the open-ended responses did indicate a greater tendency for accurate 
eyewitnesses to mention being “struck” by a picture or as sense of “familiarity,” 
but with no mention of a “pop out.” Due to the power of the automatic 
response for accurate eyewitnesses in Dunning & Stern (1994), the “I just 
recognized him, I cannot explain why” statement was included in the final 
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decision statements. This statement was, however, endorsed more often by 
inaccurate eyewitnesses in Study 2. In Study 3, a second automatic statement 
was added, “As soon as I saw the picture, I knew it was the culprit.” In Study 3, 
the new statement was endorsed moderately more often by accurate 
eyewitnesses but the original automatic recognition statement was endorsed 
again by inaccurate eyewitnesses.  The collapsing of data from Studies 2 and 3 
and the creation of an “automatic” composite variable combing the two 
automatic decision statements produced the first significant evidence of 
automatic processing by accurate eyewitnesses. However, in Study 4 this effect, 
although in the right direction, was no longer significant. Why are accurate 
eyewitnesses not describing automatic statements in their decision-making?  
 Accurate eyewitnesses consistently described a simple matching process, 
and although this process is quick and not deliberate it probably does not feel 
as “automatic” as the “pop out” found in simultaneous lineups. These 
witnesses may have an inclination to select a photograph but perhaps there is a 
lurking uncertainty as to whether that same feeling would be there for another 
photo yet to be seen. Therefore, it may be this hesitation that prevents accurate 
witnesses from consistently endorsing the automatic decision statements. The 
fact that the other lineup photographs do not influence their decision is support 
for an automatic one-to-one match of memory to individual picture. More 
studies need to further explore the sense of automaticity that accurate 
eyewitnesses might be feeling in sequential lineup situations, that was not 
sufficiently tapped by the decision statements used in theses studies.  
  A second unexpected finding was the lack of effective manipulation of 
decision strategies in Study 5. In previous work looking at simultaneous 
lineups, forcing witnesses to use controlled, process of elimination strategies 
did decrease witness accuracy (Perretta, 1998). Why was this not the case in 
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Study 5? In the simultaneous lineup experiment the manipulation procedures 
were a great deal more elaborate.  Perretta required participants to spend 5 
minutes analyzing their reasons for why each photo in the lineup was or was 
not a good match with the perpetrator they had witnessed. In my study, in 
order to test ecologically viable instructions that police could actually use 
without concern from lawyers, Study 5 participants were only asked to think 
back to the video for each lineup picture, and only at the beginning of the 
lineup. Perhaps if we had reminded witnesses to look back to video when each 
picture was turned over it would have forced them to adhere to the 
instructions, and could have facilitated the predicted decrease in accuracy. At 
this point, police would not be recommended to instruct witnesses on specific 
decision strategies to use or not use. However, real eyewitnesses are highly 
motivated to follow police instructions and a replication of this study 
introducing a comparable motivation level in laboratory participants could 
produce the expected effects.  
 A third finding requiring some discussion was the lack of above chance 
results in Study 6. Analysis of the manipulation check indicated that the 
informed condition participants did not take into account the “helpful hints” 
instructions given to them. In Study 6, the experimenter did not verbally go 
over the informed conditions instruction sheet but merely asked them to read it. 
This could represent an important difference in the criminal justice system 
between judges’ verbal instructions to jurors and the court’s written 
recommendations to jurors. It may be the case that jurors have difficulty seeing 
decision process differences in people and will be hesitant to pay close attention 
to written instructions on how to treat eyewitness evidence, even from an 
authority. Although the present data indicate that this might be the case, an 
additional dozen participants were given verbal instructions and this did not 
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improve the situation. Further research needs to replicate these findings before 
it can be concluded that instructions on witness decision processes are not a 
useful postdictive variable. It is also important to note that jurors are, in 
general, more highly motivated to follow judge’s instructions than participants 
in a laboratory procedure are to follow the experimenter or even the graduate 
student researcher’s instructions. There may be ecological concerns with the 
design of this study and greater motivation for participants may remedy the 
barely chance findings. Study 6 does highlight that the potential effects of how 
instructions about eyewitness evidence are given to juries should be of great 
concern to eyewitness researchers for how their recommendations are put into 
play in the criminal justice system.  
 Before any such recommendations are made, it is important to have a 
better understanding of how inaccurate eyewitnesses make false identifications. 
Have we successfully identified their decision-making processes? If so, have we 
successfully demonstrated that they are controllable?  
 
Understanding Inaccurate Face Recognition 
 In Chapter 1, it was posited that inaccurate eyewitnesses use the 
“identifying” route of face recognition described by Mandler (1991), where 
recognition results from a more analytical and deliberative process requiring 
significant cognitive effort. This prediction was supported by the findings of 
Dunning & Stern (1994) in their evaluation of inaccurate recognition in 
simultaneous lineup situations. They found that inaccurate eyewitnesses did 
use controlled processing, in the form of process of elimination of lineup 
photographs to narrow the choices. However, the sequential display of lineup 
photographs clearly prohibits this type of controlled processing by making it 
very difficult for eyewitnesses to use the other lineup photographs to fill in 
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their incomplete memorial representations of the culprit. Thus, in this series of 
studies it was more specifically predicted that witnesses with incomplete 
memories that make a lineup choice would be more likely in sequential 
situations to use the constituent features used to encode the face to narrow 
down the lineup choices. This would be a modified relative judgment strategy. 
 There is substantial evidence from Studies 2-5 that inaccurate 
eyewitnesses were not comparing lineup photographs using the constituent 
parts encoded in memory before selecting a picture, as was predicted from face 
recognition theory. Across these studies witnesses reported that they did use 
the other lineup pictures in their decision-making, although the other pictures 
often confused them and made the decision more difficult. Nevertheless, there 
was no evidence that they were comparing facial features across lineup 
photographs as predicted. In Study 1, 74% of accurate and 84% of inaccurate 
eyewitnesses reported looking for specific facial features, therefore, the 
statement “I focused on his most distinctive feature” was included as a decision 
processes statement in all subsequent studies. There was inconsistency in 
responses to this statement across the remaining studies. In Study 2 there was 
no difference between accurate and inaccurate choosers in selecting the 
distinctive feature decision statement. However, in Studies 3 and 4a/4b 
collapsed accurate eyewitness were marginally significantly more likely than 
inaccurate eyewitnesses to endorse using specific features in their decision-
making (z = 1.83, p < .06; z = 1.86, p < .06). In addition, in Study 3, “I focused on 
his most distinctive feature” was the only decision statement that significantly 
differentiated target present and target absent inaccurate eyewitnesses. 
Focusing on a distinctive feature of the culprit to identify a lineup photograph 
was a strategy used inconsistently by both accurate and inaccurate 
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eyewitnesses and does not explain much, if any, of inaccurate eyewitnesses 
decision-making.  
 If inaccurate eyewitnesses were not using the facial features that were 
successfully encoded in memory, then they must have been using information 
gathered sometime during the witness experience to justify their selection of a 
lineup picture. In Study 2, factor analysis revealed two significant themes in 
eyewitness decision-making, which were identified as simple matching and 
deliberative thought strategies. The deliberative thought strategy proved to be 
significantly used by inaccurate eyewitnesses in Studies 2-4, although it did not 
reach significance in Study 3. This strategy is generally described as witnesses 
looking at each photograph and thinking back to the video to compare images, 
then selecting the closest person to what they remember. It, therefore, requires 
attention to the other photographs in the lineup when making a selection, 
which is clearly controlled and analytical processing.  
 The controlled processing used by inaccurate eyewitness across 
simultaneous and sequential lineup conditions begs the question of whether 
these false identifications can ever be suppressed completely. The sequential 
lineup was created to suppress relative judgment processing and has 
successfully reduced false identifications from approximately 30% to 17%.  
However, suppressing one controlled process only led another to emerge. In 
sequential lineups, inaccurate witnesses tried to use their memory of the video 
to help them narrow down the lineup photographs, and those unable to do so 
chose nobody. Given the failure of sequential lineups to reduce false 
identifications below 17%, is it even reasonable to think that the false 
identification numbers can be reduced further?  There will always be some 
error in identification accuracy, but if face recognition is normally automatic, 
what type of reasoning drives inaccurate eyewitnesses to ignore the fact that 
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their lineup identifications do not feel automatic and effortless like the other 
face recognitions they do on a daily basis?  
 
Two Systems of Reasoning 
 The strength of an eyewitness’ memory may impact what kind of 
processing the witness uses when faced with a police lineup. Steve Sloman 
(1996, 2002) has argued that people have two systems of reasoning, an 
“associative” system and a “rule-based” system. He believes that “associative 
thought feels like it arises from a different cognitive mechanism than does 
deliberate, analytical reasoning” (p. 3). The associative system is defined as a 
cognitive system that draws inferences on the basis of similarity and contiguity, 
and represents decisions or information that “resonate” with people. Similarity 
is central to associative processing and is derived from the similarity between 
the current stimulus and previously associated stimuli. Analyses by Sloman of 
previously collected data showed that associative responses were automatic in 
that they persisted even when attempts were made to ignore them. Thus, he 
characterizes associative inferences as reflexive.   
 In contrast, the rule based system makes different predictions for 
eyewitness accuracy. The rule-based system is described as being very productive 
and effortful. The rules are thought to come in different kinds (i.e., instructions 
and laws of nature or society) and can be normative (i.e., telling people how 
they should behave to reach some prespecified goal). How do people learn 
these rules? They can be made up, discovered in logic, or passed down through 
culture. The important thing to note is that humans understand and apply these 
rules without external support or verification from the environment as long as 
their analytic mechanisms have mastered the rules and can access them when 
relevant.  
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 The associative system parallels nicely with the face recognition research 
which predicts a one-to-one match between the memorial representation and 
the current stimulus. Matching involves a computation of similarity, thus, it is 
an associative response. In addition, the face recognition literature asserts that 
these matches will be automatic and the process will be difficult to explain. 
Dunning and Stern (1994) found that both of these patterns were related to the 
decision-processing of accurate eyewitnesses viewing simultaneous lineups. In 
addition, the studies presented here found that accurate eyewitnesses viewing 
sequential lineups also reported more automatic and simple matching 
processing. Accurate witnesses in the sequential procedure retained an image in 
their head of the perpetrator and used that image to compare with each 
photograph, which did not require relying on the other lineup photographs for 
comparison. A compelling case has been made for automatic recognition using 
similarity matching processing in accurate witness identifications across three 
different literatures: reasoning, face recognition, and eyewitness identification.  
 Unfortunately, not all eyewitnesses will have an automatic response to a 
lineup photograph using the associative system. The face recognition research 
predicts that this is because these witnesses do not have complete enough 
memorial images to automatically match with the lineup photographs. The two 
systems of reasoning theory would predict that witnesses without an 
instinctual type of response will rely on the rule-based system in trying to make 
an identification from a police lineup. Researchers have consistently found with 
simultaneous lineups that people in this situation use a relative judgment rule 
and apply the rule through a process of elimination strategy. This is a much 
more deliberate and thoughtful process that aims to produce an identification 
in place of a recognition that did not pop to mind associatively. Eyewitness 
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research shows that most of these witnesses are inaccurate in their 
identifications. This issue will be discussed later in this section.  
 What happens when applying a particular rule is prohibited or made 
impossible yet no associative response occurs? The dual-process theory of 
reasoning would claim that the rule-based system would then follow another 
logical rule. In sequential lineup situations, the present data show that 
inaccurate eyewitnesses used a more deliberative strategy in their attempts to 
make identifications. In the present studies, this strategy or rule included 
thinking back to the video for each lineup photograph and comparing that 
image to the photographs. It also showed, although inconsistently, that some 
inaccurate eyewitnesses relied on all of the lineup photographs to help them 
reach an identification decision by comparing a specific feature of the 
perpetrator to each photograph in search of the closest match. If the rule of 
thinking back to the video was prohibited or made impossible to use for those 
who did not have the ability to even recall that memory, they would be forced 
to follow yet a different rule. In these studies, the secondary rule was 
comparing one or two distinctive features across lineup photographs to 
produce an identification. Consistent with the face recognition research, when 
the holistic image stored in memory was not complete but a few constituent 
features were retained, any identification required the use of those features.  In 
inaccurate identification situations, the current findings and the face 
recognition research support the belief that these eyewitnesses were relying on 
the rule-based system of reasoning.  
 The discussion thus far has argued that accurate eyewitnesses use the 
associative system and inaccurate eyewitnesses use the rule-based system. Does 
this mean that the two systems are independent of each other? In other words, 
if the associative system is reflexive and the rule-based system is productive 
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does it make sense, or is it possible, for people to use both simultaneously? 
Sloman (1996, 2002) contends that both systems do not need to be applied to 
every problem and that neither has an exclusive problem domain. He believes 
that the domains of application are overlapping and differ depending on each 
person’s knowledge, skill, and experience. However, Sloman also presents 
research showing that the two systems are interactive and that they “function 
as two experts who are working cooperatively to compute sensible answers” (p. 
6). Evidence that the two systems exist and often work in parallel comes from 
research showing that people can simultaneously believe two contradictory 
responses. This has been shown in the field of judgment demonstrated by the 
conjunction fallacy (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), in how people project 
unfamiliar properties against categories (Sloman, 1993), in syllogistic reasoning 
(Revlin, Leirer, Yopp, & Yopp, 1980), in conditional reasoning, best known by 
the Wason task (Wason, 1966), and even with the perception illusions like the 
Muller-Lyer illusion. In the Muller-Lyer illusion where two identical lines look 
like they are different lengths, depending on how the arrows on each end are 
facing, knowledge that the two lines are of equal size does not affect the visual 
perception that they are not. One’s associative response is that they are not the 
same and even when the rule based system says that they are the same, the 
image still produces the illusion. In all of these examples, both systems 
contribute a response and try to solve the problem but the associative, more 
intuitive, system often intrudes even when someone is attempting to use the 
more rational, rule-based system.  
 Is it possible then to determine which system is responsible for a given 
response? Although this is not experimentally tested, Sloman proposes that the 
contents of awareness can cue when a response is produced solely by one of the 
systems. He asserts that when people are conscious only of the result of the 
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decision, but not the process, then the associative system was at work. In 
contrast, if people are aware of both the result and the process, then the rule-
based system was at work. However, Sloman also proposes that the rule-based 
system can suppress or overrule the associative system, probably because it 
demands and provides explanation or justification for a response in a more 
complex manner. However, the opinion of the associative system is always 
heard and often precedes the rule-based system, presumably because it is 
quicker and more efficient. Not to mention, humans are “cognitive misers” (i.e., 
using the least amount of cognitive resources necessary in interpreting their 
environments). It makes logical sense for people to rely first on the efficient 
associative system in decision-making and not the rule-based system, especially 
when an adequate response is produced by the former (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
 People are very good at face recognition, so much so that they rarely 
notice that they even process faces, relying almost entirely on the automatic 
associative system. As well, eyewitness identification findings support the 
prediction that eyewitnesses are most likely to start out using the associative 
system in their decision-making. Accurate identifications, as research has 
demonstrated, are faster and witnesses have consistently described them as 
being automatic and yet difficult to explain. When forced to explain, they often 
indicate an absolute strategy of matching their memory to each lineup 
photograph but there is clearly little or no rule-based system processing. 
However, when the memory trace is poor for some eyewitnesses and the 
associative system fails to provide any automatic response, witnesses will turn 
to the rule-based system to do more evaluative and complex processing of the 
lineup photographs. These eyewitness identifications are more complex and 
take longer and paired with witnesses' motivation to select someone, they tend 
to produce false identifications of distractor photographs or innocent suspects.  
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 The two systems of reasoning clearly apply to the eyewitness situation; 
accurate witnesses describe using the associative system while inaccurate 
witnesses describe using the rule-based system. It is important to clarify that 
the discussion here may appear to imply that using the rule-based system leads 
to inaccuracy in eyewitness identification judgments. This, however, is not the 
message that the data reveal. The data reveal a strong correlation between 
inaccurate eyewitness face recognition and rule-based reasoning. Witnesses 
who reported using rule-based reasoning (i.e., deliberative strategy) are more 
likely to have produced false identifications than those who reported using 
associative reasoning (i.e., simple matching strategy). The causal direction of 
the link between eyewitness accuracy and decision-making processes has yet to 
be fully demonstrated or thoroughly discussed and requires further 
elaboration.  
 
Causal Direction 
 A connection between identification accuracy and decision-making 
processes has been demonstrated but the direction of causality has yet to be 
unequivocally addressed. It could be argued that the use of different decision 
strategies actually leads to different accuracy rates. Certainly, evidence for this 
claim could have been provided by Study 5. This study attempted to show that 
encouraging witnesses to use a simple matching strategy, of creating a clear 
image of the perpetrator before beginning the lineup and using only that image 
to match to the lineup photographs, would lead to greater accuracy rates. 
Trying to improve accuracy rates by asking all witnesses to endorse the strategy 
of previously accurate witnesses proved ineffective, as it has in previous 
research with simultaneous lineups (Perretta, 1998). However, these findings 
make sense when considering the face recognition and reasoning literatures. 
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The lack of significant findings in attempting to increase accuracy rates may be 
due to witnesses’ inability to force an automatic matching response when their 
memorial representation is incomplete. Recall that “recognition” requires a 
familiarity match between a stimulus and a memory trace and the associative 
system determines similarity by comparing current stimuli and the previous 
stimulus.  If the memory trace is too weak, forcing the consideration of a match 
will not increase the chances of achieving familiarity or similarity.  
 Study 5 also attempted to show that strongly encouraging witnesses to 
use a deliberative strategy of looking back to the video and using only that 
image to compare with each lineup photograph would reduce accuracy rates. 
This was unsuccessful and could also be explained by face recognition research 
and the two systems of reasoning. If good face recognition is automatic and the 
associative system of reasoning is active then it may be difficult to get 
eyewitnesses to ignore or bypass their first sense of “familiarity.” As the 
manipulation check revealed witnesses in this condition were not more likely to 
say that they followed the instructed procedure. The data are not able to 
determine whether this was because it was too difficult for them to ignore the 
image of the perpetrator in their memory, if they had retained one, or whether 
it was only a lack of motivation to comply with the instructions. Further studies 
would need to be designed to specifically address the unanswered questions 
from Study 6. However, the data using simultaneous lineups discussed earlier 
do lend support to the possibility that decision processes might cause witness 
accuracy (Perretta, 1998).   
 More likely though, the causal direction is the reverse. It could be argued 
that determination of decision-making processes is the result of whether or not 
someone has made a correct identification of the perpetrator. According to face 
recognition encoding and recognition, people who are certain to be accurate 
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need a whole configural image of the culprit they saw, and the associative 
reasoning system predicts a rapid similarity match between new stimuli and 
past memory, thus seeing the lineup photographs the system would force a 
quick match of the stored memorial image to each photograph, eliciting feelings 
of automaticity and familiarity when a match is made. The process should be 
very different for witnesses that do not have a complete image stored and are 
not likely to be able to identify the perpetrator at all. In this case, witnesses will 
find the associative similarity match unsuccessful, if not impossible, requiring 
action on the part of the rule-based system. The rule-based system may test 
many rules, such as process of elimination, thinking back to the video, and/or 
matching the specific features that are stored, and select the best photograph 
possible with the information it has available. However, due to the poor 
memory trace to start, the photo selected by any rule is likely to be inaccurate, 
outside of chance.  
 The question of causality is difficult to answer but the answer is 
probably that both directions are involved. It is even possible that one direction 
is stronger for accuracy than it is for inaccuracy. Perhaps good memory and 
accuracy initiate and require only the use of automatic associative system 
processing.  It is not likely the case that automatic processes cause eyewitness 
accuracy.  A witness either has a good memory of the perpetrator’s appearance 
or not, and there is nothing forcing that witness to think automatically to 
improve that memory.  Rather, a good memory (which usually leads to a more 
accurate match between memory and pictures) causes the eyewitness to have 
an automatic experience when the perpetrator is presented to them.  If the 
witness has a good and complete memory of a perpetrator’s face, then that 
witness will more likely recognize the perpetrator rapidly and without 
conscious deliberation.  As such, although automatic decision processes are 
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reflective of eyewitness accuracy, they are not likely responsible for that 
accuracy.  On the other hand, decision processing that is very deliberative may 
lead to greater inaccuracy, regardless of memory. This was demonstrated by 
Perretta (1998) with simultaneous lineups.  These suppositions, although based 
on the current data analyses and eyewitness literature, require the design of 
many experiments that specifically address issues of causal direction.  
 
Recommendations to the Legal System 
 The first six studies presented here sought to identify and better 
understand one potentially valuable indicator of eyewitness accuracy, witness 
lineup decision processing. How can these decision processes be practically 
used in the police stations to diagnose eyewitness accuracy with individual 
witnesses? Witness decision processes are one part of a potential profile of 
accuracy that could be used as part of an “eyewitness checklist” by 
investigators to determine the probability of a given witness’s accuracy. 
 In order to hand a criminal investigator a checklist to help classify a 
witness’s identification as right or wrong, we would need to combine post-
diction information. For the sequential lineup this checklist could include the 
witness decision strategies presented here (i.e., simple matching versus 
deliberative), rating of relative versus absolute judgment processing (Lindsay, 
et al, 1991), and decision times (Sporer, 1993), as well as the potential addition 
of confidence measures (witness confidence after sequential lineups has not 
been clearly shown to be reliable but research is underway to investigate it 
further). One study looking at simultaneous lineups used confidence, decision 
time, and judgment processes to statistically distinguish correct eyewitness 
identifications from inaccurate ones, and found that they could successfully 
classify 67% of eyewitnesses making own-race identifications (Smith, Lindsay, 
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Pryke, & Dysart, 2001). This research suggests that an “eyewitness checklist” is 
possible but the research does not describe the “boundaries” along these 
variables that separated accurate witnesses from inaccurate ones. To create a 
valid checklist, researchers would have to describe the borders.  Researchers 
would have to take multiple variables and determine the boundaries that best 
separated accurate from inaccurate identifications, or show how the variables 
could be combined to define a reliable boundary.  Again, only in simultaneous 
procedures, this was done with the single variable of decision time, showing 
that a border of ten- to twelve-seconds best separated accurate positive 
identifications from the rest (Dunning & Perretta, 2002). However, before 
boundaries can be demonstrated and successfully replicated, researchers will 
first need to standardize measurement of variables across the discipline (e.g., 
decision-making and confidence).  
 The studies in this manuscript demonstrated that accurate eyewitnesses 
were consistently more likely to use a simple matching strategy and inaccurate 
eyewitnesses were more likely to use a more deliberative and thoughtful 
strategy. In order to decisively include these decision strategies on an 
eyewitness checklist, future research would need to reliably show that the use 
of one or the other of these strategies was predictive of witness accuracy and 
reliably distinguished the correct identifications from the false positive ones. 
The studies presented support this possibility but causal direction needs to be 
further determined. Such a demonstration could compel police investigators to 
collect and record decision processes, as well as other information as part of 
their eyewitness evidence.  
 There are a number of things that police investigators can do to assist in 
the successful postdiction of eyewitness accuracy. The most appropriate 
recommendations that can be made from the data presented here on the 
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sequential lineup procedure are that investigators should discourage 
eyewitnesses from using relative judgments but more importantly, they should 
collect and record postdicting information like eyewitness decision strategies. 
  
 Through the collection of additional information, that may seem 
invaluable at the time, investigators and jurors will be able to better assess the 
accuracy of each eyewitnesses’ package of information. That package already 
includes their description of the culprit, details of the event, and confidence, but 
should also include decision processes during an identification. Research 
suggests that providing triers of fact with information about witnesses’ decision 
processes would help them better determine the eyewitness’s accuracy.  For 
example, educating people about decision processing differences helped them 
to assess an eyewitness’s identification even more, particularly when the 
witness was wrong.  Dunning and Stern (1994, Study 5) provided a set of 
participants with information about how twenty witnesses had reached their 
decisions.  The researchers then asked participants to separate the accurate 
witnesses from the inaccurate ones.  Participants showed some facility at this 
task, achieving an accuracy rate of 61% (where chance accuracy was 50%). 
Although they properly suspected, without any intervention from the 
researchers, that accurate witnesses would reach their decisions automatically, 
they did not realize until told that inaccurate witnesses tended to work their 
way to an identification through a process of elimination strategy.  Once told, 
they were much better at spotting when a witness had chosen incorrectly, with 
their accuracy rates rising from 61% to 67% in this circumstance.  
 Study 6 followed similar procedures in trying to educate potential jurors 
about the decision processes and weaknesses of eyewitnesses seeing sequential 
lineups. Surprisingly, educating people about the decision processing 
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differences did not help them to assess an eyewitness’s identification accuracy 
at a rate greater than chance or even greater than those who were not informed 
about witness decision processes. The results showed that these participants 
did not pay any extra attention to the decision processes hints given to them. 
Therefore, educating jurors with written instructions about eyewitness 
decision-making patterns may not prove to be effective if they are not 
motivated to incorporate them into their decisions.  
 Due to the fact that subtle education is not consistently effective, it is 
tempting to suggest an even more hands-on role for police investigators in 
affecting, not just postdicting, eyewitness accuracy when showing eyewitnesses 
sequential lineups. If people facing sequential lineups are more accurate when 
they are automatic and use a simple matching strategy, then it could be 
recommended that investigators force people to use a simple matching strategy 
and be more automatic when they look over a sequential lineup.  Witnesses 
should be asked to create an image of the culprit and compare only that image 
to each lineup photograph, a quick match and response for each picture. This 
was a tempting idea and so in Study 5 I did just that, and found it not to be 
worthwhile.  Other researchers have tried similar tactics of increasing 
automaticity during simultaneous lineups with no success (Perretta, 1998; 
Brewer, Gordon, & Bond, 2000).  Why might forcing people to rely on such a 
process not promote accuracy? The best explanation rests on the causal 
connection between automatic decision processes and eyewitness accuracy.  As 
discussed previously, it is probably not the case that automatic processes cause 
eyewitness accuracy.  If the witness has a good and complete memory of a 
perpetrator’s face, then that witness will recognize the perpetrator rapidly and 
without conscious deliberation.  Automatic decision processes are reflective of 
eyewitness accuracy but they are probably not responsible for that accuracy.   
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In contrast, the eyewitness literature and the studies presented here do 
suggest things that criminal investigators can do to successfully help witnesses 
avoid making false positive identifications.  First, as accuracy is the primary 
goal of the sequential lineup, criminal investigators should prevent witnesses 
from pursuing an effortful relative judgment strategy in which they consciously 
and analytically compare lineup choices to each other. Such a strategy is 
indicative of a poor memory, and thus induces witnesses to make erroneous 
positive identifications. Other researchers have tried forcing participants to 
analytically compare lineup choices to each other and successfully shown that it 
damages their accuracy (Perretta, 1998; Perretta & Dunning, 2003).  In Study 5 
of this manuscript, some participants were forced for each lineup photograph to 
go back to the video and compare that image to the picture in order to find the 
closest match to their memory; a process indicative of a poor memory when 
viewing a sequential lineup. This procedure was not found to decrease witness 
accuracy rates in comparison to a control condition, but specific concerns with 
the study design have already been discussed. If police officers are to ever be 
encouraged to modify witness decision processes, it is likely that they will also 
desire to modify the lineup procedures as well.  
Can small modifications to the sequential lineup procedure affect 
eyewitness accuracy rates? Studies 7 and 8 addressed whether two 
modifications to the traditional sequential lineup procedure would damage the 
rate of accuracy or increase false positive identifications. Both studies found 
that seeing the lineup twice or in a two-step process of seeing it once without 
making a selection and then seeing it again and having to make a selection did 
affect false identification rates. In Study 7, however, there was a significant 
increase in accurate identifications using the two-step no-ID-first viewing 
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presentation, although this relationship did not reach significance in Study 8. 
Therefore, these studies demonstrate that researchers should not be overly 
concerned if police investigators modify the sequential lineup presentation in 
either of these ways. Allowing witnesses a “second chance” when they do make 
an identification the first time did not harm accuracy rates and may even help 
investigators acquire more information from eyewitnesses who did not select 
from the first sequential lineup. In addition, the no-ID-first viewing 
presentation is similar to that used in Britain’s VIPER system, and although not 
reliably superior to the traditional method it did produce increased accuracy 
across two studies. Future work should explore further this modified sequential 
procedure, for it alleviates practical concerns of the American criminal justice 
system which hesitates to recommend only one viewing of the sequential 
lineup procedure.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 Research evidence overwhelmingly shows that human being are neither 
unbiased observers nor veridical recorders, and as such will always make 
mistakes when it comes to eyewitness identification. Researchers have often 
asked typical people whether or not they agree with certain beliefs about 
memory like “Memory is like a video recording of your observations and can be 
played back at will to remind you of what you saw,” or “An eyewitness report 
is accurate evidence as to who was present and what happened at a crime 
scene” (Haber & Haber, 2000). They found that most people who have been 
asked either agree or strongly agree with both of these statements. These 
responses are representative of what a typical juror might believe about how 
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human memory functions. However, these statements are at a sharp variance 
with the data presented and reviewed in this manuscript.  
 Despite the scientific data surrounding the fallibility of eyewitness 
identification, neither the courts nor the typical person who may become a juror 
consider eyewitness identification to be a fallible matching test between 
memory and lineup, with a substantial false positive rate. In general terms, a 
test is accurate when only true positive outcomes (i.e., when the culprit is 
present, the culprit is picked) and true negative outcomes (i.e., when the culprit 
is absent, nobody is picked) occur, and a test is flawed to the extent that either 
false outcome occurs (i.e., when the culprit is absent but the suspect is picked, 
or when the culprit is present and he is not picked) (Haber & Haber, 2000). The 
courts require scientific evidence of a test’s accuracy with respect to its 
likelihood of false positive outcomes when any new forensic matching test is 
introduced into evidence. This has been the requirement for blood tests, 
polygraph tests, voice recognition tests, and most recently DNA tests. However, 
eyewitness identification “tests” have not been assessed with the same rigor as 
these other tests, and testimony based on the eyewitness identification test, 
even with its demonstrated high false-positive rates, is almost never excluded 
by the courts.  
 The criminal justice system continues to allow almost all eyewitness 
identifications into the courtroom because it has implemented safeguards. A 
large part of the criminal justice system genuinely believes that these 
safeguards are not only sufficient for protecting innocent suspects but warrant 
giving eyewitness identification such an influential status.  However, the 
system is designed so that it is both practical and advantageous to work around 
these safeguards.  First, there is the presence of counsel at live lineups if they 
are post indictment, but most lineups are done with photospreads for 
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convenience and to avoid the hassle of having lawyers present. Second, there 
are opportunities for motions to suppress identifications, although this assumes 
a judge will be able to identify a biased identification task or lineup. Third, 
expert testimony is occasionally allowed to inform jurors about the external 
influences on eyewitness identifications, but this is not standard in most courts 
because it is expected that defense lawyers can cover any external influences in 
their opening and closing statements to the jury. Lastly, cross-examination of 
identifying witnesses is supposed to give the defense the greatest opportunity 
to reveal a poor eyewitness identification.  However, creating doubt about an 
eyewitness is not always easy, as the following example demonstrates.  
 
  “After establishing that the incident occurred at night, at some  
  distance, in an area where there were no street lights, the defense  
 counsel demanded, ‘Then tell the jury, just how far can you see in  
 the dark?’ The witness, a simple country fellow, paused for a moment  
 and then replied, “Well, I can see the moon. How far is that?”  
 (Roberts, 1984, p. 1064).  
 
 
The jury found the defendant guilty.  
 The impact of this “tyranny of the eyewitness,” as it is properly 
described in England (Devlin, 1976), is reflected in the horrific number of 
American DNA exonerations, especially those in which the only or primary 
evidence against the defendant was the testimony of eyewitnesses.  There is, 
however, one important legal solution to the “tyranny of the eyewitness” 
problem, the application of the Old Roman “unis testis” rule (Haber & Haber, 
2000).  In this context, “unis testis” holds that the testimony of only a single 
eyewitness should never be sufficient to convict a stranger. This rule would 
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require that less emphasis be put on eyewitness testimony and more emphasis 
on other types of evidence in building a case. If the United States were to apply 
such a rule in our adversarial system, it would show people that the courts 
recognize the fallibility of sincere eyewitnesses attempting to get the 
perpetrator. 
 Even if  “unis testis” was put into effect it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to break the “tyranny of the eyewitness” and get people to 
understand the weaknesses of human memory in all its complexity. Therefore, 
it is essential that the criminal justice system look at ways it can prevent 
confident but inaccurate eyewitness identifications from reaching jurors. The 
National Institute of Justice, using the eyewitness research that has 
demonstrated dramatic implications for the way police lineups are done today, 
made a recent attempt to impact police procedures.  The Guide was a handbook 
presented to all police investigators of recommendations on how to best handle 
eyewitness evidence based on the science of psychology and the practical 
requirements of the law. Considerable amounts of psychological research were 
considered when The Guide was written, including the first ten years of research 
on the sequential lineup. Yet the sequential lineup procedure was not included 
as a central recommendation (Wells et al, 2000). 
 The Guide was a call for more research. Since The Guide was written, 
eyewitness researchers have sought to better understand the sequential 
procedure, its small decrease in accuracy rates, its significant decrease in false 
identifications, as well as the decision time and decision processes of 
eyewitnesses viewing sequential presentations. Eyewitness researchers have 
continually demonstrated the superiority of the sequential lineup over the 
traditional simultaneous lineup (Lindsay & Wells, 1985).  
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 The studies presented here continue to show the superiority of the 
sequential lineup as well as flesh out the underlying decision processes of 
eyewitnesses and the effects of variations on the sequential lineup presentation. 
Six of the studies presented here dug deeper into the decision processing of 
eyewitnesses to get an understanding of what inaccurate eyewitnesses are 
doing that impedes their accuracy. I identified two distinctive decision 
strategies that differentiated accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses viewing 
sequential lineups: the simple matching and deliberative thought strategies. 
Both the identification and demonstration of these processes show that even 
when relative judgment processing is suppressed, there is still more to learn to 
about eyewitness decision-making. When one analytical process was prohibited 
another emerged, demonstrating clear evidence for controlled processing in the 
case of poor face recognition, and leading me to believe that there will always 
be eyewitnesses who make false positive identifications. The final two studies 
presented here demonstrated that the sequential lineup is flexible, such that 
practical and policy oriented modifications to the presentation of the procedure 
did not increase false positive identifications and may even increase accuracy 
rates.  
 The Guide and the research presented here are steps in the right direction 
but there is much more that can be done to improve the current situation.  
There is a need for more “in the field” research that will help us determine how 
police investigators, judges, and jurors use and understand lineup procedures 
and other eyewitness evidence.  This could be accomplished by the 
centralization of eyewitness research into a “Center for Eyewitness Evidence” 
where researchers and practitioners could work together to address issues of 
concern to the criminal justice system in more systematic but policy oriented 
ways. While eyewitnesses will always make mistakes, with better research and 
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better communication between researchers, law enforcement, and the judicial 
system, we can continue to decrease the numbers of false positive 
identifications, and increase the efficacy of lineup procedures to the point 
where eyewitnesses on the witness stand do not have to be asked, “Got Perp?”  
 
  
  
APPENDIX A 
 
Identification Form 
Remember, as in a real identification situation, the guilty party may or may not be 
present. Please circle your responses on this form. 
                     Certainty 
Is #1 the person you saw in the video?    No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
 
Is #2 the person you saw in the video?    No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
 
Is #3 the person you saw in the video?    No   Yes    (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6  7(very) 
 
Is #4 the person you saw in the video?   No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
 
Is #5 the person you saw in the video?   No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
 
Is #6 the person you saw in the video?   No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
 
Is #7 the person you saw in the video?   No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
 
Is #8 the person you saw in the video?   No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
 
Is #9 the person you saw in the video?   No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
 
Is #10 the person you saw in the video? No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
 
Is #11 the person you saw in the video? No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
 
Is #12 the person you saw in the video? No   Yes   (not very)1   2    3    4   5   6   7(very) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
1a. What decision did you reach: 
 _____I chose Photo #_____ 
 _____I reach no decision at all. 
 _____I believe that he is not there. 
 
1b.  If you endorsed “I reach no decision” or “He’s not there” which photo 
would you choose if forced to make a positive identification?Æ I would 
choose Photo #____ 
 
2.        If you either chose a photograph or said that he was not there, how 
 confident are you in your choice, please respond from 0% - 100%.Æ___% 
 
3. How would you best describe your decision process (please circle as 
 many as apply)? 
a. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why. 
b. I went with my gut feeling.  
c. I focused on his most distinctive feature.  
d. He was the closest person to what I remember, but not exact.  
e. I matched the image in my head to the picture in front of me. 
f. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think back to the video 
and compare.  
g. Other (please explain below). 
 
4.  How much influence did the other pictures have on your decision 
(please circle as many as apply)? 
a. They had little influence on my decision. 
b. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look the same.  
c. They confused me; they made the task more difficult. 
d. They were all so similar that they made me less confidence.  
 
5.  What would you say had a greater influence on your decision, the 
pictures in the line-up, or your memory of the culprit? 
a. My memory 
b. The pictures 
c. They had about equal impact on my decision. 
         Could you explain this last answer. Why did you choose a, b, or c above? 
 
6.  In your own words, describe your decision process. What led you to 
choose the photo you identified?  
  164
  
APPENDIX C 
 
1a. What decision did you reach: 
 _____I chose Photo #_____ 
 _____I reach no decision at all. 
 _____I believe that he is not there. 
 
1b.  If you endorsed “I reach no decision” or “He’s not there” which photo 
would you choose if forced to make a positive identification?Æ I would 
choose Photo #____ 
 
2.        If you either chose a photograph or said that he was not there, how 
 confident are you in your choice, please respond from 0% -100%.Æ___% 
 
3. How would you best describe your decision process (please circle as 
 many as apply)? 
a. I just recognized him, I cannot explain why. 
b. I went with my gut feeling.  
c. I focused on his most distinctive feature.  
d. He was the closest person to what I remember, but not exact.  
e. I matched the image in my head to the picture in front of me. 
f. While I looked at each photograph, I tried to think back to the video 
and compare.  
g. As soon as I saw the picture, I knew that it was the culprit.  
h. Other (please explain below). 
 
4.  How much influence did the other pictures have on your decision 
(please circle as many as apply)? 
a. They had little influence on my decision. 
b. As I looked at more pictures, they all began to look the same.  
c. They confused me; they made the task more difficult. 
d. They were all so similar that they made me less confidence.  
 
5.  What would you say had a greater influence on your decision, the 
pictures in the line-up, or your memory of the culprit? 
a. My memory 
b. The pictures 
c. They had about equal impact on my decision. 
         Could you explain this last answer. Why did you choose a, b, or c above? 
 
6.  In your own words, describe your decision process. What led you to 
choose the photo you identified?  
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